Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Imitation, conscious will and social conditioning

  • Published:
Mind & Society Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This essay aims to explore imitation in social contexts. The argument that summarizes my claim is that the perception of other people’s behaviour conditions the agent in imitating that behaviour, as evidence from social psychology holds (Bargh and Chartrand in J Pers Soc Psychol 76(6):893–910, 1999; Bargh and Ferguson in Psychol Bull 126(6):925–945, 2000; Bargh and Ferguson in Trends Cogn Sci 8(1):33–39, 2004), but what the agent perceives and experiences becomes potential motives for her actions only through her identification with a particular way of being and acting. Therefore, although the agent’s actions are conditioned by perceptual stimuli, the latter are not the cause of the actions. The agent is the ultimate cause. That is, a convergence between perceptual stimuli and conscious will. I take this latter conclusion to suggest a compatibilist approach whereby action in a social situation would require the perceptual conditioning as much as the freedom and consciousness of the agent.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See the analysis that McDougall (2001) does on imitation as the process that secures organized social life. And Gabriel Tarde (the source of McDougall) attributes the same important role to imitation in the process of social group formation and cohesion (1910, 1921).

  2. See the defence of determinism (natural and cultural) in Holbach (1978 [1770]) and more recently within social psychology, see Bargh and Chartrand (1999), Bargh and Ferguson (2000, 2004), Bargh and Baumeister (2014).

References

  • Bagg S (2018) Beyond the search for the subject: an anti-essentialist ontology for liberal democracy. Eur J Polit Theory. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885118763881

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bandura A (1999) A social cognitive theory of personality. In: Pervin L, John O (eds) Handbook of personality, 2nd edn. Guilford Publications, New York, pp 154–196

    Google Scholar 

  • Bargh J, Baumeister R (2014) Conscious and unconscious toward an integrative understanding of human mental life and action. In: Jeffrey SW, Gawronski B (eds) Dual-process theories of the social mind. The Guilford Press, New York, pp 35–49

    Google Scholar 

  • Bargh J, Chartrand T (1999) The chameleon effect: the perception-behaviour link and social interaction. J Pers Soc Psychol 76(6):893–910

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bargh J, Ferguson M (2000) Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes. Psychol Bull 126(6):925–945

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bargh J, Ferguson M (2004) How social perception can automatically influence behavior. Trends Cogn Sci 8(1):33–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumeister R (2008) Free will in scientific psychology. Perspect Psychol Sci 3(1):14–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elzein N, Pernu T (2017) Supervenient freedom and the free will deadlock. Disputatio 45:219–243. https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0005

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer J, Kane R, Pereboom D, Vargas M (2007) Four views on free will. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt HG (1969) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. J Philos 66:829–839

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt HG (1988) The importance of what we care about. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gray J, Bargh J, Morsella E (2013) Neural correlates of the essence of conscious conflict: FMRI of sustaining incompatible intentions. Exp Brain Res 229:453–465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3566-5

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanna R, Maiese M (2009) Embodied mind in actions. Oxford University Press, Oxford

  • Hart M (2017) A modest classical compatibilism. Disputatio 9(45):265–285. https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0007

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holbach P (1978) The illusion of the free will. In: Feinberg J (ed) Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy. Dickenson Publishing Company, California, pp 418–422 (The text of Holbach was published in The system of nature, 1770)

  • Husserl E (1970) The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Northwestern University Press, Evanston

    Google Scholar 

  • Kane R (2005) A contemporary introduction to free will. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawless J (2018) Gruesome freedom: the moral limits of non-constraint. Philos Impr 18(3):1–19

    Google Scholar 

  • Libet B (1999) Do we have free will? J Conscious Stud 6(8–9):47–57

    Google Scholar 

  • McDougall W (2001) An introduction to social psychology. Batoche Books (First edition in 1919, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London), Kitchener

  • Mele A (2009) Effective intentions: the power of conscious will. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Moya C (2017) Free will and open alternatives. Disputatio 9(45):167–191. https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nahmias E, Morris S, Nadelhoffer T, Turner J (2004) The phenomenology of free will. J Conscious Stud 11(7–8):162–179

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor T, Franklin C (2018) Free will. In: Edward Z (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2018 edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/freewill/

  • Rychter P (2017) Does free will require alternative possibilities? Disputatio 9(45):131–146. https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartorio C (2017) Actual causes and free will. Disputatio 9(45):147–165. https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartre JP (1948) The psychology of imagination. Philosophical Library, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartre JP (1956) Being and nothingness. Philosophical Library, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair N (2016) Reasons, inescapability and persuasion. Philos Stud 173:2823–2844

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith M (2016) One dogma of philosophy of action. Philos Stud 173:2249–2266. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0608-9

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sripada Ch (2016) Free will and the construction of options. Philos Stud 173:2913–2933

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tarde G (1910) L’opinion et la foule. Félix Alcan, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarde G (1921) Le lois de l’imitation. Félix Alcan, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor D (2018) A minimal characterization of the indeterminacy. Philos Impr 18(5):1–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Todd P (2012) Manipulation and moral standing: an argument for incompatibilism. Philos Impr 12(7):1–18

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cultural Studies and Philosophy, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Hebei Normal University, No. 20, Road East of 2nd Ring South, Yuhua District, Shijiazhuang, 050024, Hebei, China

    Daniel Rueda Garrido

Authors
  1. Daniel Rueda Garrido
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel Rueda Garrido.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest, no funding to be acknowledged and the research doesn't involve human participation. Although I am a member of Hebei Normal University, I follow my own research project with no specific financial support from this institution or any other.

Ethical Standards

I thereby confirm that the article follows the ethical standards.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Rueda Garrido, D. Imitation, conscious will and social conditioning. Mind Soc 20, 85–102 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-020-00259-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-020-00259-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation