Abstract
In this paper I propose an interpretation of Kant’s notion of the highest good which bears political, ethical, and religious layers simultaneously. I argue that a proper analysis of what Kant allows us to hope for necessarily involves what we should hope for as moral agents. I argue that Kant’s conception of the highest good plays a crucial role in his moral theory as it designates the ideal “context” of moral experience which can be described as “a moral world”. Each of these three layers or aspects of the moral world (i.e., political, ethical, and religious) as the interrelated contexts in and through which we realize our moral agency is inextricably linked with the highest good. Without any dichotomy between secular or religious conceptualization of the highest good, in the political and in certain aspects of the ethical contexts we should adopt certain hopes as an implicit aspect of being virtuous, whereas from a religious perspective we are able to, and we may legitimately adopt hope and faith about the cosmic/ teleological context of our moral experience.
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Notes
I believe that the highest good makes the pinnacle of Kant’s comprehensive “moral teleology” which he articulates in detail in the third Critique (KU 5:447), whereas its systematicity can be traced in his various works in varying forms, arguments, and implications. In his essay “On the use of teleological principles in philosophy” (1788) Kant uses the specific term “a pure practical teleology, i.e., a morals” (eine reine praktische Teleologie, d.i. eine Moral) for the first time (8:182-3), whereas this brief essay is mostly ignored in the literature. I use the term ‘moral teleology’ in a comprehensive sense to emphasize that according to Kant moral willing is implicitly purposive (R 6: 4–6) and necessarily concerned with its success (KU 5:432, 5:447, ), i.e., with the consequences of its volition, morality and reason has necessary ends, and reason demands that both nature and history should harmonize with its claims (KU 5:431-2; UH 8:18, 27, 29, 30, 40; G 4:432; TP 8:312-3; EA 8:328–331; PP 8:377; CF 7:91–93 ).
In her article “Kant’s contextualism” (2018) Katrin Flikschuh uses the term “contextualism” in a sense which implies some sort of relativism or context-sensitivity for moral judgment, in the application of Kant’s formal moral principles. In this paper I use the term “context” in a broader sense to embrace both the environment within which moral experience transpires and the perspective through which one perceives her moral agency and moral environment. In my usage political, ethical, and religious contexts are considered as different aspects of moral experience. Even though it is possible to refer each as different contexts, to emphasize the unity of one’s moral experience I prefer to designate them as different aspects of a single context. I would like to thank dear Saniye Vatansever for bringing Flikschuh’s article to my attention.
KdrV A808/B836.
KdrV A807/B835, A808/B836, A815/B843; KdrV 5:125, 5:128, 5:145; R 6:5; KU 5:444, 446, 458, 471.
TP 8:279; KdrV A813/B841; KprV 5:115,130; KU 5:453, 471.
Reath attributes this role merely to what he designates as the “secular conception of the highest good” (Reath, 1988, p. 600). Reath’s reading rightly emphasizes that the highest good embraces the collective realization of two parts of the metaphysics of morals, namely duties of rights and duties of justice (Reath, 1988, p. 615) and it systematizes and unifies all ends of morality. Nevertheless, as I argue below in § 5, his reading of “religious conception” which excludes Kant’s moral teleology is restrictive and problematic.
In “Two Conceptions of Kantian Autonomy” (Tilev, 2021), I argue that a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s notion of autonomy and religiosity involves considering autonomy as our share of the divine in us. In this conception, moral willing regards the divine willing as an exemplar and aims at instantiating the morally good as a part of cosmic teleology.
KdrV A798/B826; KprV 5:108, 109, 110, 122, 129; KU 5:444,446, 458.
Silber (1958) also refers to Kant’s two conceptions of the highest good. One of them is the “immanent conception” of the highest good which is our duty to promote, the other is the “transcendent conception” which refers to the final end of reason as the realization of the highest good. Silber regards this second as transcendent conceptualization, which functions as the standard or the paradigm for our duty to promote it. In a similar line of thought, I argue that the final end of reason, which is the moral-rational interest or demand for the realization of the highest good, plays a regulative role for our duty to promote it. Nevertheless, I contend that this picture does not introduce two distinct objects or notions for the highest good since both refer to the same notion: the “moral world”. These two conceptions indicate the ways in which we relate ourselves to such a moral context. Vatansever (2021) again mentions two senses for the highest good (as secular and religious) in her article “Kant’s coherent theory of the highest good”. She holds that “Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of individual humans and the domain of the human species” (Vatansever, 2021, p. 263). She argues that while the former (domain of the individual) requires a religious reading and immortality of the soul, the latter can be considered in secular terms. Like Reath (1988), she successfully establishes how a secular version can be achieved by practicing the moral law itself as a duty. Nevertheless, her “religious conception” implies a merely individualistic and post-mortem reading of the highest good, and she does not account for how these two conceptions are or can be unified in moral reasoning and acting.
