Abstract
For the marriage model with indifferences, we define an equivalence relation over the stable matching set. We identify a sufficient condition, the closing property, under which we can extend results of the classical model (without indifferences) to the equivalence classes of the stable matching set. This condition allows us to extend the lattice structure over classes of equivalences and the rural hospital theorem.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Irving [3] refered to stable matchings as weakly stable matchings. In this paper, we use the term stable matching.
Item 3 is equivalent to say that \(\mu \) is a homogeneous function of order two, i.e. \(\mu ^{2}\left( i\right) =i,\) for all \(i\in M\cup W.\)
By abuse of notation, we continue to write \(R_{M}\) for a order over \( S(R)/_{\sim }.\)
References
Roth, A., Sotomayor, M.: Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica 72, 257–279 (2004)
Irving, R.: Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete Appl. Math. 48, 261–272 (1994)
Knuth, D.: Stable Marriage. Les Presses de lUniversit de Montral, Montreal (1976)
Manlove, D.: The structure of stable marriage with indifference. Discrete Appl. Math. 12, 167–181 (2002)
Spieker, B.: The set of super-stable marriages forms a distributive lattice. Discrete Appl. Math. 58, 79–84 (1985)
Erdil, A., Ergin, H.: Two-sided matching with indifferences. J. Econ. Theory 171, 268–292 (2017)
Sotomayor, M.: The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences. Int. J. Game Theory 40, 631–644 (2011)
Roth, A.: The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. J. Polit. Econ. 92, 991–1016 (1984)
Roth, A.: On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: a general property of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica 54, 425–427 (1986)
McVtie, D., Wilson, L.: Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets. BIT Numer. Math. 10, 295–309 (1970)
Irving, R., Manlove, D.F., Scott, S.: The hospitals/residents problem with ties. In: Proceedings of ICALP 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1851, pp. 259–271 (2000)
Erdil, A., Ergin, H.: What’s the matter with tie-breaking? Improvement efficiency in school choice. Am. Econ. Rev. 98, 669–89 (2008)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This research was supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis (No. PROICO 319502), and from the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) (No. PIP 112-201501-00505), and from Agencia Nacional de Promoción Cientifíca y Tecnológica (No. PICT 2017-2355).
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Strongly Stable Matchings and the Closing Property
Proof of Lemma 1
Let \(\mu _{1},\) \(\mu _{2},\) \(\mu _{3}\in \mathcal {M}\) for all \(i\in A\).
1. Let us assume that \(\mu _{1}I_{i}\mu _{2}\) and \(\mu _{2}P_{i}\mu _{3}\). From the definition of \(I_{i}\) and \(P_{i}\), we have that
The transitivity of \(R_{i}\) and conditions (A1), (A2) imply that \(\mu _{1}R_{i}\mu _{3}.\) Suppose that \(\mu _{3}R_{i}\mu _{1}.\) Condition ( A1) and transitivity of \(R_{i}\) imply that \(\mu _{3}R_{i}\mu _{2}.\) This contradicts (A2). Hence, \(\overline{\mu _{3}R_{i}\mu _{1}}\) and \( \mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{3}.\)
2. Similarly, we can prove that if \(\mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{2}\) and \(\mu _{2}I_{i}\mu _{3},\) then \(\mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{3}.\)
3. We assume that \(\mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{2}\) and \(\mu _{i}^{\prime }\in \left[ \mu _{i}\right] \) for \(i=1,2.\) Then,
Condition (A3) and the fact that \(\mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{2}\) imply that
We have that \(\mu _{1}P_{i}\mu _{2}\) and \(\mu _{2}I_{i}\mu _{2}\). By item 2, we have
4. It follows from 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let \(\left[ \mu _{1}\right] ,\) \(\left[ \mu _{2}\right] ,\) \(\left[ \mu _{3}\right] \in S(R)/_{\sim }\) for all \(i\in A\), and let \(\mu _{1}^{\prime }\in \left[ \mu _{1}\right] ,\mu _{2}^{\prime }\in \left[ \mu _{2}\right] \) and \(\mu _{3}^{\prime }\in \left[ \mu _{3}\right] .\)
-
1.
Reflexivity. Since \(R_{M}\) is a reflexive relation over \( \mathcal {M}\), we have that
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _{1}^{\prime }R_{M}\mu _{1}^{\prime }, \end{aligned}$$so
$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \mu _{1}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{1}\right] . \end{aligned}$$ -
2.
Transitivity. \(R_{M}\) is a transitive relation over \( \mathcal {M}.\) If \(\mu _{1}R_{i}\mu _{2}\) and \(\mu _{2}R_{i}\mu _{3}\), then \( \mu _{1}R_{i}\mu _{3},\) i.e.
$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \mu _{1}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{2}\right] ,\left[ \mu _{2}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{3}\right] \text { and }\left[ \mu _{1}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{3}\right] . \end{aligned}$$ -
3.
Antisymmetric. Assume that
$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \mu _{1}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{2}\right] \text { and }\left[ \mu _{2}\right] R_{M}\left[ \mu _{1}\right] , \end{aligned}$$i.e.
