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The EU, the Revision of the World Anti-Doping Code and the Presumption of Innocence

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Abstract

On account of its strict liability principle as well as other rules, the World Anti-Doping Code effectively does not recognise the presumption of innocence (PoI) (in dubio pro reo). This has implications in a number of ways in which the current WADA-led anti-doping system works, which are discussed in this paper, including with reference to the CAS Pechstein case and the recent OLG München ruling in Pechstein. Against this backdrop, the paper revisits the four EU contributions to the revision Code (2011–13) with regards to comments and proposals aimed at ensuring recognition of the PoI. The legal scope and the political scope for these EU contributions are explained by drawing on wider legal, scientific and political debates on anti-doping.

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Notes

  1. WADA (2015b).

  2. See Reszel (2012).

  3. See Anderson (2010), pp. 123-126.

  4. Duval and Van Rompuy (2015) note that the court: "based itself on German antitrust law to challenge the validity of arbitration clauses in favour of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which are commonly used across the sporting world. Interestingly, competition law was used to indirectly secure a fundamental right enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights: the right to a fair trial."

  5. OLG München · Teil-Urteil vom 15. Januar 2015· Az. U 1110/14 Kart. http://openjur.de/u/756385.html.

  6. Owen (2015).

  7. Pechstein, OLG München, paragraph 116, section eee): "[…] dass die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit einen der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit grundsätzlich gleichwertigen Rechtsschutz bietet […]".

  8. For a comprehensive overview of the revision process, including the drafts submitted by WADA at each stage of the process, with synoptic, four-column tables, see Rigozzi et al. (2013).

  9. European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2011-2014 (OJ C 162, 1.6.2011, 1-5).

  10. First EU contribution (2012): Brussels, 23 February 2012, Council doc. 6846/12, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st06/st06846.en12.pdf.

  11. Second EU contribution (2012): Brussels, 26 September 2012, Council doc. 14204/12, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14204.en12.pdf.

  12. Third EU contribution (2013): Brussels, 15 February 2013, Council doc. 6427/13, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06427.en13.pdf.

  13. Fourth EU contribution (2013): Brussels, 12 July 2013, Council doc. 12159/13, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st12/st12159.en13.pdf.

  14. For details and a discussion, see Kornbeck (2015b).

  15. WADA (2015b), p. 130.

  16. Blackstone (1765-1769), Book Four, Chapter the Twenty Seventh, p. 352.

  17. For a discussion, see also European Commission (2013), pp. 3-4.

  18. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50.

  19. For an overview of the legislation and case law see Kranenborg (2014).

  20. The PoI "constitutes a basic principle under the rule of law common to the legal traditions of the Member States. It is applicable to proceedings leading to the imposition of severe sanctions on natural or legal persons, particularly under domestic penal/criminal law. It is intimately linked to the apportioning of the burden of proof and the requisite standard of proof that the prosecuting administration or judge needs to meet in order to show that an offense has been committed which may give rise to a sanction." Nehl (2014), p. 1278.

  21. Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 8 July 1999. Hüls AG v Commission of the European Communities. Case C-199/92 P. ECR p.I-4287. ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, at 149-150.

  22. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 13 July 1989. Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am Main - Germany. Case 5/88. ECR 1989 -02609. ECLI:EU:C:1989:321, at 19.

  23. Case 53466/07 Konstas v Greece. See Nehl (2014), p. 1278.

  24. Cf. the formulation "particularly under domestic penal/criminal law" (emphasis added). Nehl (2014), p. 1278.

  25. The phrase "applicable to proceedings leading to the imposition of severe sanctions on natural or legal persons," used by Nehl (2014), p. 1278, does not conceptually limit the material scope of the principle ipso facto to criminal courts or the judiciary. It may be a useful guiding principle for disciplinary panels in various areas, ADOs, etc., even if they are not bound to respect it.

  26. Joined opinion of Mr Advocate General Vesterdorf delivered on 10 July 1991. Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-1/89. Petrofina SA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-2/89. Atochem SA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-3/89. BASF AG v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-4/89. Enichem Anic SpA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-6/89. SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-7/89. DSM NV v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-8/89. Hüls AG v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-9/89. Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-10/89. Shell International Chemical Company Ltd v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-11/89. Solvay & Cie SA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-12/89. Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-13/89. Montedipe SpA v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-14/89. Chemie Linz AG v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-15/89. Competition - Concepts of agreement and concerted practice - Collective responsibility. ECR 1991 II-00867. ECLI:EU:T:1991:38, see p. II-943 (no paragraph numbering).

  27. Nehl (2014), p. 1278.

  28. AG Vesterdorf in Rhône-Poulenc, p. II-943

  29. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 18 July 2006. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. Case C-519/04 P. ECR 2006 I-06991. ECLI:EU:C:2006:492.