In most of the texts where Kant refers to the highest good his reference to our duty to promote it outweighs its realization as a moral requirement on behalf of us. Even in the context of the second Critique where Kant elaborates the highest good to substantiate the postulates of practical reason (God, immortality of the soul and freedom), out of the twenty-two passages in which Kant mentions the highest good as a moral requirement upon us, in nine of them he talks of “realizing” or “producing” the highest good (KprV 5:43, 109, 113, 119, 122, 126, 129, 144). In all these passages only three of them explicitly specify the realization of the highest good as a duty. Three others focus on the necessary or natural relation between a morally determined will and the realization of the highest good as its object. Two of them simply neglect the obscurity in the meaning and keep the tone of “either or” between promotion and realization. In the rest of the second Critique Kant clearly states that it is a moral duty to “promote” the highest good rather than to “realize” it: see KprV 5:114, 119, 122, 125, 130, 142, 143, 145, 146. In most of these passages, Kant directly uses the terms duty, ought, or command in relation to promoting the highest good. Thus, both the number of these passages, and their phrasing and emphasis enable us to claim that regarded as a duty Kant’s dominant approach is promoting the highest good rather than realizing it. Furthermore, in almost all works subsequent to the second Critique, Kant explicitly states that the highest good is to be achieved in the sensible, or in the natural world (KU 5:450) initially through our collectivity with or without divine assistance (TP 8:130,277–280, WO 8:139, R 6:6, 104, 135; MM 6:354–355).
Kant’s own subjective conviction sides with rational faith: “However, given all of the capacities of our reason, it is impossible for us to represent these two requirements of the final end that is set for us by the moral law as both connected by merely natural causes and adequate to the idea of the final end as so conceived. Thus the concept of the practical necessity of such an end, by means of the application of our own powers, is not congruent with the theoretical concept of the physical possibility of producing it if we do not connect our freedom with any other causality (as a means) than that of nature” (KU 5:450). Nonetheless, we should notice that here he talks of the final end of reason, not about the particular duty of promoting the highest good.
Similarly, Kleingeld (2016, p. 40) also argues that happiness can be considered as a legitimate component of the moral world in which the highest good is realized, because it is a duty of virtue (grounded in the moral law itself) to promote the happiness of others and in this moral world all would be aiming at happiness of all collectively.
See for instance: “Accordingly, happiness in exact proportion to morality constitutes the highest good of a possible world which stands as the necessary object of any will determined by the moral law” (KprV 5:122). Only in very few places does Kant talk of maximum or greatest happiness connected with maximum perfection. His continuous requirement of “proportionality” suggests that, although the highest good in the world is envisaged as a whole in which all relations are harmonized with the demands of morality, everyone also gets what exactly they “deserve” in the form of happiness. He keeps this approach in his works after the second Critique where he emphasizes the highest good in the world, rather than an intelligible, future world. See also; KprV 5: 110-1 (“exact” proportion), 115 (“precise” proportion), 119,124,125, 130 (“in most exact proportion”), 145; KU 5:436, TP 8:280, R 6:6, NF 18:464. (See also Insole 2008, pp. 334–335). As a sidenote, I contend that the proportionality element of the highest good signifies “justice” which I believe to be the paradigm of Kant’s moral thought.
See KdrV A813/B841, KU 5:453.
Engstrom also states that Kant “views morality and happiness as much more intimately related than is often supposed. He does not regard the moral requirements of duty as imposed upon us with a complete lack of consideration for our natural end of happiness. Rather, this natural end is always presupposed as the material that is to be subjected to a rational form. From the start, reason’s concern is to legitimize our naturally self-interested actions and purposes” (Engstrom, 1992, p.779).
