Abstract
This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s (1908, 1927) A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series (namely an ersatz-B-series) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time.
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Notes
This assumption is questionable. For instance, John Bigelow notes: ‘Incidentally, cyclic time also threatens McTaggart’s assumption that the properties past, present and future are contraries.’ (1991, pp.13–14; cf. Cameron 2015, p.53). “Cyclic time” here means time has a closed, rather than an open, topological structure, wherein all events would be past and future, with those present, having all three A-determinations. Nevertheless, even rejecting McTaggart’s questionable assumption does not ultimately prevent conflict between a transitory temporal series’ momentary temporal orderings, since series-members would both have a particular A-determination, such as presentness, in one momentary temporal ordering, and lack that same A-determination in another; and that at least seems contradictory. Even in cyclic time, events change through a transitory temporal series between having and lacking presentness.
This is how Dainton’s (2001, §6.11) Compound Presentism—whereby reality evolves through a series of overlapping temporal extended presents—is meant to escape the problem of transtemporal relations (and with it, the problem of temporal unity). Though, we see now, temporally extended presents are inessential to that solution, the same result being attainable merely with enduring entities.
Presentism, as the thesis that everything is present, does not strictly exclude past or future existents, since present things, through endurance, may also be past and/or future. This allows some, or all, past and future things to also be present. Consider, for instance, Prior’s following proposals:
We might, indeed, attempt to argue on physical or metaphysical grounds that tables and chairs and horses and men are not genuine individual continuants but only collections of these, the real continuants being certain ultimate ‘simples’ which exist throughout all time and merely get rearranged in various ways. Or we might argue that there is only a single genuine individual, the Universe, which gets John-Smithish or Mary-Brownish in such-and-such regions for such-and-such periods. (1965, p.94)
In both instances—where the ultimate individuals are, simples that get re-arranged (cf. Keller 2004, under the guise of Atomic Presentism), or a world that gets “John-Smithish or Mary-Brownish in such-and-such regions for such-and-such periods” (cf. Horgan and Potrč 2008, under the guise of Blobjectivism)—all individuals are seemingly each past, present, and future, contra McTaggart’s contention that the A-determinations are incompatible (see Section 1).
In particular, either it results in a position where conflicting momentary temporal orderings in a transitory temporal series are real together—whereby, presentism is no solution to McTaggart’s A-series paradox—or a deflationary account of the A-determinations is accepted, such as usually accompanies the static block view—whereby, presentism is redundant in solving McTaggart’s A-series paradox. And in similar ways, the merging of present realities undercuts other motivations for dynamic presentism. Accordingly, even if the merging of the distinct present realities is not against the letter of presentism, it offends its spirit.
Giuliano Torrengo (2014) has done more than anyone to clearly distinguish these issues; of the existence-entailing property of ineliminable relations (what he calls the “argument from cross-time relations”), and of the irreducible transtemporality of ineliminable relations that bridge times or their occupants (what he calls the “no-splitting problem”). In his words: ‘I urge the reader to note here that this argument—the Argument From (cross-time) Relations—is not another way to present the central problem this book is about, namely it is not another phrasing of the “no-splitting” problem.’ (Ibid., p.114).
Notably, Dainton (2001, §6.11) expounds Compound Presentism as a solution to the problem of transtemporal relations (see fn.2), and an escape for dynamic presentism from the second horn of his dilemma. But it fails against the problem of irreducible transtemporality, and the problem of temporal unity. Specifically, compound presentism may seem to solve the problem of irreducible transtemporality for dynamic presentism, by allowing irreducibly transtemporal genuine relations to hold between times within each distinct temporally extended present reality. Yet, as Dainton concedes, ‘The status of the past in compound presentism is ambiguous, since “past” comes in two forms: the real and the unreal.’ (Ibid., p.89). The Real Past concerns the near past moments contained within the temporally extended present reality, and ‘...is just as real as the (extended) present.’ (Ibid.); the Unreal Past concerns that contained within former distinct temporally extended present realities. Crucially, Dainton’s compound presentism disallows irreducibly transtemporal genuine relations to hold between distinct temporally extended present realities—between the extended present reality (including the real past) and the unreal past (former distinct temporally extended present realities). So, whilst each distinct temporally extended present reality preserves temporal unity for times within it, no temporal unity is secured for the transitory temporal series of distinct (albeit temporally extended) present realities.