  30. Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 June 2013. Guillermo Cañas v European Commission. Case C-269/12 P. ECR 2013-00000. ECLI:EU:C:2013:415.

  31. Meca-Medina, at 26.

  32. Nehl (2014), p. 1278.

  33. Meca-Medina, at 54.

  34. Meca-Medina, at 55.

  35. Steinacker (2013).

  36. Backhouse et al. (2014); Houlihan and Garcia (2012); Parzeller et al. (2009). TMC Asser Instituut (2010).

  37. Kornbeck (2015a). Anderson (2010), p. 53.

  38. Blackstone (1765-1769), Book Four, Chapter the Twenty Seventh, p. 352.

  39. See also Appendix 1 (Definitions), WADA (2015b), p. 141.

  40. Pound, Clarke (2011), p. 145.

  41. McLaren (2011), p. 56.

  42. McLaren (2011), p. 56, note 149. McLaren lists a number of CAS awards supporting this view, including CAS 99/A/239: UCI v Moller, CAS 94/129 USA Shooting & Quigley v International Shooting Union and CAS 95/122 National Wheelchair Basketball Association v International Paralympic Committee, see McLaren (2011), p. 56, note 149.

  43. Erbsen (2006, p. 446), quoted in.

  44. Nafziger (2006, p. 415), quoted in McLaren (2011), p. 56, note 149.

  45. See e.g. McLaren (2011), pp. 50-51: "an athlete with allergies who fails to pass a doping test after a team doctor has prescribed a medication containing a banned substance. […] placing this athlete in the same category as // and athlete who knowingly ingested performance-enhancing substances. […] it is better tpo set a stricter standard than a more lenient one."

  46. See Waddington (2010).

  47. CAS 94/129 USA Shooting & Quigley v UIT.

  48. Quigley, at 14: "It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an individual case, such as that of Q., where the athlete may have taken medication as the result of mislabelling or faulty advice for which he or she is not responsible – particularly in the circumstances of sudden illness in a foreign country. But it is also in some sense “unfair” for an athlete to get food poisoning on the eve of an important competition. Yet in neither case will the rules of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness. Just as the competition will not be postponed to await the athlete's recovery, so the prohibition of banned substances will not be lifted in recognition of its accidental absorption. The vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may create many types of unfairness, whether by accident or the negligence of unaccountable persons, which the law cannot repair."

  49. Quigley, at 15: Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable policy objective not to repair an accidental unfairness to an individual by creating an intentional unfairness to the whole body of other competitors. This is what would happen if banned performance-enhancing substances were tolerated when absorbed inadvertently. Moreover, it is likely that even intentional abuse would in many cases escape sanction for lack of proof of guilty intent. And it is certain that a requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may well cripple federations – particularly those run on modest budgets – in their fight against doping.

  50. Quigley, at 16: "For these reasons, the Panel would as a matter of principle be prepared to apply a strict liability test. The Panel is aware that arguments have been raised that a strict liability standard is unreasonable, and indeed contrary to natural justice, because it does not permit the accused to establish moral innocence. It has even been argued that it is an excessive restraint of trade. The Panel is unconvinced by such objections and considers that in principle the high objectives and practical necessities of the fight against doping amply justify the application of a strict liability standard."

  51. McLaren (2011), p. 56.

  52. According to Duval (2015), in "the post-Bosman world, the CAS is omnipresent, but not only because it is cheaper, faster and more knowledgeable as some may, rightly or wrongly, believe. Recourse to arbitration has been a very successful legal strategy to curb access to national courts and to curtail the reach of EU law in the sporting world" (p. 226). "However, the CAS remains to some extent dependent on the goodwill of other national courts to ensure that its awards are duly respected in national proceedings. Indeed, even though CAS awards rarely need to be recognized by a national court to be implemented, the latest string of German cases contesting the validity of CAS awards demonstrates that this possibility can certainly not be discarded" (p. 236). Nevertheless, the fact that SGBs [sports governing bodies] are powerful enough to impose a private system of norms and dispute resolution mechanisms to the sporting world at large does not per se suffice to establish the legitimacy of the lex sportiva. On the contrary, such private lawmakers should be ‘checked and balanced’ by the necessary counter-powers" (p. 255).

  53. McLaren (2011), pp. 55-56.

  54. Pound & Clarke (2011), p. 145.

  55. LG Stuttgart Urteil vom 2.4.2002, 17 O 611/00, http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&nr=1014, at 129: "Would the international federation allow national federations to rule exclusively and definitively on some anti-doping rule violations, then an internationally coherent prosecution of doping would not be possible. There would be a high risk that the national federation, which usually has an interest in the achievement of outstanding performances by its own [scil. prosecuted] athlete in international competitions, would very fast feel convinced of the innocence of the [scil. prosecuted] athlete." [translation: J.K.] ("Würde es der internationale Verband abschließend den nationalen Verbänden überlassen, über einen Teil der Dopingverstöße ausschließlich und abschließend zu entscheiden, wäre eine international einheitliche, konsequente und nachhaltige Dopingverfolgung nicht möglich. Es bestünde die große Gefahr, dass der nationale Verband, der ja in der Regel ein Interesse an Spitzenleistungen seiner Athleten bei internationalen Wettkämpfen hat, sich sehr schnell von der Unschuld des Athleten überzeugen lassen könnte.")

