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Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result

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Abstract

This paper addresses how multiple individual credences on logically related issues should be aggregated into collective binary beliefs. We call this binarizing belief aggregation. It is vulnerable to dilemmas such as the discursive dilemma or the lottery paradox: proposition-wise independent aggregation can generate inconsistent or not deductively closed collective judgments. Addressing this challenge using the familiar axiomatic approach, we introduce general conditions on a binarizing belief aggregation rule, including rationality conditions on individual inputs and collective outputs, and determine which rules (if any) satisfy different combinations of these conditions. Furthermore, we analyze similarities and differences between our proofs and other related proofs in the literature and conclude that the problem of binarizing belief aggregation is a free-standing aggregation problem not reducible to judgment aggregation or probabilistic opinion pooling.

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Notes

  1. For more pros and cons of credences and binary beliefs, see Dietrich (2022).

  2. In addition to the four types of belief aggregation problems, Bradley and Wagner (2012) suggest a framework for modeling intermediate belief states (finitely many-valued doxastic states) between probabilistic and binary beliefs. More complex belief aggregation methods might include different dynamic processes: sequential evidence learning by Blackwell and Dubins (1962), deliberation processes (the consensus formation model by DeGroot (1974)), and higher-order evidence learning (the peer disagreement literature and supra Bayesianism by Morris (1974)). Note also that the input does not need to be individual beliefs to form collective beliefs. If we use belief elicitation mechanisms, such as the prediction market (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), the input can be individual actions, which supposedly reveal individual beliefs.

  3. We do not argue that only binary beliefs qualify as a group agent’s belief type: for a group’s decision-making under risk or uncertainty, it might be more appropriate that the group’s beliefs take the form of credence; for mere summaries of individual beliefs, credences would be a suitable output data type.

  4. In most of the literature regarding belief binarization, belief is associated with high credence. One of them is the well-known Lockean Thesis which states that an agent should believe a proposition if and only if its probability exceeds a given threshold. However, the lottery paradox shows that the Lockean thesis might result in contradictory beliefs. Many attempts have been made to resolve this paradox (Kyburg, 1961; Leitgeb, 2017; Lin and Kelly, 2012).

  5. The interpretation of binarizing belief aggregation is flexible. The theory can be applied to belief binarization of an imprecise probability that is represented by a (finite) set of probabilistic beliefs. It can also be used for a judgment aggregation problem where a group is divided into several subgroups and each subgroup’s credence is calculated somehow from the binary beliefs of subgroup members. For example, consider the case where a political party requests separate opinions of two subgroups (e.g., machine learning programmers and labor economists) on the effect of AI on the labor market, and the opinions of each subgroup are collected through an anonymous and proposition-wise independent procedure. This method is appropriate when we want to respect the subgroups’ opinions, rather than individual opinions.

  6. Note that each agent’s opinion in Table 1 is probabilistically coherent, if we regard each formula as the set of possible worlds satisfying the formula.

  7. A typical discursive dilemma in judgment aggregation can also be viewed as a dilemma in binarizing belief aggregation. We thank the first reviewer for this indication.

  8. In the opinion pooling context, finitely additive probability measures are used and discussed in Herzberg (2015) and Nielsen (2019).

  9. A domain of F can be any non-empty set of profiles, which is not necessarily the set of all profiles.

  10. In most of the opinion pooling literature, the underlying agenda is a \(\sigma\)-algebra, and \(\sigma\)-additive probability measures are addressed (McConway, 1981). However, the results relevant to our research—the characterization of linear pooling—can be obtained under the weaker assumption of finite-additivity on an algebra as well. Thus, we do not assume the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) to be a \(\sigma\)-algebra and probability functions to be \(\sigma\)-additive when we regard opinion pooling. Moreover, we do not demand our agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) to form an algebra and thus we only require inputs and outputs to be extendable to a finite-additive probability function on \(\mathfrak {a}({\mathcal {A}})\).

  11. Note that Dietrich and List (2017a, 2017b) explored generalized opinion pooling where the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) does not need to be an algebra and is just required to be closed under complement as our agenda. However, unlike our definition of probabilistic beliefs, they require inputs and outputs of opinion pooling to be extendable to \(\sigma\)-additive probability measures.

  12. In this definition, we do not exclude \({\mathcal {Y}}= \emptyset\) and adopt the convention that \(\bigcap \emptyset = W\), which implies \(\emptyset \vDash W\).

