Note, comment, and letter to the editorCorrelated equilibria and evolutionary stability
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The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
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My thanks are due to Jonathan Cave for many stimulating conversations, to an associate editor, and to an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved the exposition.
Copyright © 1991 Published by Elsevier Inc.