Believing there is no past or future, just an eternal unchanging present, would inspire inaction, since belief that there can be no activity, undercuts motivation for efforts (requiring activity) to improve our situation. Briefly, assuming beliefs primarily serve the function of guiding our actions towards fulfilling our desires, belief in solipsistic presentism would undercut the usefulness of believing anything at all; we have all to gain and nothing to lose from disbelieving, and all to lose and nothing to gain from believing, solipsistic presentism.
The presentist’s truthmakers for facts about former or eventual present realities are “surrogates” in the sense they are not the grounds for those facts (i.e. what those facts ultimately consist in). This presupposes truthmakers, for facts about former or eventual present realities, need not be what those truths are about—contrary to Smith (2002, p.121), Merricks (2007, especially pp.132 and 137), and Mozersky (2011, pp.133–134). However, insofar as truthmaking concerns securing or guaranteeing truths, rather than providing grounds for truths, I see little reason to think truthmakers must be what their secured-truths are about. These authors have arrived at their conclusion by unhelpfully conflating truthmaking with grounding.
Le Poidevin’s emphasis on “purely” present is important here. After all, what is present need not be purely so (it might be past and/or future also), and as I later explain, this opens a crucial avenue for dynamic presentists out from the problem of temporal unity.
Actually, I am unsure that those complaining, ‘dynamic presentism fails to provide adequate grounds for truths about the non-present,’ have the same kind of objection in mind. Specifically, there is a tendency to unhelpfully conflate issues of grounding, with providing truthmakers for, truths (see fn.8). But these really are distinct concerns; it is reasonable for presentists to claim, grounds for truths about the non-present (what they ultimately consist in) are (at least partly) the constituents of what happened and what will happen (respectively for truths about the past or future), even though they may presently be unreal. After all, there is no better candidate to ground an event than that event itself. Yet, the ground itself need not be what secures or guarantees the truth that it obtained or will obtain (respectively for facts about the past or future); the ground need not be the truthmaker—if that job needs doing, then some surrogate (truthmaker) can do it.
The tense propositional operators “N(...)”,“P(...)”, and “F(...)” stand respectively for “It is now that(...)”, “It was that(...)”, and “It will be that(...)”.
This is neither the only, nor even what I consider the best, way for dynamic presentists to answer the problem of temporal unity. Nevertheless, it appears promising, and has become popular amongst dynamic presentists; it thereby earns the close consideration I give it.
It is perhaps more apt to call ersatzer presentism’s abstract time-space a non-ersatz abstract C-series, ordered by abstract C-relations, rather than an ersatz-B-series, ordered by ersatz-B-relations. Indeed, this assessment accords with Pezet’s (2018, §4) critique of ersatzer presentism. But it would be unnecessarily confusing to enforce this terminological preference.
I follow Pezet (2017a) in using the expression “There is as of now...” to capture the unrestricted existential quantifier (compared to “there is at the now...”, capturing a temporally restricted quantifier), where the “as of now” modifier is required to capture the irreducibly temporary/dynamic aspect of presentism’s ontological claims. This attracts attention to a potential circularity in the analysis of presentness. If the circularity there is problematically ineliminable, this will mean ERSATZ-PRESENT, unlike ERSATZ-PAST and ERSATZ-FUTURE, is non-reductive. However, this would not terminate ersatzer presentist claims to ideological parsimony, which survives in its reductive analyses of pastness and futurity.
