Abstract
The potential benefits of an alternative to physical gestation are numerous. These include providing reproductive options for prospective parents who are unable to establish or maintain a physiological pregnancy, and saving the lives of some infants born prematurely. Ectogenesis could also promote sexual equality in reproduction, and represents a necessary option for women experiencing an unwanted pregnancy who are morally opposed to abortion. Despite these broad, and in some cases unique benefits, one major ethical concern is the potential impact of this emerging technology on abortion rights. This article will argue that ectogenesis poses a challenge to many common arguments in favour of a pregnant woman’s right to choose, but only insomuch as it highlights that their underlying justifications for abortion are based on flawed conceptions of what the foetus and pregnancy actually are. By interrogating the various interests and relationships involved in a pregnancy, this article will demonstrate that the emergence of artificial gestation need not impact existing abortion rights or legislation, nor definitions of independent viability or moral status.
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Kendal, E. Pregnant people, inseminators and tissues of human origin: how ectogenesis challenges the concept of abortion. Monash Bioeth. Rev. 38, 197–204 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-020-00122-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-020-00122-0