Abstract
Deacon develops a minimal model of a nonparasitic virus to explore how nucleotide sequences came to be characterized by a code-like informational at the origin of life. The model serves to problematize the concept of biological normativity because it highlights two common yet typically implicit assumptions: (1) that life could consist as an inert form, were it not for extrinsic sources of physical instability, and (2) that life could have originated as a singular self-contained individual. I propose that the origin of life, the genetic code, and biological normativity more generally, lead us to reject this passive individualism.
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Notes
I side with Hutto and Myin (2013) that the states of basic minds, including of minimal lifeforms, are strictly speaking contentless because they are not “about” anything in a strong semantic sense, e.g. involving truth conditions. But we all agree that basic minds can nevertheless be intentionally directed at aspects of the world, and this is sufficient common ground for the current discussion.
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Froese, T. To Understand the Origin of Life We Must First Understand the Role of Normativity. Biosemiotics 14, 657–663 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09467-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09467-3