The proximate and the ultimate: past, present, and future

Abstract

The distinctions inherent in the proximate–ultimate dichotomy have a long history. I examined several issues related to this distinction. It is important that distinctions among different problem areas be made so that the type of answer presented in research in animal behavior is appropriate for the type of questions being asked. This may require more than the two-way distinction between the proximate and the ultimate. I suggest that such terms as ‘function’, ‘ultimate’, and ‘ultimate causation’ be re-evaluated. Methodological problems encountered when measuring differential adaptive consequences of alternative behavioral patterns and when using proximate stimulus control to infer adaptive significance require further consideration.

Introduction

All psychologists and other life scientists tread in the footsteps of Aristotle. Following his predecessors, it was he who proposed the first systematic taxonomy of different types of causation. These are generally taught using a statue as a pedagogic device. Aristotle’s material cause is the stuff of which the statue is composed, perhaps marble; the formal cause is the shape into which the material has been molded, perhaps the Venus de Milo; the efficient cause is the agent of the change, the sculptor. Especially interesting is the fourth variety, the final cause, or the purpose of the object. The statue is created to provide a beautiful object that brings pleasure. Why did Aristotle make these distinctions? It was because he believed that various of his predecessors had emphasized one kind of cause at the expense of the others. The early Milesian philosophers focused on material causes; Empedocles stressed efficient causes; Plato focused on formal causes. Aristotle sought a more comprehensive view incorporating all four aspects (Taylor, 1967).

The concept of causation has been a topic of dispute among philosophers ever since. With the development of modern science, the four Aristotelian causes were relegated to courses in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless it is interesting that Aristotle was trying to do exactly what later biologists, such as Ernst Mayr and Niko Tinbergen, later attempted—to make a distinction among different questions and to find a balance in their consideration.

Most problematical of the Aristotelian causes for modern scientists is the concept of final cause. They see no indwelling purpose in the universe in general or in life in particular, although the behavior of individuals may be goal-directed in a certain limited sense. Yet the human mind naturally seems to seek comfort and closure with the idea that the world is purposive. In some respects the concept of the ultimate replaces that of final cause and provides the closure sought. The modern biologist’s adaptive significance has replaced the philosopher’s teleology; it is fundamentally different and should not be confused with it—but it serves a similar function in our view of nature.

The topic of the proximate and the ultimate can be viewed as a development of Aristotle’s four causes and has become focal in the field of Animal Behavior Studies. I shall consider several aspects of the topic: the early history and development of the concept and related concepts, recent views, and, finally, some methodological concerns.