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Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects

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Abstract

Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires. Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. This emerging discussion is concerned with figuring out how (and whether) ordinary people go about attributing mental states of qualitative experience, or what philosophers might call states of phenomenal consciousness. This paper briefly describes some of the primary works in the existing experimental philosophy literature and presents new experimental data that weigh on those hypotheses. Finally, it offers a cognitive model of the processes underlying attributions of mental states, called the Agency Model.

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Notes

  1. Though there is also a small minority of theorists who subscribe to a Phenomenological Theory of Mind (Gallagher 2005; Zahavi 2005).

  2. See Gray et al. (2007), Robbins and Jack (2006), for instance.

  3. Responses were recorded using a 7-point Likert scale (1=‘sounds weird’, 7 = ‘sounds natural’).

  4. All surveys were written in English. East Asian participants were students in English-speaking courses at Chinese University Hong Kong.

  5. Sytsma and Machery’s second argumentative line is that Knobe and Prinz may have actually been measuring the folk recognition of functional and behavioral differences between groups and individuals. In support of this hypothesis, they present data from their own experiments, the details of which I will not go into here.

  6. Notice that these sentences essentially invert the structure of the sentences used in Knobe and Prinz’s second study.

  7. The point might be put more straight-forwardly that, when testing for the causal influence of certain features on folk judgments, each feature needs to be treated as an independent experimental variable requiring its own control condition. For studies aimed at testing the impact of phenomenal states (variable 1) being predicated of groups (variable 2), we need two controls: one control to compare with the phenomenal feature of attributions (e.g., attributions of nonphenomenal states) and one control to compare with the group feature of attributions (e.g., attributions to individuals).

  8. Minimal pairs are stimuli that are maximally similar save for the one variable (i.e., the ‘independent variable’) that is being tested for effect.

  9. The fact that they did not run the crucial comparison makes their appeal to functional and behavioral differences between individuals and groups somewhat mysterious as an explanation of the asymmetry in folk judgments about group attributions. How, that is, would pointing to a difference between individuals and groups explain a difference between judgments on phenomenal attributions to groups and nonphenomenal attributions to groups?

  10. The accepted wisdom in the literature to date is that sentences are phenomenal attributions insofar as they use phenomenal language, namely when they include locutions like ‘is feeling’ or ‘is experiencing’ when predicating a psychological state. I follow in this tradition, though the opening paragraphs of the discussion section will offer some reason for thinking this assumption is unwarranted.

  11. This crucial comparison will also need to include attributions of nonphenomenal states to individuals.

  12. The attribution sentences that Knobe and Prinz presented to their subjects were non-minimal pairs because their nonphenomenal attributions included additional information (about the context of attribution) that their phenomenal attributions lacked:

    ‘Acme Corp is upset about the court’s recent ruling’ vs. ‘Acme Corp is feeling upset.’

  13. Clearly, these two theses need not be entirely incompatible (see Discussion).

  14. t(28)=.639, p = .528

  15. Without Context: t(60)=1.287, p =  .203. With Context: t(60)=.626, p = .534.

  16. (One-way ANOVA) F(1, 59)=16.324, p < 0.001

  17. (One-way ANOVA) F(1, 59)=15.135, p < 0.001

  18. Psychology often uses the phrase “context effect” to refer to the influences played by differences in the context of evaluation, where features in the judge’s environment influence their judgment. Contemporary epistemologists, however, utilize a distinction between “context of utterance” and “context of evaluation”, where the former refers to the situation described in an attribution of knowledge, and the latter refers to the situation in which one is evaluating an attribution of knowledge. For present purposes, the “context” in “context effects” refers, like the epistemologist’s ‘context of utterance’, to the context in which a mental state is attributed, rather than to the context in which one finds herself while judging the attribution.

  19. [2(context vs. no-context) x 2(group vs. individual) Multi-factorial ANOVA] F(1, 59)=21.492, p = .00002

  20. t(28) = 4.923, p < .00005, for attributions to groups overall (i.e., including both phenomenal and nonphenomenal); t(28) = 3.393, p = .002, for phenomenal; t(28) = 4.365, p  <  .001, for nonphenomenal.

  21. t(31) = -.138, p=.891, for attributions to individuals overall (i.e., including both phenomenal and nonphenomenal); t(31)=.203, p = .841, for phenomenal; t(31) = -.040, p  =  .968, for nonphenomenal.

