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Intermodal maritime supply chains: assessing factors for resiliency and security

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Abstract

Much of the value exchanged in international trade is transported as containerized freight. While this transport mode has become ubiquitous for manufactured goods, offering a fast and efficient service, it does pose security threats in the post-9/11 era. Even though containerization offers security from pilferage, it provides a means for obscuring contraband as well as opportunities to tamper with goods in shipment. Although the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-PAT) are high profile initiatives seeking to improve the security of global supply chains, vulnerability still remains from the port of origin and on the high seas to the port of discharge. This research is based on interviews from a wide range of supply chain participants that includes regulatory agencies, transportation providers, importers, exporters, and trade intermediaries. These provide the basis for a decomposition of the global maritime supply chain into those elements up to that point when goods are cleared by U.S. Customs. Analysis of the informational and physical flows suggests that the greatest vulnerabilities lie in those transportation segments between the origin of the goods and that point when they await shipment at a foreign port.

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Notes

  1. Expressed as TEUs or Twenty-foot Equivalent Units. Maritime containers are usually either 20 or 40 feet long, a standard that fosters both stacking and interchangeability between vessels.

  2. A specialized agency of the United Nations.

  3. Opinion of the author from prior experience at TSA.

  4. The Pareto principle simply states that 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes.

  5. Intended nodes denotes those that are known at the time that the shipment is planned.

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Correspondence to Gary A. Gordon.

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Young, R.R., Gordon, G.A. Intermodal maritime supply chains: assessing factors for resiliency and security. J Transp Secur 13, 231–244 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-020-00224-0

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