According to Kant, virtuous disposition refers to a mastery over one’s inclinations and setting oneself proper –morally necessitated and permitted – ends. Therefore, in a continuous virtuous disposition, in time, one frees oneself by moral self-discipline and self-development from the burden of capricious inclinations and impossible or improper ends, all of which contribute to holistic well-being of the moral agent which can be legitimately designated as happiness (see also: R 6:58). For a further and successful elaboration of this point see also, Alix Cohen “Kant on Moral Feelings, Moral Desires and the Cultivation of Virtue” (2018, pp. 3–18).
In the second Critique Kant emphasizes this proportionality and uses it to argue for the immortality of the soul or a future world to realize the highest good. Nevertheless, in his later works too where he locates the highest good in nature rather than in a future world, he does not give up the requirement of the necessary connection between happiness and virtue, now formulating it in terms of a demand for the harmony between laws of nature and morals.
Guyer considers that hope in the highest good and postulates of God and immortality meet our psychological needs to be able make virtue our end (Guyer, 2000, p. 370).
Kleingeld (2016, pp. 42–45) successfully explicates how the duty to promote the highest good can be considered as a particular duty, without being analytically derived from the moral law, so that it provides an extension to the categorical imperative.
At this point it is important to note that Kant repeatedly defines the highest good as the necessary object of a will determined by the moral law. This raises the legitimate suspicion that lacking such an end is a symptom of a moral failure. Kantian hope always involves a certain mindset, a virtuous disposition, certain moral attachments and a “moral agenda”. So long as our willing is more nearly specified by the moral law, the ends/ objects of our desire would overlap more with that moral agenda.
As the following sections argue, Kantian hope should not be treated as a personal or singular psychological state. Hope is a regulative principle and a moral perspective embracing who and where we are; it plays a continuous and fundamental role in our maxim formations. In this regard, it is not added as an extra “motivating” element to our principled actions. At times we all might feel desperate about the dignity of our species or about the possibility of a better future. Nevertheless, even if we cannot answer how and when exactly things can be better, principled hope involves adopting a moral agenda beyond our temporal emotional states which removes the apparent absurdity of moral commitments and makes it possible for us to act.
For a detailed analysis of this point and its relevance to Kant’s Critical account of rational judgment and justification see Westphal 2020, pp. 291–305.
In almost all works subsequent to the second Critique, Kant explicitly states that the highest good is to be achieved in the sensible, or in the natural world (KU 5:450) initially through our collectivity with or without divine assistance (TP 8:130,277–280, WO 8:139, R 6:6, 104, 135; MM 6:354–355). Nevertheless, as I argue here, in particular, Religion and the third Critique do not move towards a secular version, but rather emphasize the collectivity of morality for Kant; both works emphasize that the full realization of a moral world demands God and teleology.
Reath considers that Religion establishes this claim as he considers the ethical community of Religion merely as a secular social ideal (Reath (1998) pp. 617–619).
Thorpe (2010) considers the realm of ends “as a real whole” made of “individuals unified by laws they have.
given themselves” namely as a community of autonomous individuals (2010, p. 461).
“It is true that, even though a rational being scrupulously follows this maxim himself, he cannot for that reason count upon every other to be faithful to the same maxim nor can he count upon the kingdom of nature and its purposive order to harmonize with him, as fitting member, toward a kingdom of ends possible through himself, that is, upon its favoring his expectation of happiness;. . .” (G 4:438).
See KprV 5:137; “If these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), and of immortality…” “Wenn, nächstdem, diese Ideen von Gott, einer intelligibelen Welt (dem Reiche Gottes)…”.
“Wenn von Pflichtgesetzen (nicht von Naturgesetzen) die Rede ist und zwar im äußeren Verhältnis der Menschen gegen einander, so betrachten wir uns in einer moralischen (intelligibelen) Welt, …”.
“. . ein ethischer Staat, d.i. ein Reich der Tugend (des guten Prinzips). . . ”
Rossi (2005) in his book The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind also argues for a global, cross-cultural sense of common moral good which can constitute a true ethical commonwealth and enable human race to defeat the evil.
