Abstract
In this short comment on Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism, I concentrate on the permissible extent of interference by a liberal state in a community within that state when such interference aims to protect individuals within that community from it. He and I both value individuals and want them protected, of course. This shared value, however, leads us to different conclusions. On any liberal view, individuals must be allowed to act as they wish subject only to specific sorts of justified limitations. In the mainstream approach that Cohen-Almagor accepts, these will include limitations necessary to not merely protect but also to promote autonomy. On my own view, by contrast, it is protection alone that justifies interference. I thus spell out Cohen-Almagor’s view about the need for interference with non-liberal groups within a liberal state and indicate my disagreement.
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Notes
All in-text citations are to Cohen-Almagor 2021 unless stated otherwise.
It’s worth noting that the first four chapters of JRM provide a brief but extremely useful synopsis of the state of liberal democratic multicultural theory from the last 50 years. It does this while wisely passing over numerous side issues—like the debate between participatory and deliberative democracy—which would only serve to unnecessarily muddy the waters.
Cohen-Almagor would allow for extensive interference in forms of female circumcision that he would call genital mutilation. I would as well, though, not likely as often, depending on some empirical facts about consent, as I discuss below.
For more on this, including discussion of how the harm principle plays into it, see my 2018, 113 f.
The Court seems to have disagreed, claiming that any such rights were subsidiary to “tribal autonomy” (185).
While some who are incapable of living autonomously may suffer some form of mental disability, I do not think that need be the case. Autonomy is something we develop just as is the ability to comprehend legal (or any) jargon, or understand higher order mathematics, science, or philosophy. While many seem to claim that all humans are equally capable of these things, that claim flies in the face of evidence we see all the time. This does not mean that individuals incapable of these things lack what makes them due respect. People who find themselves incapable of understanding the claim that the universe has more than ten dimensions, as required by string theory, for example, are nonetheless due respect. The same is true of those incapable of autonomy. John Stuart Mill, of course, worried about something like this when he noted that “He who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only be being used” (Mill,1978, 56). I suspect autonomy is a scalar notion. If that is right, a liberal society that seeks to respect all citizens must take this seriously and be set up such that people that have different degrees of autonomy can lead good lives. This entails, I think, that none should be prohibited from gaining more autonomy but also that none should be forced to gain more autonomy.
For more on this view, see my 2018, 85 ff.
Cohen-Almagor generally believes “The way to deal with people who wish to leave the community is through deliberation, not coercion; through compromise and mutual respect, not by showing contempt” (193). Imagine, though, Sammy The Sadistic Satanist who is hell-bent on destroying the liberal democratic order of his country. Cohen-Almagor would presumably not worry about showing Sammy contempt.
He notes that “Kukathas’ arguments might be convincing in the realm of philosophy alone, not in reality” (189, emphasis added).
See my 2018, 167 ff.
See Shue’s Basic Rights.
Volenti non fit injuria. Roughly, this is the jurisprudential principle that what one volunteers for or consents to cannot be considered an injury. For example, the boxer who consents to fight cannot complain about getting punched (assuming the other boxer abided by the agreed to rules of the game).
Again, see my 2018, 167 ff.
Nor do I deny that life is bad for women in a variety of cultural or religious groups. I am quite happy, for that reason, to encourage dialogue between those in the broader liberal culture and those within smaller more authoritarian groups. The Amish practice of Rumspringa (see 223 ff) seems to me one practice that allows this. That does not mean there is not abuse within Amish communities (see 219–222). Unfortunately, Cohen-Almagor does not give comparable stats in the broader liberal society, so it is unclear if the stats (and, in some cases, anecdotes) from within the Amish community demonstrate that it is significantly deficient by comparison. One can easily imagine what Amish people think of the depravities aired on television every day by the broader liberal community.
This is worth further discussion. We must admit some people will rationally want to exit their community and we may want to help them do so. Certainly, a liberal state ought to help if these individuals are genuinely victims of harm by the community. Cohen-Almagor seems to want more; he claims that the “rights violations…, the insufficient dispute resolution mechanism and the inability of individuals to leave the community if they so desire without penalty justify state intervention” (186, emphasis added). However, it is doubtful that the liberal state should seek to make it costless for the potential community emigrants—this may well be impossible in any case. I do not believe we ought to force the community to change so that the potential emigrant can stay but be in comfort. That response—which I think Cohen-Almagor would favor—imposes costs directly on the community instead of the potential emigrant. While a community that causes individuals harm should likely bear some of the costs of aiding emigration, some costs simply cannot be transferred. The community can do nothing, for example, to eliminate the emotional pain the emigrant is likely to suffer if she can’t maintain relationships she had in the community. Some might insist that this is why she should not have to leave at all and the community ought to be made to change. As I note next in the text, though, that would essentially change the community which means the potential emigrant could only stay in a changed community. Her desire might then go frustrated (indirectly bearing a cost she sought to avoid). Admittedly, she may prefer the changed community to the original; it’s unclear, though, why her preference ought to take precedence over that of all of the other members of the community who do not want the change. (If she can convince them to change, whether from within or as an emigrant, then all will be well. Here, I agree with Cohen-Almagor (190) except that while he thinks this is merely preferable, I think it the only liberal response.) For more, see my 2018, 168 ff., including the discussion of Okin’s challenges on 169 ff.
References
Andrew J. C. (2018). Toleration and Freedom From Harm: Liberalism Reconceived. NY: Routledge.
Cohen-Almagor (2021). Raphael. Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mill, J. S. (1978). On Liberty. Elizabeth Rappaport. ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Shue, H. (1996). Basic Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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For helpful feedback. I am grateful to Peter Balint, William Edmundson, and Ryan Muldoon.
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Cohen, A.J. What about Opting out of Liberalism? A comment on Raphael Cohen-Almagor’s Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism. Philosophia 50, 2357–2367 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00544-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00544-6