  56. WADA (2015b).

  57. WADA (2015b), p. 141.

  58. WADA (2015b), p. 20.

  59. “"doping in sport" means the administration to sportsmen or sportswomen, or the use by them, of pharmacological classes of doping agents or doping methods; "pharmacological classes of doping agents or doping methods" means, subject to paragraph 2 below, those classes of doping agents or doping methods banned by the relevant international sports organisations and appearing in lists that have been approved by the monitoring group under the terms of Article 11.1.b; "sportsmen and sportswomen" means those persons who participate regularly in organised sports activities.” (Article 2(1): Definition and scope of the Convention). Anti-Doping Convention. Strasbourg, 16.XI.1989. ETS (European Treaty Series) 135. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/135.htm.

  60. O’Leary (2013), p. 200.

  61. Albergotti and Connell (2012).

  62. Kayser (2011b).

  63. Under the current Directive 95/46/EC, Article 15(1) requires MS to “grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.” Under Article 15(2) MS may authorise profiling under certain conditions, contingent upon specific provisions to be laid down in national legislation with appropriate safeguards against abuse. The future General Data Protection Regulation is likely to offer an even higher level of protection to data subjects. For a discussion see Vermeulen (2013).

  64. Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes. OJ C 110, 1.5.2008, pp. 1-15.

  65. “One could discuss whether this type of investigation would qualify as profiling. Profiling would consist of a ‘computer method making use of data mining on a data warehouse, enabling or intended to enable the classification, with some probability — and thus with some margin of error — of an individual in a specific category in order to take individual decisions towards that person” (EDPS Opinion on PNR (2008), paragraph 20). “The EDPS is aware that there are ongoing discussions on the definition of profiling. Whether or not it is officially recognised that the proposal aims at profiling passengers, the main point at stake is not about definitions. It is about the impact on individuals” (ibid;, paragraph 21) [emphasis added: J.K.].

  66. In relation to PNR, the "main part of the processing happens in a grey zone, having material links with the first as well as with the third pillar. As it will be developed in Chapter IV, the quality of actors processing the data is not clear. Airlines are obviously no enforcement authorities, and intermediaries could be actors of the private sector. Even with regard to PIUs [MS' national Passenger Information Units] which would be public authorities, it must be stressed that not every public authority has the quality and the competences to perform law enforcement tasks on a routine basis" (EDPS Opinion on PNR (2008), paragraph 57).

  67. Sottas et al. (2010).

  68. Kayser (2011b), p. 88.

  69. Kornbeck (2015a). See also Cox (2013), p. 188: “The final reason why it is arguably not appropriate to regard doping rules as just another term of a contract is considerably more nebulous, but, it is submitted, no less valid. The financial and popular support for anti-doping policy is based on a clear and unshakeable popular consensus that it is necessary on a ‘fair play’ basis—that is, that doping is bad and hence the fight against doping is, by definition, good. No doubt it can be argued that some of this public support is media driven and its unshakeability is grounded in part on the refusal of anti-doping authorities to engage meaningfully with their critics but again this is immaterial. The point is that such support exists and is vital to underpin the ongoing existence and funding of anti-doping units. But if this is the case then it is obviously necessary that the public continues to believe that anti-doping policy is necessary in the furtherance of a moral ideal connected with broad normative ideals of fair play and justice and hence it would be disastrous if that policy started to be regarded as being itself unjust or immoral. It can be argued, however, that this probably would happen if governing bodies ever imposed an anti-doping policy without any consideration for the interests of athletes accused of doping and on the basis simply that they were entitled to do so as a matter of contract. In other words, quite apart from issues connected with the rights of athletes it actually makes good policy sense in terms of the long-term future of anti-doping policy to ensure that the rules are treated with the seriousness that they deserve, and the rights of athletes are protected as such.”

  70. Neuberger and Simon (2014), p. 277.

  71. Kayser (2011a).

  72. See Pound, Clarke (2011), p. 146: Hearing panels have specifically declined to apply the criminal onus in doping matters […] but the reasoning they have demonstrated in decisions suggests that comfortable satisfaction is likely considerably closer to the higher standard than to the lower." In line with their style of presentation overall (the entire chapter has not a single footnote), Pound and Clarke do not refer to any CAS awards supporting their claim.

