Committees and rent-seeking effort

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Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent-seeking effort. Within the environments explored, relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators. To the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent-seeking, the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent-seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees.

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The author would like to thank Fred Menz, Paul Downing and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

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