Committees and rent-seeking effort
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Quantity-cum-quality contests
2019, European Journal of Political EconomyCitation Excerpt :Finally, Epstein and Hefeker (2003), Rai and Sarin (2009) and Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010, 2012) have studied contests with multiple dimensions of efforts, none of which is necessarily destructive (sabotage). Contests in which the prize is awarded by a committee and so the players direct their efforts toward multiple committee members also fall in this class of contests (see, for example, Amegashie, 2002; Congleton, 1984). There is also a literature on selection or entry of participants into contests that is related to the present paper.
Net neutrality and innovation at the core and at the edge
2016, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationCitation Excerpt :It first increases in xF, reaches a maximum when xG = xF, and then it decreases. Notice that this is a feature shared by all models of imperfectly discriminating contests à la Tullock (see, e.g., Congleton, 1984; Dixit, 1987). In that literature, the “effort” of a player first increases when outside competition is weak and then decreases continuously.
The effects of party campaign spending under proportional representation: Evidence from Germany
2012, European Journal of Political EconomyMonitoring technical managers: Theory, evidence, and prescriptions
2012, Journal of High Technology Management ResearchCitation Excerpt :By hearing multiple points of view, the executive may be able to separate motivations and gain knowledge useful in the decision. And a committee reduces the possibility of collusion among (technical) managers (Congleton, 1984). Finally, socialization is a possibility, here defined as training that inculcates values of the organization (e.g., Ouchi, 1980).
Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
2011, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsThe public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors
2010, Journal of Public EconomicsCitation Excerpt :Such frictions are due to the existing transaction costs of side-contracting, including possibly the cost that firms may bear in organizing corruptible activities. The existence of such transaction costs is a standard assumption in the public choice and regulation literatures (see Congleton, 1984, and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2003, among others). Importantly, the function k(·) is positive, increasing, and strictly concave.
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The author would like to thank Fred Menz, Paul Downing and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.