  13. Provided that the agenda is an algebra, our notions of deductive closure and consistency are the same as the notions of individual or social logical closure and consistency in Gärdenfors (2006).

  14. There are also cases with the agenda being infinite where no distinction is made between our notion of deductive closure and the other two notions: Let W be the set of all \(0/1-\)valuations on classical propositional language L with countably infinite atomic propositional letters and \({\mathcal {A}}= \{[\psi ]\subseteq W \vert \ \psi \text{ is } \text{ a } \text{ formula } \text{ in } L \}\) where \([\psi ]\) is the set of all valuations assigning 1 to \(\psi\). In this space, for any \(Bel \subseteq {\mathcal {A}}\), any superset of \(\bigcap Bel\) in the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) is a superset of the intersection of finitely many elements in Bel due to compactness of propositional logic. For example, consider \(Bel=\{[\psi ] \subseteq W \vert \ v(\psi )=1 \}\) for some \(v \in W\). Then, \(\bigcap Bel=\{v\}\) is not in \({\mathcal {A}}\) and hence not in Bel since a singleton valuation \(\{v\}\) cannot be expressed by a formula. However, any superset of \(\{v\}\) in the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) can be expressed by a finite conjunction of formulas and thus, Bel is not only deductively closed by our definition but also satisfies the other two stronger notions.

  15. Let us explain this with the following two examples. (1) Let W be the set \({\mathbb {N}}\) of natural numbers and the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}={\mathcal {P}}({\mathbb {N}})\). Consider the belief set \(Bel=\{A \in {\mathcal {P}}({\mathbb {N}}) \vert \ A^c \text{ is } \text{ finite } \}\), called Fréchet filter on \({\mathbb {N}}\). (2) Let W be the set \({\mathbb {R}}\) of real numbers and the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) be the Borel algebra \({\mathcal {B}}\). Consider \(Bel=\{ A \in {\mathcal {B}} \vert \ (0,\epsilon ] \subseteq A \text{ for } \text{ some } \epsilon > 0 \}\). In both examples, we have \(\bigcap Bel=\emptyset \notin Bel\) and there is an empty intersection of a countable subset of Bel (e.g., \(\bigcap \{ [n,\infty ) \in {\mathcal {P}}({\mathbb {N}}) \vert \ n \in {\mathbb {N}} \}= \emptyset\) and \(\bigcap \{ (0,\frac{1}{2^n} ] \in {\mathcal {B}} \vert \ n \in {\mathbb {N}} \}= \emptyset\)). However, Bel is deductively closed according to our definition.

  16. Consider the two examples in Footnote 15. In both examples, there is an empty intersection of countably many believed propositions, and \(\bigcap Bel = \emptyset\). However, they are consistent according to our definition.

  17. In opinion pooling, (i) \(\vec {P}(A^c)=\vec {1}\) is equivalent to \(\vec {P}(A)=\vec {0}\), and (ii) \(F(\vec {P})(A) = 0\) is equivalent to \(F(\vec {P})(A^c) = 1\). However, in binarizing belief aggregation, (ii) does not hold unless we assume that CCP and CCS. Under the assumption of CDC and CCS, \(F(\vec {P})(A^c) = 1\) does not follow from \(F(\vec {P})(A) = 0\).

  18. For an exception, see Footnote 11.

  19. Their formal setting and their notion of deductive closure are different from ours. However, we can easily check that their results can be adapted to our setting. Note that they assumed, instead of ZP and CP, the weaker condition of unanimity preservation such that if \(P_i=P\) for all i, then \(F((P_i)_{i \in N})=P\), which follows from ZP and CP, but not in general vice versa. However, it is easily shown that, if we have IND, the converse also holds. Therefore, their result is equivalent to the above statement.

  20. Note that the unanimity rule parallels the notion of the unanimity rule in judgment aggregation, where, however, the opinion short of 1 means the opinion of 0, as opposed to binarizing belief aggregation.

  21. (Fact 1) represents a kind of monotonicity defined by

    $$\begin{aligned} (\hbox {MON})\ \hbox {if}\ \vec {P}(A) \le \vec {P}'(A) \ \hbox {and}\ F(\vec {P})(A)=1, \hbox {then}\ F(\vec {P}')(A)=1. \end{aligned}$$
  22. In Wang and Kim (2023), we have proven that path-connectedness and even-negatability constitute the necessary and sufficient agenda condition for the oligarchy result. Thus, the triviality result follows from the oligarchy result only under that agenda conditions.