Krueger (2010) argues that secular interpretations of the highest good; “a merely human kingdom of ends” like Reath’s does not provide an intelligible end for us. He suggests that in such a picture “the problem of evil” which could block the proper balance of happiness and virtue remains upon the shoulders of human agents (Krueger, 2010,163). Nevertheless, contra Krueger, I contend that “a merely human kingdom of ends” can provide an intelligible end for all the human race, regardless of one’s moral psychology. Krueger is right to admit that “the problem of evil” is a legitimate concern in attaining the highest good without hope for divine assistance. Nevertheless, it is no less a problem for the theist too, so long as the ideal of the moral world is not postponed to a future intelligible realm. Having a hopeful perspective on the human condition and the possibility of adopting collective moral ends do not mean that we can provide a rational explanation to the problem of evil. Pihlström (2013a, 2013b, esp. ch. 5) very rightly argues that a humble and reasonable theistic perspective which he designates as pragmatic philosophy of religion, does not (and should not) argue for arrogant answers to the “problem of evil” to defend “god’s reasons”. Namely a Kantian position would avoid attempting to explain why God allowed the Auschwitz or allows the crimes against humanity the Uyghur community in China suffers today. Such a humble theism does resonate with Kant’s sincerity and humility about the problem of evil in the story of Job (“Theodicy” 8:267) as well his discussion of the issue in the “End of All Things” (1794) (8:328–339). (For this point see also, Theodicy 8:260).
Reath explicitly denies any legitimacy for a theological conception of the highest good on the grounds that it is about a state of affairs that will be realized in another world, by God’s actions (Reath, 1988, 601). Nevertheless, as I argue, a religious reading of the highest good does not deny human agency, yet it stands as complementary perspective on the possibility of its full achievement. Furthermore, another premise Reath uses is problematic. Reath suggests that because “Kant commits himself to the view that only states of affairs that we can imagine as the possible results of human action are included in what is morally good”, any conception of the highest good which cannot be conceived as possible merely by human conduct is illegitimate (Reath, 1988, 597). Nevertheless, the initial passage where Reath quotes Kant, in which Kant defines “an object of practical reason as an ‘effect possible through freedom’” (Reath, 1988, 597), Kant does not refer to humanly imperfect use of freedom and rational agency. Therefore, considering Kant’s standard equation of the moral law with a possible perfect (holy) moral will, Reath’s limiting “moral good” to what humans can achieve is problematic.
Several readings which consider hope for the existence of God and immortality of the soul either as a mere psychological consolation (Guyer, 2000), or as a rational motivation for morality (Wood, 1970), fail to recognize Kant’s more comprehensive rational completeness achieved by faith within this world. Insole successfully argues that beyond being merely a moral motivation, rational faith is indispensable for a fully functioning morality, yet his conception also considers the highest good initially as a goal for happiness (Insole, 2008). Vatansever’s theological conception also initially refers to a merely individualistic and post-mortem reading of the highest good (Vatansever, 2021).
See also “The End of All Things” 8:330: “. . in this respect, consequently, it is wise to act as if another life - and the moral state in which we end this one, along with its consequences in entering on that other life – is unalterable”.
For the inconceivability of happiness and virtue after death see also Westphal 1991, pp. 153–154.
In her exceptional essay, “Applying the Concept of the Good: The Final End and the Highest Good in Kant’s Third Critique”, Esser (2016) successfully depicts what the virtuous atheist lacks “right here and now” of her moral experience in terms of failing to capture the moral demand itself. As a result of “reductive and false conceptions of nature”, she cannot conceive herself being chosen as the final end by the author of a purposive whole (2016, p. 248).
I am grateful to Lucas Thorpe to whom I had submitted the very first draft of this paper several years ago, as a course paper. With very useful feedback he had encouraged me, as he always does, to keep working on this topic. I presented an earlier version of this paper at “Kant: Action, Knowledge and Belief” conference at The American University of Beirut (2017). I am grateful to the participants of the conference for their questions and comments, in particular to Jeffrey L. Wilson and Andrew Chignell. I also would like to thank sincerely to the reviewers for their very helpful comments and efforts towards improving this manuscript.
Abbreviations
- KU:
-
Critique of Judgment
- KdrV:
-
Critique of Practical Reason
- KpV:
-
Critique of Pure Reason
- MS:
-
Metaphysics of Morals
- G:
-
Groundwork
- PP:
-
Perpetual Peace
- R:
-
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- TP:
-
On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice
- UH:
-
The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose
- WE:
-
An Answer to the Question: “What Is Enlightenment?”
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*All references to Kant’s texts are made to the Academy Edition, Kant, Gesammelte Schriften. I have used the translations in the Cambridge Editions of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation.
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