  73. Morgan (2006).

  74. CAS 2009/A/1912-1913 Pechstein vs International Skating Union.

  75. O’Leary (2013), p. 195.

  76. O’Leary (2013), p. 203.

  77. "4.3 Criteria for Including Substances and Methods on the Prohibited List WADA shall consider the following criteria in deciding whether to include a substance or method on the Prohibited List: 4.3.1 A substance or method shall be considered for inclusion on the Prohibited List if WADA, in its sole discretion, determines that the substance or method meets any two of the following three criteria: 4.3.1.1 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the substance or method, alone or in combination with other substances or methods, has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; 4.3.1.2 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the Use of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health risk to the Athlete; 4.3.1.3 WADA’s determination that the Use of the substance or method violates the spirit of sport described in the introduction to the Code. 4.3.2 A substance or method shall also be included on the Prohibited List if WADA determines there is medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience that the substance or method has the potential to mask the Use of other Prohibited Substances or Prohibited Methods. 4.3.3 WADA’s determination of the Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods that will be included on the Prohibited List, the classification of substances into categories on the Prohibited List, and the classification of a substance as prohibited at all times or In-Competition only, is final and shall not be subject to challenge by an Athlete or other Person based on an argument that the substance or method was not a masking agent or did not have the potential to enhance performance, represent a health risk or violate the spirit of sport." [emphasis added: J.K.]

  78. For a discussion from the perspective of sports philosophy, see Kornbeck (2013b).

  79. See eg. Pound, Clarke (2011), p. 133.

  80. Gleaves and Llewellyn (2014).

  81. For an alternative perspective on the protection of athletes' health see Savulescu et al. (2004).

  82. Belet (2013). Belet (2014).

  83. See Kornbeck (forthcoming).

  84. Berry (2008).

  85. Ljungquist et al. (2008).

  86. Nature (2008).

  87. Sottas et al. (2010).

  88. Fischer and Berry (2014).

  89. Smith (2014).

  90. See e.g. Rouvroy (2012); Stiegler (2014).

  91. See Smith (2014), p. 66: "Contrary to the received view, our central concern about big data is not about the data. It is about big data’s power to enable a dangerous new philosophy of preemption. […], we focus on the social impact of what we call “preemptive predictions.” Our concern is that big data’s promise of increased efficiency, reliability, utility, profit, and pleasure might be seen as the justification for a fundamental jurisprudential shift from our current ex post facto system of penalties and punishments to ex ante preventative measures that are increasingly being adopted across various sectors of society. It is our contention that big data’s predictive benefits belie an important insight historically represented in the presumption of innocence and associated privacy and due process values—namely, that there is wisdom in setting boundaries around the kinds of assumptions that can and cannot be made about people."

  92. Stiegler (2014, p. 1 ) refers to testimony given during a a US Senate hearing by Alan Greenspan on 23 October 2008, arguing "that the great economic disaster, for which each of us knows the role of subprime mortgages and credit default swaps, had indeed been caused by economic design flaws related to the automation of calculation and the absence of any critical apparatus, that is, any theoretical reflection" [emphasis added: J.K.].

  93. See Korff, Georges (2015), pp. 24-25: "This phrase is used to refer to the mathematically unavoidable fact that if you are looking for very rare instances in a very large data set, then no matter how well you design your algorithm, you will always end up with either excessive numbers of “false positives” (cases or individuals that are wrongly identified as belonging to the rare class), or “false negatives” (cases or individuals that do fall within in the rare, looked-for category, but that are not identified as such), or both. It is important to stress the mathematical inevitability of this: you // cannot improve the data set, or the algorithm, to avoid these debilitating results. You cannot avoid the base rate fallacy. Statisticians know this. Epidemiologists know this: they know that it is effective to screen all women over the age of 50 for breast cancer, because in that group there is a sufficiently high incidence of that affliction. But it is not effective to screen all women over the age of, say, 15, because that would throw up enormous numbers of 'false positives', which would deplete hospital resources. Exactly the same applies in anti-terrorist screening based on profiles: there are (thank God) simply not enough terrorists in the general population, or even in smaller populations (say, all Muslims in the UK of Pakistani or Saudi origin), to make the exercise worthwhile. The police and the security services would be chasing thousands of entirely false leads, while a significant number of real terrorists would still slip through the net."

  94. Korff, Georges (2015), p. 24.

  95. WADA (2015a).

  96. WADA (2014).

  97. See WADA (2014, p. 4): "In the absence of a positive analytical test(Adverse Analytical Finding, or AAF), a Passport may still be used to pursueanADRVin accordance with World Anti-Doping Code(Code) Article 2.2."