  23. For example, if the agenda is negation connected, which is proven in Wang and Kim (2023) to be the necessary and sufficient agenda condition for the triviality result, the triviality result holds, but the oligarchy result does not hold.

  24. Two natural ways to extend a JA to a BA might include (i) assigning 0 to all profiles of probability functions that are not 0/1-valued or (ii) extending while maintaining monotonicity in a minimal manner. However, Wang and Kim (2023) have demonstrated that neither of these approaches serves as a direct and typical extension method preserving all the properties mentioned above.

  25. (Fact 1\(\upharpoonright\)) corresponds to closure under supersets of winning coalitions (sets of agents whose beliefs and the other agents’ non-beliefs are the necessary and sufficient condition for the collective belief) in judgment aggregation.

  26. It does not imply that (Fact 2\(\upharpoonright\)) is unnecessary for the results in judgment aggregation, as (Fact 2\(\upharpoonright\)) is required in [Step 3], which is needed when using our proofs for judgment aggregation.

  27. It is worth noting that the difference between their notions of consistency and deductive closure, which involve the intersection of arbitrary sets, and our weaker notions, which only involve the intersection of finitely many sets, does not impact the proof of (2\(''\)) and (4\(''\)). This is because they assume the agenda to be a (non-trivial) algebra, and our weaker notions suffice to establish (2\(''\)) and (4\(''\)).

  28. Wang and Kim (2023) have demonstrated that the agenda conditions for the oligarchy/triviality/non-existence results are path-connectedness and even-negatability/negation-connectedness/blockedness, respectively.

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Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to Hannes Leitgeb, Christian List, and Ilho Park for the excellent and insightful feedback. I am also indebted to two anonymous reviewers for the extensive comments. Furthermore, I thank the audience at the MCMP workshop on "Decision and Philosophy” and "Joint Meeting of Korean Association for Logic and Korean Association for Analytic Philosophy”. Finally, special thanks go to Chisu Kim for the exciting and fruitful discussions.

Funding

This research is based on work supported by the German Academic Scholarship Foundation and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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Appendix — Proofs

Appendix — Proofs

Lemma 1

Let W be a non-empty set, \({\mathcal {A}} \subseteq {\mathcal {P}}(W)\) be an agenda, and \(Bel:{\mathcal {A}} \rightarrow \{0,1\}\) be a binary belief function. Then, (i) Bel is complete and consistent iff Bel is extendable to a finitely additive 0/1-valued probability function on the algebra \(\mathfrak {a}({\mathcal {A}})\) generated by \({\mathcal {A}}\). (ii) Bel is complete and \(\sigma\)-consistent iff Bel is extendable to a \(\sigma\)-additive 0/1-valued probability function on the \(\sigma\)-algebra \(\sigma ({\mathcal {A}})\) generated by \({\mathcal {A}}\).

Proof

Proof of part (i)

(\(\rightarrow\)) It is well-known that any \(A \in \mathfrak {a}({\mathcal {A}})\) has the form of \(\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i}^{\circ }\) where \(E_{ij_i}^{\circ }\) is \(E_{ij_i}\)(\(\in {\mathcal {A}}\)) or \(E_{ij_i}^c\). Since the agenda \({\mathcal {A}}\) is closed under complement, we let \(A=\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i} E_{ij_i}\). Define \(Bel^{*}:\mathfrak {a}({\mathcal {A}}) \rightarrow \{0,1\}\) as

$$\begin{aligned} Bel^{*}\left( \bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i}\right) :=\max _{i=1,...,n}\min _{j_i=1,..., m_i} Bel(E_{ij_i}) \end{aligned}$$
  1. (a)

    \(Bel^*\) is well defined: Assume \(\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i} = \bigcup _{k=1}^{l}\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k}\). Then \((\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}\) \(E_{ij_i})^c \cap (\bigcup _{k=1}^{l}\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k}) = \emptyset\). Since \((\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i})^c = \bigcup _{(j_i)_i \in J} \bigcap _{i=1}^{n}E_{ij_i}^c\) where \(J=\{1,..., m_1 \} \times ... \times \{1,..., m_n \}\), we have

    $$\begin{aligned} \bigcup _{(j_i)_i \in J} \bigcup _{k=1}^{l} \bigcap _{i=1}^{n} \bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k} (E_{ij_i}^c \cap F_{kq_k} ) = \emptyset \end{aligned}$$
    (1)

