Abstract
Economic sanctions are a primary tool the US government and international organizations use to promote human rights abroad, yet they have proven to be largely ineffective and harmful to civilians. There is accumulating evidence that this paradox may be explained by the expressive purposes of sanctions and domestic politics. This article further explores these explanations by examining human rights sanction policy debates. Specifically, I analyzed 27 US Congressional hearings on human rights policy toward China (1990–1999). I argue that moral pressure enabled support for human rights sanctions, high costs fueled opposition to them, and discussions of effectiveness were marginal to the debate. The findings contribute to past studies by (1) identifying the psychological and sociological mechanisms by which legislators circumvent arguments of sanction ineffectiveness and harmfulness and (2) delineating the role of business, human rights, and ethnic interest groups in enabling and constraining support for human rights sanctions.
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Notes
This included the suspension of all sales of weapons and exchanges between military leaders, a ban on diplomatic exchanges above the level of assistant secretary, suspending the implementation of the Sino-American agreement on nuclear cooperation, and supporting the postponement of any World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans to China (Baker 2002; Foot 2000).
MFN trade status designates the normal trading terms, including low tariffs, which most countries enjoy with the USA. Under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, the President is required to certify that countries with non-market economies allow for freedom of emigration in order to renew their MFN status. MFN status was renamed “Normal Trade Relations” in 1998.
This is based on Morgan et al.’s (2014) stricter definition of sanction success of total or partial acquiescence of the target. They also employ a more generous definition of success that includes negotiated settlement with a success rate of 56.3%.
Absolutist reasoning is equivalent to Weber’s (1922/1968) concept of value rationality (wertrational).
Consequentialist reasoning is equivalent to Weber’s (1922/1968) concept of instrumental rationality (zweckrational).
This included all hearings accessible through the LexisNexis Congressional database at my university and another local university and through the online database of the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO Access). I excluded all hearings that were issue-specific and informal roundtables. Of the total universe of 56 hearings that fit these criteria, I was able to access electronic versions of 51 of them.
Hearings that were analyzed but not cited in this article are listed in the ‘Further reading’ section.
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Further reading
U.S. Congress (1990d) Senate. Committee on Finance. Extending Most-Favored-Nation status for China, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990 June 20
U.S. Congress (1990e) House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. United States-People’s Republic of China (PRC) trade relations, including Most-Favored-Nation trade status for the PRC, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990 June 21
U.S. Congress (1993a) House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Future of U.S.-China policy. 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993 May 20
U.S. Congress (1994c) Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. policy toward China, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1994 May 4
U.S. Congress (1996a) Senate. Committee on Finance. China Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996 June 6
U.S. Congress (1996c) House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. China MFN: Human rights consequences, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996 June 18
U.S. Congress (1997a) Senate. Committee on Finance. Renewal of Normal Trade Relations with China, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997 June 10
U.S. Congress (1997c) House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. U.S./China trade relations and human rights: Is constructive engagement with working?, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997 October 28
U.S. Congress (1998a) House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. U.S.-China trade relations and renewal of China’s Most-Favored-Nation status, 105th Cong., 2nd sess, 1998 June 17
U.S. Congress (1998b) Senate. Committee on Finance. President’s renewal of normal trade relations with China, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1998 July 9
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Richard Madsen, John Skrentny, John Evans, Dan Hallin, Susan Shirk, Michael Evans, Lisa Nunn, Julie Lee, and anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on this paper.
Funding
The University of California, San Diego Sociology Department and Biola University funded this research.
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Chan, S. Principle Versus Profit: Debating Human Rights Sanctions. Hum Rights Rev 19, 45–71 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-017-0484-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-017-0484-0