  98. See the contributions in Hildebrandt and Vries (2013).

  99. See European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS): Opinion 4/2015. Towards a new digital ethics: Data, dignity and technology, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-09-11_Data_Ethics_EN.pdf: "Technology should not dictate values and rights, but neither should their relationship be reduced to a false dichotomy. […] Business models are exploiting new capabilities for the massive collection, instantaneous transmission, combination and reuse of personal information for unforeseen purposes, and justified by long and impenetrable privacy policies." (p. 4) "Human innovation has always been the product of activities by specific social groups and specific contexts, usually reflecting the societal norms of the time38. However technological design decisions should not dictate our societal interactions and the structure of our communities, but rather should support our values and fundamental rights." (p. 10).

  100. OLG München · Teil-Urteil vom 15. Januar 2015· Az. U 1110/14 Kart. http://openjur.de/u/756385.html

  101. CAS 2009/A/1912-1913.

  102. McArdle, D. (2011), p. 215.

  103. 30.01.2015. Doping. Olympischer Sportbund hält Pechstein für unschuldig. Experten-Kommission erklärt Sperre für falsch–Präsident Hörmann bittet um Entschuldigung. http://www.nwzonline.de/sport/olympischer-sportbund-haelt-pechstein-fuer-unschuldig_a_23,0,1136674620.html - Traduction: J.K.

  104. Hecker and Reinsch (2013).

  105. Tagesspiegel (2013) Hilfe für Claudia Pechstein: Polizei-Gewerkschaft stellt Strafantrag gegen Eislauf-Verband, Tagesspiegel, 13.11.2013 17:20 Uhr, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/sport/hilfe-fuer-claudia-pechstein-polizei-gewerkschaft-stellt-strafantrag-gegen-eislauf-verband/9071288.html.

  106. Pechstein, OLG München, paragraph 31 (defining the amount of the claim). This aspect of the ruling has been emphasised in numerous press reports, e.g. Schadensersatzprozess Claudia Pechstein: Oberlandesgericht München nimmt Klage an. dpa, 15.01.2015 09:32 Uhr. http://www.abendzeitung-muenchen.de/inhalt.schadensersatzprozess-claudia-pechstein-oberlandesgericht-muenchen-nimmt-klage-an.3f18d519-51d7-4362-8858-cfe69f9881c6.html. See also: Klage wegen Schadensersatz: Pechstein erringt wichtigen Etappensieg vor GerichtDer Spiegel, Donnerstag, 15.01.2015 – 09:43 Uhr, http://www.spiegel.de/sport/wintersport/claudia-pechstein-erringt-gegenisu-etappensieg-vor-oberlandesgericht-a-1012970.html.

  107. McArdle (2011). McArdle (2013). Neuberger and Simon (2014).

  108. Statement by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on the decision made by the Oberlandesgericht München in the case between Claudia Pechstein and the International Skating Union (ISU). Lausanne, 27 mars 2015. http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_statement_ENGLISH.pdf.

  109. LG München I, 27.06.2001 - 7 HKO 16591/94.

  110. Heermann (2015).

  111. Hartley (2013), p. 10.

  112. Houlihan (2002), p. 190.

  113. Cox (2013), p. 189.

  114. CAS 2001/A/343 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / H., award of 28 January 2002.

  115. Vest Christiansen (2006), p. 168.

  116. Judith Vidall-Hall, Robert Hahn and Marc Bradshaw v Google Inc. [2015] EWCA Civ 311. Judgment of 27 March 2015. Case No: A2/2014/0403. https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/google-v-vidal-hall-judgment.pdf.

  117. Vidall-Hall, at 3.

  118. Vidall-Hall, at 1.

  119. Cf. MacGregor et al. (2013).

  120. For a discussion see Aalto et al. (2014).

  121. Vidall-Hall, at 101.

  122. Vidall-Hall, at 98.

  123. First EU contribution (2012): Brussels, 23 February 2012, Council doc. 6846/12, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st06/st06846.en12.pdf.

  124. Second EU contribution (2012): Brussels, 26 September 2012, Council doc. 14204/12, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14204.en12.pdf.

  125. Third EU contribution (2013): Brussels, 15 February 2013, Council doc. 6427/13, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06427.en13.pdf.

  126. Fourth EU contribution (2013): Brussels, 12 July 2013, Council doc. 12159/13, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st12/st12159.en13.pdf.

  127. Kornbeck (2015b).

  128. In 2015: Prohibited List (List), Testing and Investigations (ISTI), Laboratories (ISL), Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) (ISTUE) and Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (ISPPPI). See: https://www.wada-ama.org/en/what-we-do/international-standards.

  129. Cf. Geeraert et al. (2014).

  130. Hon et al. (2015); Momaya et al. (2015).

  131. Kornbeck (2015a).

  132. Currently found in WADA (2015b), p. 17. For a comparison of the four proposals (including the one adopted) see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), p. 1 of the annex.