Crisp (2007, pp.102–103) suggests analysing e-simultaneity in terms of being at no temporal distance. But this is inadequate where time lacks a metric. Similarly, events ending with an open temporal boundary temporally adjacent to events beginning with a closed temporal boundary, would be at no temporal distance at those boundaries, yet would not be simultaneous.
Bourne actually believes the ersatz-B-series undergoes limited changes over time. Specifically, he thinks ersatzer presentists should adopt the temporal topology of a closed-past with an open-future:
...presentism has a very good reason for adopting a branching topology; that is, where the E-relation is a one-many relation in the direction from the present to future (the direction in which the dates increase in magnitude), but only a one-one relation in the direction from the present to the past (the direction in which the dates decrease in magnitude). The reason is simple: we all need a way of distinguishing the past from the future. (2006, p.55)
Yet, in this account of an open-future with a closed-past, he posits futures that never become present. Thus, he betrays some of the most fundamental and inviolable truth-value links across time. His reasoning is most clearly manifest in the following passage:
...branching does not conflict with our ordinary presupposition that we will have a single future, although it does conflict with the idea that we have a single future. The former presupposition is something we surely do not want to reject—it is close to being a platitude. But it is far from clear that the latter presupposition has such a status, and arguably is contrary to most people’s common-sense view of the future: many people think, in a clear-headed way, that pace Lewis, we don’t have a single future, but we will have one. (Ibid., p.61)
It is straightforwardly absurd to contend it will be that p, but then maintain p may nonetheless never come about. This is clearly not commonsensical belief, despite whatever protestations Bourne might make. And even if it were, it would only evince conceptual confusion amongst common folk. However, what is especially troubling for present concerns is that, Bourne makes his ersatz-B-series temporally variable. If the ersatz-B-series is temporally variable in this way, it becomes harder to understand why we should think ersatzer presentism is any better positioned to resolve the problem of temporal unity than standard tensed facts. After all, what seems particularly problematic about Bigelow’s (1996) past- and future- orientated Lucretian properties is that they must constantly change according to reality’s evolution.
It is another question whether the ersatz-B-series is of a sort that can influence, or even track, history. This issue suggests to me that dynamic presentism would be better served in tackling the problem of temporal unity by employing governing natural laws (which do have influence) to construct their C-series. Such governing laws, by actively determining changes to reality, thereby have a better chance of explaining why the A-series follows the tracks laid down by that C-series; they have the power to drive the transitory face of time according to it.
Leininger further pressures dynamic presentists with her “One-Instant-Test”: ‘(OIT) Suppose that God creates only this one instant, exactly as it is NOW. Is he able to create—in this one instant—the relevant ingredients by which the presentist establishes temporal change?’ (2015, p.732). She complains against each of the dynamic presentist’s proposed surrogate truthmakers for facts about the non-present—including the ersatzer presentist’s (Ibid., pp.735–736)—that God could intervene and prevent reality unfolding as the truthmakers suggest. But, as Pezet (2017b, p.356, fn.41) notes, introducing God as a defeater to the truthmaker’s influence makes for a bad test, since God’s presence would both, change the supervenience base for the truths, and prevent the ersatz-B-series from playing its truthmaking role. Yet, that does not mean the ersatz-B-series cannot play its truthmaking role in the absence of such defeaters.
Though, this would offer no reprieve from the charges made at the beginning of Section 4 that the ersatz time-series cannot capture facts about temporal direction and metaphysical change, of which the argument from temporal disunity is meant to help draw out.
Bourne betrays this distinction in his own account by making some ersatz-B-relations temporary (see fn.16).
My friendly suggestion is that dynamic presentists explore such entities as immutable governing laws, or divine temporal scaffoldings, for their C-theoretic unifying determiner role-players.
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Pezet, R.E. The Problem of Temporal Unity: an Examination of the Problem and Case Study on Ersatzer Presentism. Philosophia 47, 791–821 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0001-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0001-y