Abstract
Despite many twenty-first century efforts to minimize corporate corruption, initiatives taken by local governments, global organizations, academic institutions, or the corporate world itself, it is clear that corporate corruption is perpetuating itself. In this paper, I apply the Aristotelian concept of “akrasia” (moral weakness) in order to provide an interpretation of corporate corruption as an act of moral failure and misapprehension of the right thing to do, if not an act of wickedness, which originates with lack of integrity. By utilizing Aristotle’s philosophical framework, I attempt a redefinition of integrity not only with reference to the Aristotelian moral and intellectual virtues but also with a combination of theoretical and practical wisdom, that is, a connection between theory and action, definitive of moral consistency. Through this interpretation, I also wish to further emphasize the need for a philosophical background of contemporary managerial practices for a more effective countering of corporate corruption.
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Notes
A reductive account of virtue reduces it to its behavioural neglecting its inner dimension, while the non-reductive account states that for an action to derive from a state of character, it should reflect the inner qualities of the agent (Alzola 2015: 301). For Alzola, social scientists should be more concerned with virtue as “virtuousness” rather than with objective or authentic virtue; they should establish the link between character and virtuous behavior (307).
I am borrowing the phrase by Pearce (2013: 32–34) who examines the business life as one in the domain of action (“praxis”) to be distinctive from the life of contemplation (“theoria”).
As connected with “phronesis”, as we shall see below.
See below on the Aristotelian “spoudaios”, as the person who demonstrates an advanced moral caliber.
Eudemian Ethics H15, 1248 b 34 – 37. In general, Aristotle presents the “kalokagathos” man as a person who makes good choices for the sake of what they represent, since they originate from virtue itself.
See DeLeon 2015 and Heywood 1997, who mostly focus on political corruption in terms of the dealings between public office and the private sector. Other studies have also indicated the connection that exists between corporate corruption and culture, especially in the domain of international business. In particular, Campbell and Goritz 2014, used a qualitative approach to study similarities of organization culture across different corrupt organizations. They found that corrupt organizations perceive themselves in a war that accepts the view “the end justifies the means”, as well as that managers and employees differ in their perception of organizational culture.
Hereafter, it will be used in its abbreviated form NE. The translation of the Nicomachean Ethics used is by Irwin (1999).
Mele 1985, 389.
Ibid., 385.
Bobonich and Destree (2007) also indicate that in certain passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that the akratic person acts against his own decision not to eat the sweet and, in other passages, especially in De Anima Γ.11, he presents akrasia as a conflict between two desires. At the same time, in other passages, Aristotle appears to defend a rather intellectualist idea of akrasia, i.e. a sort of a lack of knowledge and not a lack or weakness of will (139). Kenny (1979) and Irwin (1992) have allowed for a conception of will in Aristotle.
The Aristotelian term “eupraxia” can be interpreted as “acting well”. As Aristotle states: “Acting well or badly requires thought and character” (Z2, 1139 a 34 – 35); he also refers to this term as “telos” (goal, purpose): “An unqualified goal is what we achieve in action, since acting well is the goal, and desire is for the goal” (1139 b 3 – 4). We notice that Aristotle identifies “eupraxia” with the goal of action, that is, acting well is what we should aim at when proceeding with a moral choice.
“Ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται πράξις”.
“Κατά τον ὀρθόν λόγον”.
“Μετά τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου”.
Cf. Brickhouse 2003, 17.
Cf. Cai and He 2014, who use a quantitative analysis to argue that corporate environmental responsibility is an intangible asset, since it creates firm value.
Cf. Discussion of corporate personhood by Eabrasu (2018: 28–47).
NE Z11, 1143 a 8 – 10: “φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστὶ”.
On the basis of Metaphysics, Λ10, 1075 b 20–22: “τὰ τιμιώτατα τῆ φύσει”.
NE Z7, 1141 a 17 – 18: “Περί τὰς ἀρχάς ἀληθεύειν”.
Cf. below on the connection between the exercise of theoretical and practical wisdom.
Kenny 1992, 23–42.
Cf. NE, A7, 1098 a 18–20.
Cf. Tsoukas and Cummings (1997), who emphasize the significance of the Aristotelian virtue ethics approach for the organization studies.
Schneider et al. (2015) advocate that a socially responsible behavior “is founded in a moral character which is intrinsically motivated rather than promises of rewards or threats of sanction” (p.15). Such a behavior “becomes routinized, integrated in strategy and embedded in organizational culture”.
Cf. Aspasius 1889, Classicorum Aristotelicum Graecorum XIX.1: 56.18-23. In this passage, Aspasius, an Aristotelian commentator, emphasizes the significance of practical wisdom, since its assistance is required in order for the agent to define exactly what must be done or how a particular conduct should be exhibited.
Cf. Koutras 1987, 70–73.
