Abstract
Campaign-style environmental implementation (CEI) is widely exerted in environmental protection, while its benefits and costs are controversial. We take advantage of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI) System—a latest and distinguished form of CEI launched by China in 2016, as a quasi-natural experiment, to compare the benefits and costs of CEI based on water pollution effect estimates. Our results based on the annual panel data from 500 cities during 2009–2018 show that CEPI significantly reduced water pollution by an average of 20.7%. Further cost–benefit analysis based on the estimates of water pollution reduction shows that the potential health benefits of mortality and morbidity reduction resulting from CEPI are at least $12.26 billion, without bearing additional economic costs. We also explore why CEPI is cost-effective and find that CEPI reduces water pollution and becomes cost-effective mainly through deterring local officials, punishing polluting enterprises, and increasing public participation in environmental governance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
The data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.
Notes
PUUSD refers to the total amount of urban untreated wastewater discharge, which includes industrial wastewater and other forms of wastewater, etc. This is because the CEPI is a comprehensive environmental policy, which targets not only industrial water pollution problems, but also other forms of water pollution problems. For example, the CEPI report on Inner Mongolia in western China mentions that: “the wastewater treatment capacity of Chifeng city is insufficient, and about 50,000 tons of domestic sewage is discharged directly every day, leading to the deterioration of water quality”; “there are 70,000 tons of domestic wastewater per day in Baotou city is not effectively treated directly into the river.” Therefore, we use urban untreated wastewater discharge, rather than only industrial wastewater discharge, to assess the policy performance of CEPI on water pollution.
It should be noted that in the study of He and Perloff (2016), the relationship between changes in water quality grades and infant mortality was nonlinear, which is “If water quality changes from type I or II to type III, the infant mortality rate will increase by about 6.0 per thousand. Changing water quality from type III to type IV decreases the infant mortality rate by 7.9 per thousand, if water quality deteriorates from type III to type VI, the infant mortality rate drops by 20.2 per thousand.” However, in this paper, we calculate the decrease of infant mortality based on the assumption that the water quality is improved from type III to type I or II, that is a one-grade improvement in water quality leads to a 0.6% reduction in infant mortality. The rationality for our assumption is as follows. First, according to the Chinese authorities, the water quality is divided into six grades (from type I to type VI). The type I water is the best, while type VI is the worst, and only type I to type III water can be used as drinking water. In China, 80% of surface waters are type I to III; thus, the possibility of water quality decreasing from type III to type IV, V, or VI is low. Second, even when the water quality deteriorates severely (worse than type III water), people can notice the change by sight, smell, etc., so they will not drink the water. And thus the infant mortality will not be affected.
Cancer Report in China, 2019.
References
Baron RM, Kenny DA (1986) The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. J Pers Soc Psychol 51(6):1173–1182. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173
Cheng J, Yi J, Dai S, Xiong Y (2019) Can low-carbon city construction facilitate green growth? evidence from China’s pilot low-carbon city initiative. J Clean Prod 231:1158–1170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.05.327
Chow GC (2010) China’s environmental policy: a critical survey. Princeton University Center for Economic Policy Studies No. 206. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814368810_0027
Deng H, Gan T, Tu Z (2021) China’s road to atmospheric environment governance—— based on the analysis of the central supervision of environmental protection system. China Economic Quarterly 21(05):1591–1614 (in Chinese). https://doi.org/10.13821/j.cnki.ceq.2021.05.05
Dinda S (2004) Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis: a survey. Ecol Econ 49(4):431–455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.02.011
Ding Z, Gao X, Qian X, Wang H (2021) Governmental inspection and local legislation on environmental protection: evidence from China. J Econ Surv. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12431
Duflo E, Greenstone M, Pande R, Ryan N (2018) The value of regulatory discretion: estimates from environmental inspections in India. Econometrica 86(6):2123–2160. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12876
Ebenstein A (2012) The consequences of industrialization: evidence from water pollution and digestive cancers in China. Rev Econ Stat 94(1):186–201. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00150
Fan M, He G (2019) The impact of clean water on infant mortality: evidence from China. Working paper. http://hdl.handle.net/1783.1/101379
Fan Z, Zhao R (2019) Does rule of law promote pollution control? Evidence from the establishment of the environmental court. Econ Res J 54(3):21–37 ((in Chinese))
Fang J, Liu C, Gao C (2019) The impact of environmental regulation on firm exports: evidence from environmental information disclosure policy in China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 26:37101–37113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-019-06807-2
Ferrara EL, Chong A, Duryea S (2012) Soap operas and fertility: evidence from Brazil. Am Econ J Appl Econ 4(4):1–31. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.4.4.1
Gentzkow M (2006) Television and voter turnout. Q J Econ 121(3):931–972. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.3.931