  133. Foster (2012), p. 247.

  134. Cf. redline version comparing Code 2015 with Code 2009: https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-redline-2015-wadc-to-2009-wadc-en.pdf.

  135. Text marked in strike-through was deleted as part of the Code revision, while underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  136. Inspiration can be found in Anderson (2010) but also in North American rules as explained by Reszel (2012).

  137. European Commission (2011), p. 4.

  138. Belet (2013). Belet (2014).

  139. For a comparison see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), p. 5 of the annex.

  140. Underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  141. Opinion 3/2008 of the Article 29 Working Party on the World Anti-Doping Code draft International Standard for the Protection of Privacy. WP 156. (01.08.2008). http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp156_en.pdf.

  142. Second opinion 4/2009 on the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information, on related provisions of the WADA Code and on other privacy issues in the context of the fight against doping in sport by WADA and (national) anti-doping organizations. WP 162 (06.04.2009). http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp162_en.pdf.

  143. See Waddington (2010).

  144. WADA Working Group on Lack of Effectiveness of Testing Programs (2013).

  145. Palmer et al. (2011).

  146. Simon (2013).

  147. Pitsch (2009).

  148. Korff and Georges (2015), p. 24. For a similar argument regarding the predictve use of big data see Kerr and Earle (2013).

  149. Although there is no formal rule that athletes can invoke for B samples to be analysed by another accredited laboratory than the one having analysed the A sample, this route remains open in principle. For a more detailed discussion, see section 4.6 (infra).

  150. For a comparison see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), pp. 20-21 of the annex.

  151. Text marked in strike-through was deleted as part of the Code revision, while underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  152. For a comparison see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), p. 31 of the annex.

  153. Lambertz and Longrée (2012).

  154. C2, p. 11.

  155. Current 2015 text: "If the review of an Adverse Analytical Finding under Article 7.2 does not reveal an applicable TUE or entitlement to a TUE as provided in the International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions, or departure that caused the Adverse Analytical Finding, the Anti-Doping Organization shall promptly notify the Athlete, in the manner set out in Articles 14.1.1 and 14.1.3 and its own rules, of: (a) the Adverse Analytical Finding; (b) the anti-doping rule violated; and (c) the Athlete’s right to promptly request the analysis of the B Sample or, failing such request, that the B Sample analysis may be deemed waived; (d) the scheduled date, time and place for the B Sample analysis if the Athlete or Anti-Doping Organization chooses to request an analysis of the B Sample; (e) the opportunity for the Athlete and/or the Athlete’s representative to attend the B Sample opening and analysis within the time period specified in the International Standard for Laboratories if such analysis is requested; and (f) the Athlete’s right to request copies of the A and B Sample laboratory documentation package which includes information as required by the International Standard for Laboratories. If the Anti-Doping Organization decides not to bring forward the Adverse Analytical Finding as an anti-doping rule violation, it shall so notify the Athlete and the Anti-Doping Organizations as described in Article 14.1.2."

  156. Previously available online (http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/Code_Review/Code%20Review%202015/WADA-Code-Review-2015-2nd-Consult-Part-1-Art-07.pdf ) where the author examined them in an earlier stage of the preparation of this paper. On file with author.

  157. International Floorball Federation, International Cricket Council, International Aikido Federation, International Ice Hockey Federation, United States Olympic Committee, Australian Government (Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport), Anti Doping Denmark, Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, UK Anti-Doping, Irish Sports Council, Anti-Doping Norway, CHINADA, Maria Clarke Lawyers (New Zealand), India NADA, Italian Olympic Committee, Swedish Sports Confederation (SSC), Stockholm University (Mats Larsson, Professor), UTS (Australia), Australian Athletes' Alliance.

  158. On file with author.

  159. See McLaren (2007): "Where exactly the "B" sample requirement of the testing process had its origins is difficult to pinpoint. Unreliable doping tests were perhaps the initial motivation for the "B" sample confirmation test, and so the origin may have been at the beginning of the 1960s. […] At the time, it appeared that the testers were wary of announcing a positive test due to the potentially destructive impact the allegation would have on the athlete's career. Scientists […] were also concerned that the legal system might overturn laboratory results and were only willing to expose the laboratory to the legal system if there was certainty of a favourable outcome, preferably the confirmation of a positive test" (p. 4).

  160. See e.g. Pitsch W (2009).

  161. WADA Working Group on the Lack of Effectiveness of Testing Programs (2013), p. 8.

  162. WADA Working Group on the Lack of Effectiveness of Testing Programs (2013), p. 9.

  163. For an athlete with a positive finding to ask for his or her sample to be sent to another laboratory is a risky business with an uncertain outcome, as that other laboratory might find a substance that was not detected by the first laboratory. From an analytical point of view the ideal scenario would be for all A and B samples to be submitted to different laboratories instantly, preferably using variegating methods as far as possible. Attention should be paid to reducing all sources of bias as much as possible in order to protect innocent athletes. The reality is different and the general lack of transparency and insufficient reporting make it difficult to ascertain how often B samples are sent to a different laboratory and how often this leads to a different result. Yet the rules are sufficiently open to allow using a different laboratory, in the interest of the PoI, which should be encouraged.

