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Research on the economic impact of environmental tax under the background of state-owned enterprise shareholding reform in an open economic system

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Abstract

In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg-Cournot tripartite game model and discuss the impact of tariff policy on the privatization of the state-owned enterprise, environmental tax, pollutant emission, and social welfare in an open economic system. We find that with the increase in tariff, the proportion of privatization of the state-owned enterprise increases, environmental tax falls, and environmental pollution alleviates. The relationship between social welfare and tariff is inverted U-shaped. A closed trade environment is most conducive to environmental protection, but the environmental tax at this time is very detrimental to social welfare. When social welfare is optimal, environmental damage is not the smallest.

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Data availability

The data that supports the findings of this study are available in the supplementary material of this article.

Notes

  1. In accordance with the timing of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and the environmental tax policy, we regard the reform of the state-owned enterprise shareholding system as the first stage of the game and the formulation of the environmental tax as the second stage. If the shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises and the formulation of environmental taxes are regarded as occurring at the same time, a two-stage game is constructed, and the final result is exactly the same as the three-stage game.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the reviewers and associate editor for their careful reading and helpful comments on the revision of paper.

Funding

This work was supported by the Taishan Scholars Program (tsqn20161042), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 11601270 and 72102121), and Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. ZR2021MA038).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Public Finance and Taxation, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, 250014, China

    Hui Wang

  2. School of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, 250014, China

    Yi Wang

  3. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China

    Zongxian Wang

Authors
  1. Hui Wang
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  2. Yi Wang
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  3. Zongxian Wang
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Contributions

Hui Wang, Yi Wang, Zongxian Wang: Thesis architecture design, writing the original draft.

Hui Wang: Project administration, modeling and drafting the manuscript.

Yi Wang: Formal analysis and reviewing.

Zongxian Wang: Supervision and revising the paper.

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Yi Wang or Zongxian Wang.

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Wang, H., Wang, Y. & Wang, Z. Research on the economic impact of environmental tax under the background of state-owned enterprise shareholding reform in an open economic system. Environ Sci Pollut Res 29, 81481–81491 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-21603-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-21603-1

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