Gray W (2015) Environmental regulations and business decisions. IZA World of Labor. https://doi.org/10.15185/izawol.187
Greenstone M, He G, Li S, Zou E (2021) China’s war on pollution: evidence from the First Five Years. NBER Working Paper 28467. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28467
He G, Perloff JM (2016) Surface water quality and infant mortality in China. Econ Dev Cult Change 65(1):119–139. https://doi.org/10.1086/687603
He L, Geng M (2020) Can Chinese central government inspection on environmental protection Improve air quality? Atmosphere 11(10):1025. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos11101025
Hu X, Wu H, Ge D, Zhu DW, Zhou WB, Cheng DS (2013) Method for efficiency assessment of wastewater treatment and application based on DEA. Water Resour Prot 4:77–81. https://doi.org/10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2020.04.005 ((in Chinese))
Hu Y, Cheng H (2013) Water pollution during China’s industrial transition. Environ Dev 8:57–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2013.06.001
Jacobson L S, LaLonde R J, Sullivan D G (1993) Earnings losses of displaced workers. Am Econ Rev 83(4): 685–709. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117574
Jia K, Chen S (2019) Could campaign-style enforcement improve environmental performance? evidence from China’s central environmental protection inspection. J Environ Manage 245:282–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.05.114
Kahn ME, Li P, Zhao D (2015) Water pollution progress at borders: the role of changes in China’s political promotion incentives. Am Econ J Econ Policy 7(4):223–242. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130367
Karplus VJ, Wu M (2019) Crackdowns in Hierarchies: evidence from China’s Environmental Inspections. MIT CEEPR Working Paper No. 5700–19. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449177
Kostka G, Zhang C (2018) Tightening the grip: environmental governance under Xi Jinping. Environ Polit 27:769–781. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1491116
Kostka G, Hobbs W (2012) Local energy efficiency policy implementation in China: bridging the gap between national priorities and local interests. China Q 211:765–785. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741012000860
Landrigan PJ, Fuller R, Acosta NJR et al (2018) The lancet commission on pollution and health. The Lancet 391:462–512. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32345-0
Li P, Lu Y, Wang J (2016) Does flattening government improve economic performance? Evidence from China. J Dev Econ 123:18–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.07.002
Li R, Zhou Y, Bi J, Liu M, Li S (2020) Does the central environmental inspection actually work? J Environ Manage 253:109602. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109602
Li X, Yang X, Wei Q, Zhang B (2019) Authoritarian environmentalism and environmental policy implementation in China. Resour Conserv Recycl 145:86–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.02.011
Li S, Xu B (2020) Environmental regulation and technological innovation—evidence from the prefectural level in China. Modern Econ Res 11:31–40. https://doi.org/10.13891/j.cnki.mer.2020.11.006 ((in Chinese))
Liu G, Yang Z, Chen B, Zhang Y, Su M, Ulgiati S (2016) Prevention and control policy analysis for energy-related regional pollution management in China. Appl Energ 166:292–300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.06.032
Liu NN, Lo CW, Zhan X, Wang W (2015) Campaign-style enforcement and regulatory compliance. Public Admin Rev 75(1):85–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12285
Lorentzen P, Landry P, Yasuda J (2014) Undermining authoritarian innovation: the power of China’s industrial giants. J Polit Econ 76:182–194. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001114
Lu Y, Tao Z, Zhu L (2017) Identifying FDI Spillovers. J Int Econ 107:75–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.01.006
Ma Y (2017) Vertical environmental management: a panacea to the environmental enforcement gap in China. Chinese J of Environ Law 1(1):37–68
Mettetal E (2019) Irrigation dams, water and infant mortality: evidence from South Africa. J Dev Econ 138:17–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.11.002
Miller TR (2000) Variations between countries in values of statistical life. J Transp Econ Policy 34(2): 169–188. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20053838
OECD (2012) Mortality risk valuation in environment, health and transport policies. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264130807-en
Pan D, Hong W, Kong F (2020) Efficiency evaluation of urban wastewater treatment: evidence from 113 cities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt of China. J Environ Manage 270:110940. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110940
Pang R, Zheng D, Shi M, Zhang X (2019) Pollute first, control later? Exploring the economic threshold of effective environmental regulation in China’s context. J Environ Manage 248:109275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109275
Quan Y (2020) Public participation in campaign-style enforcement: evidence from central environmental inspection. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342170889
Ran R (2013) Perverse incentive structure and policy implementation gap in China’s local environmental politics. J Environ Pol Plan 15(1):17–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2012.752186
Schwarzenbach RP, Egli T, Hofstetter TB, von Gunten U, Wehrli B (2010) Global water pollution and human health. Annu Rev Env Resour 35:109–136. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-100809-125342
Shimshack JP, Ward MB (2005) Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance. J Environ Econ Manag 50(3):519–540. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.02.002
Shimshack J (2014) The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement. Annu Rev Resour Econ 6(1):339–360. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151821
