Abstract
An alternative model of the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness is proposed. The model combines a non-standard version of the higher-order theory of consciousness with the global neuronal workspace theory and argues that implicit higher-order self-awareness is a pervasive feature of the globally integrative states formed in the global workspace.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baars, Bernard. 1988. A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baars, Bernard. 1997. In the theater of consciousness: The workspace of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Block, Ned. 1995. On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 227–247.
Block, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, accessibility and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 481–548.
Boly, Melanie, Massimini, Marcello, Tsuchiya, Naotsugu, Postle, Bradley, Koch, Christof, and Tononi, Giulio. 2017. Are the neural correlates of consciousness in the front of in the back of the cerebral cortex? Clinincal and neuroimaging evidence. Journal of Neuroscience 37: 9603–9613.
Carruthers, Peter. 2019. Human and animal minds: The consciousness question laid to rest. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene, Stanislas. 2014. Consciousness in the brain. New York: Penguin.
Dehaene, Stanislaus, and Lionel Naccache. 2000. Toward a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition 79: 1–37.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1992. The self as the center of narrative gravity. In Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, ed. F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D.L. Johnson. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Goldberg, Ilan, Michael Harel, and Rafael Malach. 2006. When the brain loses its self: Prefrontal inactivation during sensorimotor processing. Neuron 50 (2): 329–339.
Mallach, Rafael, and Zoran Josipovic. 2006. Perception without a perceiver - In conversation with Zoran Josipovic. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 13 (9): 57–66.
Rosenthal, David. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In The nature of consciousness, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, 729–753. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rosenthal, David. 2002. Explaining consciousness. In Philosophy of mind: Contemporary readings, ed. D. Chalmers, 406–421. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shea, Nicholas, and Chris D. Frith. 2019. The global workspace needs metacognition. Trends in Cognitive Science 23 (7): 560–571.
Strawson, Galen. 2003. What is the relation between an experience, the subject of the experience, and the content of the experience? Philosophical Issues 13: 279–315.
Tononi, Giulio. 2008. Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin 215: 216–242.
Van Gulick, Robert. 2004. HOGS (Higher-Order Global States) - an alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, ed. R. Gennaro, 67–92. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Van Gulick, Robert. 2006. Mirror-mirror, is that all? In Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, eds. U. Kriegl and K. Williford. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Van Gulick, Robert. 2015. E pluribus unum: Rethinking the unity of consciousness. In Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, eds. C. Hill and D. Bennett, 375–392. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Van Gulick, R. Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective. Rev.Phil.Psych. 13, 329–340 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00622-4
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00622-4