  22. Put another way, they take their data to support the notion that the folk have a distinct concept of phenomenal consciousness, which is withheld (for some reason or another) from group agents. Knobe and Prinz, for instance, argue that the folk distinguish between the psychological state of ‘upsetness’ and the phenomenal experience of ‘feeling upset.’

  23. Uriah Kriegel has suggested (personal communications) that one might think that the attributions without the feeling locution are nonetheless phenomenal attributions, and that this explains why they are treated identically in the current study. The response below applies equally well, mutatis mutandis, to this criticism.

  24. Bryce Huebner (2010) suggests a cognitive model insofar as he argues that commonsense (folk) judgments of nonphenomenal attributions are underwritten by a functionalist concept of ‘consciousness’ while judgments of phenomenal attributions and emotional attributions involve entirely distinct concepts of ‘consciousness’. It’s not clear to me, however, just how Huebner’s account actually explains the process by which we determine whether an entity is capable of phenomenal experience. After all, on what grounds do we determine whether to utilize the functionalist concept of ‘consciousness’ rather than some other concept of ‘consciousness’?

  25. Cf. DeRose 1999 and Stanley 2005 for representative discussions of the role of context in epistemology. See Sinnott-Armstrong 2008 for a useful discussion of what he calls “framing effects” in the domain of moral psychology.

  26. The version defended in Arico et al. is weaker than the “radical” version presented above, in that it claims that AGENT categorization is sufficient but not necessary for being disposed to attribute consciousness (and other psychological states). However, I endorse the more radical necessity claim in addition to sufficiency.

  27. This model is built largely on the model developed by Susan Johnson and colleagues (Johnson 2003, Johnson et al. 2007), which draws on work by Amanda Woodward (1998). Johnson hypothesizes that these surface cues dispose infants to classify an entity as an AGENT, which then disposes them to display a variety of behaviors, including gaze-following, imitation, and the attribution of goals and goal-directed behavior. The Agency model essentially just adds to this constellation of behaviors the attribution of consciousness.

  28. Given this picture, and given that the data suggests that the folk treat attributions of phenomenal states and attributions of nonphenomenal states similarly, the discussion that follows will largely lump the two together as attributions of ‘psychological states’ or ‘mental states’.

  29. Of course, this is an empirically verifiable claim, though to my knowledge no work has been done on it specifically. In the Huebner et al. paper, one stimulus included a group of just three members (‘Destiny’s Child is feeling insecure after its poor performance last night.”), but obviously we shouldn’t put too much weight on one data point.

  30. On the other hand, we might think that what’s happening is that certain contexts call for less stringent versions of the standard phenomenological notions. That is, we might think that ‘winning the Super Bowl’, for instance, is a context in which we apply the notion of ‘feeling proud’ more loosely than in other contexts; thus, the folk are willing to attribute ‘feeling proud’ to the group entity, ‘the Giants’, because they are using a more inclusive notion of ‘feeling’ that accommodates groups even though groups typically don’t count as AGENTs. The present data is consistent with both interpretations, though I prefer the former explanation for reasons I do not have room to discuss here. That said, I’m open to reconsidering my position should new empirical data support the latter explanation.

  31. On yet another alternative, we might think that there is a separate cognitive process involving a distinct conceptual category, GROUP-AGENT, which is associated with a more austere constellation of behaviors. That is, there may be another set of features that triggers us to categorize a thing as a GROUP-AGENT, which prepotently disposes us to some other constellation of behaviors. This constellation, then, would not include the attribution of phenomenal states, though it likely would also not preclude it. While this alternative is certainly within the logical space of explanations, it strikes me as unnecessarily populating the cognitive system. If the two are equal in explanatory power, I see no need to posit additional concepts/categories; thus, unless there emerges some additional explanatory force out of this alternative explanation, I prefer the more parsimonious position.

  32. The trick, I suspect, will be in coming up with contexts that are unique to AGENTs but are not also unique to individuals.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Sara Bernstein for her encouragement and support in pursuing this project, as well as Mike Bruno, Bryce Huebner, Uriah Kriegel, Edouard Machery, Justin Sytsma, and especially Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols. Thanks as well to the audiences at the 2008 Tucson Roundtable on Experimental Philosophy and the 2007 Meeting of the Society of Philosophy and Psychology, to the University of Arizona’s Department of Cognitive Science for their 2008 Spring Research Fellowship, and, finally, to the Earhart Foundation for providing financial support in the form of a H.B. Earhart Graduate Fellowship.

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Correspondence to Adam Arico.