Sun X, Wang W, Pang J, Liu X, Zhang M (2021) Study on the evolutionary game of central government and local governments under central environmental supervision system. J Clean Prod 296:126574. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126574
Tian M, Xu G, Zhang L (2019) Does environmental inspection led by central government undermine Chinese heavy-polluting firms’ stock value? The buffer role of political connection. J Clean Prod 236:117695. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.117695
Tu Z, Deng H, Shen R, Gan T (2020) The environmental and economic benefits of the Central Environmental Protection Supervision: evidence from policy pilot in Hebei. Econ Rev 1:3–16. https://doi.org/10.19361/j.er.2020.01.01 ((in Chinese))
van der Kamp D S (2017) Clean air at what cost the rise of blunt force pollution regulation in China. eScholarship, University of California. https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/vanderKamp_berkeley_0028E_17263.pdf
van Rooij B (2006) Implementation of Chinese environmental law: regular enforcement and political campaigns. Dev Chang 37(1):57–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2006.00469.x
van Rooij B, Zhu Q, Qiliang W (2017) Centralizing trends and pollution law enforcement in China. China Q 231:583–606. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000935
Wang F, Wang M, Yin H (2021a) Can campaign-style enforcement work: when and how? evidence from straw burning control in China. Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12571
Wang H, Fan C, Chen S (2021b) The impact of campaign-style enforcement on corporate environmental action: evidence from China’s central environmental protection inspection. J Clean Prod 290:125881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.125881
Wang H, Di W (2002) The determinants of government environmental performance: an empirical analysis of Chinese townships. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps02937.pdf
Wang L, Watanabe T (2019) Effects of environmental policy on public risk perceptions of haze in Tianjin city: a difference-in-differences analysis. Renew Sust Energ Rev 109:199–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.04.017
Wang Q, Yang Z (2016) Industrial water pollution, water environment treatment, and health risks in China. Environ Pollut 218:358–365. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envpol.2016.07.011
Wang W, Sun X, Zhang M (2021c) Does the central environmental inspection effectively improve air pollution?-An empirical study of 290 prefecture-level cities in China. J Environ Manage 286:112274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.112274
Wang Y, Chen X (2020) River chief system as a collaborative water governance approach in China. Int J Water Resour Dev 36:610–630. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2019.1680351
Wang Z, Feng C (2014) The impact and economic cost of environmental regulation on energy utilization in China. Appl Econ 46(27):3362–3376. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2014.929629
World Bank (2006) Water quality management: policy and institutional considerations. The World Bank, Washington, DC
World Bank (2007) Cost of pollution in China: economic estimates of physical damages. The World Bank, Washington, DC
Wu R, Hu P (2019) Does the “miracle drug” of environmental governance really improve air quality? Evidence from China’s system of central environmental protection inspections. Int J Env Res Pub He 16(5):850. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16050850
Xiang C, van Gevelt T (2020) Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environ Sci Policy 112:431–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.06.018
Xu F, Tian M, Yang J, Xu G (2020) Does environmental inspection led by the central government improve the air quality in China? The moderating role of public engagement. Sustainability 12(8):3316. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083316
Yang X, Lin S, Li Y, He M (2019) Can high-speed rail reduce environmental pollution? Evidence from China J Clean Prod 239:118135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118135
Yu X, Wang H (2013) How should the center lead China’s reforestation efforts?—policy making games between central and local governments. Resour Conserv Recycl 80:64–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2013.09.001
Zeng H, Dong B, Zhou Q, Jin Y (2021) The capital market reaction to central environmental protection inspection: evidence from China. J Clean Prod 279:123486. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123486
Zhang X, Zhuang D, Ma X, Jiang D (2014) Esophageal cancer spatial and correlation analyses: water pollution, mortality rates, and safe buffer distances in China. J Geogr Sci 24:46–58. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-014-1072-8
Zhao Y, Zhang X, Wang Y (2020) Evaluating the effects of campaign-style environmental governance: evidence from environmental protection interview in China. Environ Sci Pollut R 27:28333–28347. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-09243-9
Funding
This study was supported by the National Youth Talent Support Program and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71863016; No. 71673123).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
Dan Pan: conceptualization, funding acquisition, project administration, and writing—review and editing. Wei Hong: methodology, data curation, formal analysis, software, and writing—original draft.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
All authors have given their consent to publish this research article.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Responsible Editor: by Eyup Dogan
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix
Appendix
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pan, D., Hong, W. Benefits and costs of campaign-style environmental implementation: evidence from China’s central environmental protection inspection system. Environ Sci Pollut Res 29, 45230–45247 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-18750-w
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-18750-w