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _{1}R_{M}\mu _{2}\text { and }\mu _{2}R_{M}\mu _{1}. \end{aligned}$$Hence, \(\mu _{1}I_{M}\mu _{2}\), i.e. \(\left[ \mu _{1}\right] =\left[ \mu _{2} \right] \).
The following Manlove’s result will be useful in proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma A1
(Manlove) Let (M, W, R) be a marriage model with indifferences, and let \(\mu \) and \(\mu ^{\prime }\) be two strongly stable matchings. Suppose that for any men \(m_{1}\in M,\) \(\mu (m_{1})=w_{1}\) and \(\mu ^{\prime }(m_{1})=w_{2},\) where \(w_{1}\ne w_{2}\) and \( w_{2}R_{m_{1}}w_{1}\). Then there are sequences of agents involving, \(m_{1}, w_{1}\) and \(w_{2}\) as follows: for some \(r>1,\) there are r men \(m_{1},\cdots ,m_{r}\) and r women \(w_{1},\cdots ,w_{r}\) which satisfies
(1) If \(w_{2}I_{m_{1}}w_{1},\) then
(2) If \(w_{2}P_{m_{1}}w_{1},\) then
where \(m_{0}=m_{r}, m_{r+1}=m_{1}\) and \(w_{r+1}=w_{1}.\)
We could formulate a symmetric lemma by exchanging the role of women and men.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let \(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }\in \mathrm{SS}(R)\), if \(J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })=J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })=\varnothing , \) then the result follows. We assume that \(J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\ne \varnothing .\) We will show that
Let \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }).\) This means that
Since \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }),\) we have that \(\mu (m_{1})\ne \mu ^{\prime }(m_{1}).\) Then there exist \(w_{1}\) and \(w_{2}\) such that \(\mu (m_{1})=w_{1}\) and \(\mu ^{\prime }(m_{1})=w_{2}.\) Since \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\), we have that
By Lemma A1 (Manlove), we have that there exist successions of agents \( m_{1},\cdots ,m_{r}\) and \(w_{1},\cdots ,w_{r}\) such that
Also
If \(i=1\), then
i.e. \(w_{1}\in J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }).\) Hence, \(\mu (w_{1})=m_{1}\in \mu (J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })).\)
Now, we will show that
Let \(\mu (w_{1})\in \mu (J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })).\) Since \(w_{1}\in J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\), we have that
Notice that \(\mu (m_{1})\ne \mu ^{\prime }(m_{1}).\) Then there exist \(m_{1}\) and \(m_{2}\) such that \(\mu (w_{1})=m_{1}\) and \(\mu ^{\prime }(w_{1})=m_{2}.\) By Lemma A1 (Manlove), we have that there exist successions of agents \( m_{1},\cdots ,m_{r}\) and \(w_{1},\cdots ,w_{r}\) such that
Also
If \(i=1\), then
i.e. \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }).\) Hence, \(m_{1}=\mu (w_{1})\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }).\)
Proof of Proposition 5
Let \(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }\in \mathrm{SSS}(R)\), if \(J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })=J_{W}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })=\varnothing ,\) then the result follows. We assume that \(J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\ne \varnothing .\)
Let \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }).\) This means that
Since \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }),\) we have that \(\mu (m_{1})\ne \mu ^{\prime }(m_{1}).\) Then there exist \(w_{1}\) and \(w_{2}\) such that \(\mu (m_{1})=w_{1}\) and \(\mu ^{\prime }(m_{1})=w_{2}.\) Since \(m_{1}\in J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\), we have that
Since \(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime }\in \mathrm{SSS}(R)\subseteq \mathrm{SS}(R)\), we can apply Lemma A1 (Manlove). Then there exist successions of agents \(m_{1},\cdots ,m_{r}\) and \( w_{1},\cdots ,w_{r}\) such that
Also
If \(i=1\), then
Conditions A5 and A6 imply that the pair \((m_{1},w_{1})\) superblocks \(\mu ^{\prime }.\) This contradicts that \(\mu ^{\prime }\) is a superstable matching. This contradiction came from assuming that \(J_{M}(\mu ,\mu ^{\prime })\ne \varnothing .\) So the closing property holds.
The next example shows that the closing property is not a necessary condition to the lattice structure of the stable matching set.
Example 6
Let \(M=\left\{ m_{1},m_{2},m_{3}\right\} \) be the set of men and \(W=\left\{ w_{1},w_{2},w_{3}\right\} \) be the set of women. Consider the preference profile R :
The set of stable matchings consists of the following matchings:
Observe that \(\mu _{1}R_{m_{i}}\mu _{2}R_{m_{i}}\mu _{3}\), for \(i=1,2,3.\) Also \(\mu _{3}R_{w_{i}}\mu _{2}R_{w_{i}}\mu _{1}\) for\(i=1,2,3.\) In this example, we have a lattice structure over stable matching set. Nevertheless, the stable matching set does not satisfy the closing property. We have
So
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Juarez, N., Oviedo, J. Stable Matchings in the Marriage Model with Indifferences. J. Oper. Res. Soc. China 9, 593–617 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-020-00315-8
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-020-00315-8