Elsevier

Cognitive Psychology

Volume 3, Issue 3, July 1972, Pages 430-454
Cognitive Psychology

Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness

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Abstract

This paper explores a heuristic—representativeness—according to which the subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated. This heuristic is explicated in a series of empirical examples demonstrating predictable and systematic errors in the evaluation of uncertain events. In particular, since sample size does not represent any property of the population, it is expected to have little or no effect on judgment of likelihood. This prediction is confirmed in studies showing that subjective sampling distributions and posterior probability judgments are determined by the most salient characteristic of the sample (e.g., proportion, mean) without regard to the size of the sample. The present heuristic approach is contrasted with the normative (Bayesian) approach to the analysis of the judgment of uncertainty.

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    This study was supported by a grant from the Research and Development Authority of the Hebrew University, by NSF Grant GM 6782 to the second author, and by the U. S. Public Health Service through Grant MH-04439 to Oregon Research Institute.

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