  164. Judgment of the Court of 15 December 1995. Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, ELR 1995 I-04921. EU:C:1995:463.

  165. For a comparison see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), pp. 36-38 of the annex.

  166. See e.g. Pound, Clarke (2011), p. 152: "Any athlete or person charged with an anti-doping rule violation has a right to a fair hearing." See also Nafziger (2011), p. 17: "A core principle, perhaps the core principle, to inform not only the lex sportiva, but also the larger body of sports law, is fairness."

  167. For a comparison see Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), pp. 66-67 of the annex.

  168. "If two or more than two participating members of a team Team in a Team Sport participating in an Event are found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation during an Event Period violations during the Event, each of which are sanctioned by a period of Ineligibility of one (1) year or more, then at a minimum, the ruling body of the Event shall impose an appropriate sanction on the team (e.g., loss of points, Disqualification from a Competition or Event, or other sanction) disqualify the Team from the Event the next time it is held and the International Federation shall impose a period of Ineligibility on the Team of one year. The Consequences imposed on a Team are in addition to any Consequences imposed upon the individual Athletes committing the anti-doping rule violation violations." See Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), pp. 66-67 of the annex. Text marked in strike-through was deleted as part of the Code revision, while underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  169. C2, sec. 2.2.2.4.

  170. C2, sec. 2.2.2.4.

  171. "If two or more participating than two members of a Team team in a Team Sport participating in an Event are found to have committed an anti-doping rule violations during the Event, each of which are sanctioned by a period of Ineligibility of one (1) year or more, then at a minimum violation during an Event Period, the ruling body of the Event shall disqualify the Team from the Event the next time it is held and the International Federation shall impose a period of Ineligibility on the Team of one year. The Consequences imposed on a Team are impose an appropriate sanction on the team (e.g., loss of points, Disqualification from a Competition or Event, or other sanction) in addition to any Consequences imposed upon the individual Athletes committing the anti-doping rule violations violation." Text marked in strike-through was deleted as part of the Code revision, while underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  172. “If more than two members of a team in a Team Sport are found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation during an Event Period, the ruling body of the Event shall impose an appropriate sanction on the team (e.g., loss of points, Disqualification from a Competition or Event, or other sanction) in addition to any Consequences imposed upon the individual Athletes committing the anti-doping rule violation.” See Rigozzi, Viret, Wisnosky (2013), pp. 66-67 of the annex.

  173. Anderson (2010), p. 83.

  174. Anderson (2010), p. 83.

  175. See C4, p. 6: "In the third contribution, the EU had expressed general satisfaction with the progress made on this important subject. However, if automatic publication is considered a sanction (cf. Code Article 10.13), then it should be equally and uniformly applied for international and national level athletes. This is currently not the case, for a variety of reasons, but in particular because data protection provisions differ greatly internationally.

    Furthermore, the progress made can only materialise in the form of improved athletes’ rights if appropriate non-binding guidance is adopted and circulated by WADA. Reference was made to the solution found, in 2010/11, in relation to the International Standard on the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (ISPPPI) and the suggestion was made that a similar solution could be found in this case, by developing specific rules on public disclosure subject to international and national law. The EU cannot see that this has been done and therefore reiterates its invitation to WADA.

    The EU, therefore, invites and gives its full support and cooperation to WADA in developing appropriate nonbinding guidance to improve athletes’ rights."

  176. European Commission (2014), p. 3.

  177. Foster (2012), p. 247.

  178. See e.g. Blackshaw (2011).

  179. In quashing the IAAF award, LG München referred to "procedural requirements which are indispensable under the rule of law" ("dass […] o.g. Grundsätze zu den rechtsstaatlich unabdingbaren Verfahrensvoraussetzungen gehören.") (cit. Monheim (2006), p. 234), including the absence of a material justification supporting the ruling (ibid).

  180. LG Stuttgart Urteil vom 2.4.2002, 17 O 611/00, http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&nr=1014: The interim injunction of the court was based on the fact that Baumann had not been called as a party and had not been able to enjoy full procedural rights.

  181. See Monheim (2006), pp. 234-235.

  182. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 18 July 2006. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities. Case C-519/04 P. ECR 2006 I-06991. ECLI:EU:C:2006:492.

  183. Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 June 2013. Guillermo Cañas v European Commission. Case C-269/12 P. ECR 2013-00000. ECLI:EU:C:2013:415.

