Abstract
Why do warring parties enter negotiations during an ongoing war? This article builds on previous scholarship that has argued that the onset of wartime negotiations does not always exclusively represent a genuine will by belligerents to arrive at a settlement, but that alternative motives may also drive their decision to negotiate. The article identifies and distinguishes four alternative political and military motives and argues that belligerents may come to the table at times when they need to establish their status vis-à-vis an opponent, establish or safeguard domestic as well as external support, or when they need to buy time if they can no longer uphold levels of violence on the battlefield. This article examines the utility of this argument for the early round of talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations, which took place during Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine in February and March 2022. Triangulating information from semi-structured interviews with country experts, case studies, news sources, and statements by the warring parties, the analysis particularly underlines findings put forward by past research on the costs of war as a determinant for entering talks and shows that entering talks helped Ukraine’s government establish agency and status as a bargaining partner while also serving its broader strategic communication with external actors. There is no evidence, however, supporting proposed mechanisms on belligerents coming to the table in order to establish domestic political support or buy time on the battlefield for the case under analysis.
Zusammenfassung
Warum nehmen Kriegsparteien während eines laufenden Krieges Verhandlungen auf? Dieser Artikel baut auf bisheriger Forschung auf, die argumentiert, dass der Beginn von Gesprächen nicht immer ausschließlich ein ernsthaftes Interesse von Kriegsparteien an einer Verhandlungslösung signalisiert, sondern dass auch alternative Motive ihre Verhandlungsentscheidung beeinflussen können. Der Artikel identifiziert und unterscheidet 4 alternative politische und militärische Motive und argumentiert, dass Kriegsparteien auch dann an den Verhandlungstisch kommen, wenn sie ihren Status gegenüber einem Gegner etablieren, interne oder externe Unterstützung sichern sowie Zeit gewinnen müssen, falls sie das Maß der Gewalt nicht mehr aufrechterhalten können. Der Artikel untersucht die Erklärungskraft dieses Arguments für die frühe Verhandlungsrunde zwischen russischen und ukrainischen Delegationen, die während Russlands anhaltendem Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine im Februar und März 2022 stattfand. Die Analyse baut auf semistrukturierten Interviews mit Länderexpert*innen, Fallstudien, Nachrichtenquellen und Äußerungen der Kriegsparteien auf. Sie unterstreicht Ergebnisse der bisherigen Forschung zu Kriegskosten als einer Determinante für die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen, demonstriert, dass die Verhandlungen der ukrainischen Regierung halfen, ihren Status als Verhandlungsführerin zu etablieren, und zeigt, dass die Gespräche auch der breiteren strategischen Kommunikation der ukrainischen Regierung mit externen Akteuren dienten. Weitere vorgeschlagene Mechanismen, dass Kriegsparteien verhandeln, um innenpolitische Unterstützung zu erlangen oder um Zeit auf dem Schlachtfeld zu gewinnen, konnten für den vorliegenden Fall nicht bestätigt werden.
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Notes
Labelling as “devious” every objective of a warring party that is different from arriving at a deal—even if this deal entails costly, painful, or unpopular concessions—makes a value judgement. This article uses the term “alternative” objective to express that arriving at a deal is not the only legitimate reason for coming to the table.
Even though the Russia–Ukraine talks have colloquially been called “peace talks,” this article refrains from using this label, showing instead that the meetings were not necessarily conducted in order to arrive at a peaceful deal.
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I thank my colleagues Alisa Rieth and Elisabeth Winter as well as three anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on different versions of the manuscript.
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Strasheim, J. Why do warring parties enter negotiations during an ongoing war? Insights from the 2022 Ukraine–Russia talks. Z Friedens und Konflforsch 12, 115–134 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42597-023-00102-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42597-023-00102-1