In contemporary scholarship, Williams (1981: 49) argues that “integrity is not a virtue: it is not related to motivation as the virtues are. It’s not a disposition which yields motivation, as generosity or benevolence do”. He believes that those who hold it as virtue should explain why it is not associated with characteristic thoughts or motivations. This view grasps integrity as a kind of moral identity, acting in accordance with one’s beliefs. It is a sort of internal consistency. In a way, he means that, for Aristotle, a person acts in integrity if he or she remains true to himself or herself in action, which is closer to the identity sense of integrity. In a different line of thought, Scherkoske (2012) suggests that integrity is an epistemic virtue: it neither disposes agents to particular motivations nor characteristic thoughts (“In the same way that epistemic virtues, such as accuracy, or open-mindedness, do not specify any particular content, integrity does not supply a characteristic thought either”). The main point is that by assuming the virtue of integrity one is not supposed to be motivated to discover the truth or provide any justification about it. This view grasps integrity as the moral capacity of standing for something. In another study, Cox et al. (1999) argue that integrity is a virtue but it functions as a rather complex term: a person may exhibit integrity by deciding to resign from his job in the event of a conflict of values with his employer, or somebody else may choose to stay as a way of exhibiting moral disagreement; in fact, resigning for him would be lack of integrity.
Roca examines the significance of teaching practical wisdom in business schools (Roca 2008).
Cf. note 26.
Cf. Hartmann (1962: 439–448), who considers the Aristotelian virtues as values as opposed to wickedness which is a vice.
In the Eudemian Ethics, B5, 1222 b 20 -31 and B9, 1227 b 28 – 30, Aristotle explicitly states the analogy between ethics and the theoretical sciences and he also indicates that the theoretical life has moral relevance, since it contributes to “eudaimonia”.
In particular, Aristotle states that it would be better for the wise person to collaborate with others, but he is still the most self-sufficient of all men (“βέλτιον δ’ ἲσως συνεργούς ἒχων, ἀλλ’ ὃμως αὐταρκέστατος”).
NE, Z7, 1141 a 17 – 18.
On the basis of NE A13, 1102 a 5 – 6.
Cf. NE A12, 1102 a 2 – 4.
NE A7, 1097 b 20 (“τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος”).
Cf. Kenny (1992: 23–42), supports that “eudaimonia” cannot be taken to be a totality of goods, because it would not be able to serve as an intrinsic value.
Cf. Heinaman (1988: 31–49) who take “eudaimonia” to be the supreme good which lacks nothing, hence attaching to it a value per se.
Cf. NE Z7 1141 b 3 – 8. In this passage, Aristotle indicates that people like Anaxagoras and Thales are considered to be wise, but they may not be practically wise, such as Pericles. At the same time, however, in Z5, 1140 b 7–10, Aristotle indicates that Pericles would be considered as practically wise but not necessarily wise, since he is associated with various ills of the Peloponnesian war.
NE Z13, 1145 a 6 – 9.
NE K8, 1178 b 33 – 1179 a 16
Cf. 1178 b 5 – 6.
Cf. NE, I7, 1177 a 27 – b1.
EN, Γ4, 1113 a 24–34. Cf. A8, 1099 a 24.
Ibid., Γ4, 1113 a 33–34.
Ibid., K7, 1177 a 27 – 1177 b 1.
Cf. E2, 1130 b 30 – 33.
Ibid., E3, 1131 a 15 – 1131 b 12.
Due process in employment decisions means that employers should go through a fair procedure prior to any such decision and in the event of dismissal provide a justification. Concerning the right to due process, see Boatright (2014: 181–185).
Whistle-blowing is defined as “the voluntary release of nonpublic information, as a moral protest, by a member or former member of an organization outside of normal channels of communication to an appropriate audience about illegal/or immoral conduct in the organization that is opposed in some significant way to the public interest” (Boatright: 82).
Cf. NE E1, 1130 b 4 – 5.
Cf. cases of bribery in the international context, the use of child labour, or the various forms of discrimination at workplace that show a sharp contrast between corporate conduct in host country as opposed to that of the home country.
A7, 1108 a 20.
Cf. Dierksmeier and Pirson (2009: 428) who speak of business enterprises being “democratic, inclusive, open, transparent, accountable, effective, efficient, cooperative and holistic”.
Similarly, Weaver (2006) examines other factors, such organizational, extra-organizational and macro-cultural ones, which can foster or inhibit moral agency.
Rego et al (2011).
Ibid.: In this empirical study, the authors propose a five-factor model: 1/. Organizational optimism with a sense of a high purpose; 2/. Organizational forgiveness; 3/. Organizational trust; 3/. Organizational compassion; and 5/. Organizational integrity meaning that honesty, trustworthiness, and honour pervade the organization.
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Patsioti-Tsacpounidis, I. Aristotle’s akrasia and Corporate Corruption: Redefining Integrity in Business. Philosophy of Management 22, 421–447 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40926-023-00239-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40926-023-00239-2