Appendix A: Stimulus Items

Appendix A: Stimulus Items

Group Phenomenal WITHOUT Context:

McDonalds is feeling upset.

The Art History Department is now vividly imagining.

The Giants felt proud.

The sorority is feeling some regret.

The Housing Authority is feeling angry.

Canada’s Travel Bureau is experiencing a sudden urge.

Jamba Juice was experiencing great joy.

The Board of Trustees was feeling relieved.

The F.B.I. is feeling pressure.

The battalion is feeling excruciating pain.

The consulting firm is feeling depressed.

Cisco Systems is feeling exhausted.

Group Phenomenal WITH Context:

McDonalds is feeling upset about the court’s recent ruling.

The Art History Department is now vividly imagining a purple square.

The Giants felt proud after they won the Super Bowl.

The sorority is feeling some regret about the recent decision.

The Housing Authority is feeling angry about the foreclosures.

Canada’s Travel Bureau is experiencing a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising.

Jamba Juice was experiencing great joy after the promotion.

The Board of Trustees was feeling relieved once the audit was complete.

The F.B.I. is feeling pressure to apprehend terrorist operatives.

The battalion is feeling excruciating pain from the attack.

The consulting firm is feeling depressed about being dumped.

Cisco Systems is feeling exhausted after a rough day on the Stock Exchange.

Group Nonphenomenal WITHOUT Context:

McDonalds is upset.

The Art History Department is now strongly considering.

The Giants were proud.

The sorority is having some regrets.

The Housing Authority is angry.

Canada’s Travel Bureau is having a sudden urge.

Jamba Juice had great joy.

The Board of Trustees was relieved.

The F.B.I. is under pressure.

The battalion is in excruciating pain.

The consulting firm is depressed.

Cisco Systems is exhausted.

Group Nonphenomenal WITH Context:

McDonalds is upset about the court’s recent ruling.

The Art History Department is now strongly considering a purple square.

The Giants were proud after they won the Super Bowl.

The sorority is having some regrets about the recent decision.

The Housing Authority is angry about the foreclosures.

Canada’s Travel Bureau is having a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising.

Jamba Juice had great joy after the promotion.

The Board of Trustees was relieved once the audit was complete.

The F.B.I. is under pressure to apprehend terrorist operatives.

The battalion is in excruciating pain from the attack.

The consulting firm is depressed about being dumped.

Cisco Systems is exhausted after a rough day on the Stock Exchange.

Individual Phenomenal WITHOUT Context:

Donald is feeling upset.

Sasha is now vividly imagining.

Manning felt proud.

Alison is feeling some regret.

Gillian is feeling angry.

Leslie is experiencing a sudden urge.

Charli was experiencing great joy.

Thomas was feeling relieved.

Mueller is feeling pressure.

Steve is feeling excruciating pain.

Michael is feeling depressed.

Kevin is feeling exhausted.

Individual Phenomenal WITH Context:

Donald is feeling upset about the court’s recent ruling.

Sasha is now vividly imagining a purple square.

Manning felt proud after they won the Super Bowl.

Alison is feeling some regret about the recent decision.

Gillian is feeling angry about the foreclosures.

Leslie is experiencing a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising.

Charli was experiencing great joy after the promotion.

Thomas was feeling relieved once the audit was complete.

Mueller is feeling pressure to apprehend terrorist operatives.

Steve is feeling excruciating pain from the attack.

Michael is feeling depressed about being dumped.

Kevin is feeling exhausted after a rough day on the Stock Exchange.

Individual Nonphenomenal WITHOUT Context:

Donald is upset.

Sasha is now strongly considering.

Manning was proud.

Alison is having some regrets.

Gillian is angry.

Leslie is having a sudden urge.

Charli had great joy.

Thomas was relieved.

Mueller is under pressure.

Steve is in excruciating pain.

Michael is depressed.

Kevin is exhausted.

Individual Nonphenomenal WITH Context:

Donald is upset about the court’s recent ruling.

Sasha is now strongly considering a purple square.

Manning was proud after they won the Super Bowl.

Alison is having some regrets about the recent decision.

Gillian is angry about the foreclosures.

Leslie is having a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising.

Charli had great joy after the promotion.

Thomas was relieved once the audit was complete.

Mueller is under pressure to apprehend terrorist operatives.

Steve is in excruciating pain from the attack.

Michael is depressed about being dumped.

Kevin is exhausted after a rough day on the Stock Exchange.

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Arico, A. Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Rev.Phil.Psych. 1, 371–393 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0029-9

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