  184. Judgment of the Court of 12 December 1974. B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Arrondissementsrechtbank Utrecht-Netherlands. Case 36-74. ECR 1974 -01405. ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

  185. See Weatherill (2013), p. 146: "Most positive accounts of the CJEU’s ruling have tended to emphasise the scope allowed by the Court for debate about what is truly ‘‘special’’ in the governance of sport, while also appreciating the improved intellectual quality of the analysis, in particular its rejection of the ill-shaped concept of the ‘‘purely sporting’’ rule— which was and is rarely ‘‘purely’’ sporting at all, but rather both sporting and economic in its implications."

  186. Underlined text was added as part of the revision.

  187. C2, p. 10: "Article 13 (Appeals) has been rephrased, including the statement that no limit to the scope of the right to appeal is foreseen. This is a helpful addition which the EU explicitly welcomes, as athletes should not be discouraged from making use of their human rights and fundamental rights. However, it would be preferable if these rights could be underlined more specifically, as Article 13 is an important provision (not least in connection with the expectations presented to governments in Article 22) to which reference is made in numerous other provisions of the Code.

    In the EU, Article 47 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in the following terms: "Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.

    Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented." The exclusivity of arbitration varies from one national jurisdiction to another and an appreciation of the balance of power between the parties involved, as well as the procedural guarantees afforded to defendants, may in some jurisdictions lead to legal problems if arbitration can be construed, from the point of view of anti-doping rules, as having supplanted the rights of appeal afforded by state courts."

  188. C3, p. 6.

  189. As a pars pro toto see e.g. the outspoken language used in Article 64(3) FIFA Statues (May 2008 edition) (http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/09/75/14/fifa_statutes_072008_en.pdf):

    "The Associations shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it is prohibited to take disputes in the Association or disputes affecting Leagues, members of Leagues, clubs, members of clubs, Players, Officials and other Association Officials to ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of the Association or Confederation or to CAS.

    The Associations shall also ensure that this stipulation is implemented in the Association, if necessary by imposing a binding obligation on its members. The Associations shall impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this obligation and ensure that any appeal against such sanctions shall likewise be strictly submitted to arbitration, and not to ordinary courts of law." [Emphasis added, J.K.]

    By comparison, Article 61 Olympic Charter (http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf) uses more discreet language yet the result remains the same.

  190. Łukomski (2013), p. 69.

  191. Heermann (2015).

  192. Cf. Steiner (2014).

  193. Heermann (2015).

  194. Anderson (2010), p. 77.

  195. Anderson (2010), p. 52.

  196. Anderson (2010), p. 52.

  197. McArdle (2015), p. 19

  198. Sayers (2014), p. 1304.

  199. The phrase "applicable to proceedings leading to the imposition of severe sanctions on natural or legal persons," used by Nehl (2014), p. 1278, does not conceptually limit the material scope of the principle ipso facto to criminal courts or the judiciary. It may be a useful guiding principle for disciplinary panels in various areas, ADOs, etc., even if they are not bound to respect it.

  200. AG Vesterdorf in Rhône-Poulenc, p. II-943

  201. Meca-Medina, at 26.

  202. Kornbeck (2013a).

  203. See Anderson (2010), pp. 123-126.

  204. Deutscher Bundestag (2015), see §§ 3-4.

  205. European Commission (2013).

  206. See the study prepared for the Department of Parliamentary Services by Jolly (2013).

  207. Rule of Law Institute of Australia (2013).

  208. Blackstone (1765-1769). Book Four, Chapter the Twenty Seventh, p. 352.

  209. Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/36/220501. See also USOC Due Process Checklist.pdf, http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/USOC+Due+Process+Checklist.pdf.

  210. CAS 94/129 USA Shooting & Quigley v UIT, see Anderson (2010), p. 124.

  211. See Gleaves (2011).

  212. See McLaren (2011, p. 55): "Lex sportiva's clearest difference from other sources of law appears in the doping and doping sanctions context. The most contentious of these rules is that of strict liability […]."

  213. See Nafziger (2011), pp. 5-6.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Walter Palmer (USA), Jean-François Reymond (France), Prof. Perikles Simon (Germany) and an anonymous reviewer for input and suggestions to an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Jacob Kornbeck (Legal Officer; Police Officer)

    Present address: Legal Officer Policy and Consultation Unit, Office of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Brussels, Belgium

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  1. Sport Unit, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

    Jacob Kornbeck (Legal Officer; Police Officer)

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Disclaimer The author is an EU civil servant yet opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not render official EU positions.

After working in the European Commission (Sport Unit) (2001-2014) Jacob Kornbeck recently joined the Secretariat of the European Data Protection Supervisor (Policy and Consultation Unit). Opinions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author and not official positions of any Institution of the European Union.

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Kornbeck, J. The EU, the Revision of the World Anti-Doping Code and the Presumption of Innocence. Int Sports Law J 15, 172–196 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-015-0082-8

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