Elsevier

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume 55, Issue 2, December 1991, Pages 428-434
Journal of Economic Theory

Note, comment, and letter to the editor
Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90048-9Get rights and content

Abstract

There is a considerable body of work which shows that the set of outcomes from rational play in a game is identical to a set of correlated equilibria. We show that the set of outcomes from evolutionary stable behavior, where nature serves as a correlating device, is identical to the set of strict correlated equilibria. This extends the result that ESS corresponds to strict Nash equilibrium, provided by R. Selten (Math. Social Sci. 5, 1983, 269–363), by allowing for correlation.

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My thanks are due to Jonathan Cave for many stimulating conversations, to an associate editor, and to an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved the exposition.

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