Abstract
Since its introduction, Hubert Dreyfus’ account of expertise has been a topic of debate and continues to be. This article focuses on one particular critique: Selinger and Crease (Cont Philos Rev 35(3):245–279, 2002) argument that Dreyfus wrongfully denies expertise to those whose expertise is a matter of propositional knowledge, which they call an ‘expert in x’. This article sets out to defend Dreyfus against the ‘expert in x’ by showing that Selinger and Crease’s use of Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between know-how and know-that as the foundation of their argument is vulnerable to Ryle’s regress argument and arguments from Radical Anti-Intellectualism.
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Notes
Most notably the debate between Dreyfus and John McDowell and those various commentators (see Joseph Schear (2013) for further reading).
Selinger and Crease’s first argument starts by pointing to how we use the word ‘expert’ in everyday discourse, stating that experts are, “those who undergo special training, give professional advice, etc.” (Selinger and Crease 2002, p. 258). Since few people go through specific, professional training to walk, Selinger and Crease object to the notion of an expert walker; they say the same of Dreyfus’ expert driver. They also state that they reject “licensed” drivers, “driving enthusiasts”, and “competitive amateurs” as experts (Selinger and Crease 2002, p. 258). The only drivers that they consider ‘experts’ are those who “belong to professional driving organizations, participate in certain kinds of competitions, and so forth” (Selinger and Crease 2002, p. 258). This is their weakest argument as it might just boil down to a terminological dispute where they do not like Dreyfus’ use of the term ‘expert’ in the contexts mentioned previously. However, they do not offer a good reason why we should not consider Dreyfus’ walkers and drivers as experts apart from the appeal to everyday use. Since Dreyfus uses the term ‘expert’ in a technical sense, this objection seems to miss its target. For instance, they say that we reserve the term ‘expert’ for those “who belong to professional driving organizations” (Selinger and Crease 2002, p. 258). Therefore, we can dissolve their first argument by making it clear that by ‘experts’ we mean those who respond intuitively in a given situation (which would include, among other things, expert walkers, talkers, and drivers) and by ‘professional’ we mean those with special training and so on. This would mean that although I might not be a ‘professional’ driver, I do consider myself an ‘expert’ driver in Dreyfus’ sense of the term.
I explain the distinction know-how and know-that in further detail later in the article.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this objection to my attention.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
It should be stressed that the argument presented in this section only has promise at this point; it is not meant as a fully developed critique of Stanley and Williamson (2001) paper.
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Capstick, M. Defending Dreyfus Against the ‘Expert in X’. Topoi 36, 343–353 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9390-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9390-3