Abstract
During the recent recession and the continuing recovery, the national unemployment rate has maintained a level that has only been observed one other time since the Great Depression. While the initial causes of the increased unemployment rate are documented, the adjustment process and reduction of unemployment rates back toward some natural rate has not been addressed empirically. In this paper, the authors analyze labor supply side factors that may cause unemployment rates to remain high for a longer period than the typical recession. The authors focus on the impact of unemployment insurance extensions, housing market contractions and the general breadth of the economic downturn as factors that slow the labor supply adjustment process and lead to prolonged high rates of unemployment.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Some states with unemployment rates of 8.5 percent or more have received a UI benefits extension of 65 weeks. While most states allow UI to transfer, it is not always an easy process for the recipient.
Abraham and Shimer (2002)
Table 7, Monthly Labor Review, November 2011.
See Peltzman (1976) for a review of the Voter Model.
Transfer payments, such as UI, have a presumed multiplier range of 2.2 - 0.8, while exogenous changes in taxes have a lower impact on GDP. Estimates are supplied by the Congressional Budget Office
Some states offer additional funds per dependent which could increase the value over 50 percent. Also, UI benefits are transferable across state lines, but most seekers do not move until they obtain employment.
Source of information RealityTrac
National Association of Realtors 2009
Ibid 3
National Association of Realtors 2008 Conference and Expo
U.S. Census Bureau, “Geographical Mobility: 2007 to 2008, Detailed Tables
Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) provide convincing evidence that this trend may be due to Census imputation.
See Azariadis (1976)
Monthly Labor Review, BLS, July 2010 http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/07/mlr201007.pdf
H.R. 5749, Introduced April 9, 2008 by Representative Jim McDermitt (D) Washington
Rampell (2011)
For construction and theoretical justification of this variable see Keil and Pantuosco (1998).
For more information of the conventional mortgage home price index (CMHPI) see Stevens et al. (1995).
The fixed effect coefficients are not shown in the tables in order to save space. These results are available by request from the authors.
While we acknowledge that weak endogeneity may be an issue in our analysis, we believe that the inclusion of state and time fixed effects greatly reduces this issue. Many factors that impact unemployment rates and payment rates are consistent across state and/or time. For example, North Dakota has consistently lower unemployment rates than many other states because of their rich natural resource base. This impact would be included in the fixed effect for North Dakota and falls out of the analysis. In the same vein, the year 2007 was bad for all states, as the country fell into the beginning of the recession. The impact of 2007 is included in the year fixed effect and falls out of the analysis. What remains is an analysis of the variation across place and time.
References
Aaronson, D., & Davis, J., (2011). How much has house lock affected labor mobility and the unemployment rate. Chicago Fed Letter, 290.
Abraham, K., & Robert, S. (2002). “Changes in unemployment duration and labor force attachment. In K. Alan & S. Robert (Eds.), ” In the roaring nineties. New York: Russell Sage.
Azariadis, C. (1976). “On the incidence of unemployment”. The Review of Economic Studies, 43(1), 115–125.
Barro, R. (1988). The persistence of unemployment. American Economic Review, 78(2), 32–39.
Bartik, T. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies? Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Blanchard, O., & Katz, L. (1997). What we do know and do not know about the natural rate of unemployment. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1), 51–72.
Blanchard, O., & Perotti, R. (2004). An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of changes in government spending and taxes on output. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1329–1368.
Card, D., & Levine, P. (2000). “Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program,”. Journal of Public Economics, 78, 107–38.
Chetty, R. (2008). “Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance”. Journal of Political Economy, 116, 173–234.
Daly, Mary, Hobijn, Bart and Robert G. Valletta “The Recent Evolution of the Natural Rate of Unemployment” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) IZA Discussion Paper No. 5832 July, 2011
Ferreira, F., Gyourko, and Tracy, J. (2010). Housing busts and household mobility. Journal of Urban Economics, 68, 34–45.
Fredriksson, P., & Holmlund, B. (2006a). Optimal unemployment insurance design: time limits, monitoring, or workfare?”. International Tax and Public Finance, 13(5), 565–585.
Fredriksson, P., & Holmlund, B. (2006b). Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: a review of recent research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(3), 357–386.
Frey, William H. (2009), “The Great American Migration Slowdown: Regional and Metropolitan Dimensions,” Metropolitan Policy Program, The Brookings Institution, December.
Green, R., & Hendershott, P. (2001). Home-ownership and unemployment in the US. Urban Studies, 38(9), 1509–1520.
Johnes, G., & Hyclak, T. (1999). House prices and regional labor markets”. Annals of Regional Science, 33(1), 33–49.
Katz, Lawrence F. (2010), “Long-Term Unemployment in the Great Recession” Testimony for the Joint Economic Committee U.S. Congress. Hearing on “Long-Term Unemployment Causes, Consequences and Solutions.” April.
Katz, Lawrence, F., Meyer, & Bruce, D. (1990). “The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment,”. Journal of Public Economics, 41(1), 45–72.
Kennan, J., & Walker, J. R. (2011). The effect of expected income on individual migration decisions. Econometrica, 79(1), 211–51.
Meyer, B. (1990). Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells. Econometrica, 58(4), 757–782.
Moffitt, R., & Nicholson, W. (1982). The effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment,”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(1), 1–11.
Molloy, R., Smith, C., & Wozniak, A. (2011). Internal Migration in the United States. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 173–196.
Mukoyama, T., & Şahin, A. (2009). Why did the average duration of unemployment become so much longer? Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2), 200–209.
Munch, A., & Jakob, R. (2006). “Are homeowners really more unemployed? The Economic Journal, 116, 991–1013.
Nickell, S., & Layard, R. (1999). Labour market institutions and economic performance”. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 3029–3084.
Oswald, A. (1996). “Happiness and economic performance”. Economic Journal, 107, 1815–1831.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211–40.
Stevens, W., Li, Y., Lekkas, V., Abraham, J., Calhoun, C., & Kimner, T. (1995). Conventional mortgage home price index”. Journal of Housing Research, 6(3), 389–418.
Summers, L. (1986). Why is the unemployment rate so very high near full employment?”. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 339–383.
Topel, R. (1986). Local labor markets. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 111–143.
Valletta, Robert (2011) “Rising Unemployment Duration in the United States: Composition or Behavior?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper.
Yellen, J. L. (1991). Comments and discussion. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 127–133.