    Now suppose \(Bel^*(\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i})=0\) and \(Bel^*(\bigcup _{k=1}^{l}\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k})=1\). Then for all \(i \in \{1,..., n\}\) we can pick a \(j_i \in \{1,..., m_i \}\) such that \(Bel(E_{ij_i}^c)=1\). Note that this tuple \((j_1,...,j_n)\) is contained in J defined above. Moreover, there exists \(k \in \{1,..., l\}\) such that for all \(q_k \in \{1,..., r_k\}\), \(Bel(F_{kq_k})=1\). Since Bel is consistent, \(\bigcap _{i=1}^{n} \bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k} ( E_{ij_i}^c \cap F_{kq_k} ) \ne \emptyset\), which contradicts Equation (1). Similarly, we can prove that it is not the case that \(Bel^*(\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i})=1\) and \(Bel^*(\bigcup _{k=1}^{l}\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k})=0\). Therefore, \(Bel^*(\bigcup _{i=1}^{n}\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i})= Bel^*(\bigcup _{k=1}^{l}\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k})\).

  2. (b)

    By construction, \(Bel^*(A)=Bel(A)\) for all \(A \in {\mathcal {A}}\).

  3. (c)

    \(Bel^*\) is a finitely additive probability function: \(Bel^*(W) = Bel(E \cup E^c) = max \{ Bel(E)\) \(, Bel(E^c)\}=1\) for some \(E\in {\mathcal {A}}\)(\(\ne \emptyset\)) since Bel is complete. Let \(A=\bigcup _{i=1}^{n} A_i\) where \(A_i=\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i}\) and \(B=\bigcup _{k=1}^{l} B_k\) where \(B_k=\bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}E_{kq_k}\) and assume that A and B is disjoint. Then we have

    $$\begin{aligned} Bel^{*}(A \cup B)&= Bel^{*}\left( \bigcup _{i=1}^{n} \bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i} \cup \bigcup _{k=1}^{l} \bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k}\right) \\&= \max \{Bel^{*}(A_1), ..., Bel^{*}(A_n), Bel^{*}(B_1), ..., Bel^{*}(B_l) \} \\&= \max \{Bel^{*}(A), Bel^{*}(B) \} = Bel^{*}(A) + Bel^{*}(B) \end{aligned}$$

    The last equality follows from \(Bel^{*}(A)=0\) or \(Bel^{*}(B)=0\). This holds, for otherwise there would exist \(i \in \{1,...,n\}\) such that for all \(j_i \in \{1,...,m_i\}\) \(Bel(E_{ij_i})=1\) and also \(k \in \{1,...,l\}\) such that for all \(q_k \in \{1,...,r_k\}\) \(Bel(F_{kq_k})=1\), from which it follows, by consistency of Bel, that \(\bigcap _{j_i=1}^{m_i}E_{ij_i} \cap \bigcap _{q_k=1}^{r_k}F_{kq_k} \ne \emptyset\), a contradiction to \(A \cap B = \emptyset\).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Let P be a finitely additive 0/1-valued probability function extending Bel. (a) P is complete and so is Bel since \(P(A)=1\) or \(P(A)=0\), i.e., \(P(A^c)=1\). (b) Let \(P(A_1),...,P(A_k)=1\). Then \(P(\bigcap _{i=1}^{k} A_i) =1\) and hence \(\bigcap _{i=1}^{k} A_i \ne \emptyset\). So P is consistent and so is Bel.

Proof of part (ii)

(\(\rightarrow\)) (a) If Bel is complete and \(\sigma\)-consistent, then the extension \(Bel^*\) on \(\mathfrak {a}({\mathcal {A}})\) defined in the proof of part (i)(a) is also complete and \(\sigma\)-consistent: completeness of \(Bel^*\) follows from the finite-additivity of \(Bel^*\) in the proof of part (i)(c). For \(\sigma\)-consistency, assume \(Bel^*(A_n)=1\) for all \(n \in {\mathbb {N}}\). Let \(A_n = \bigcup _{i=1}^{l(n)} \bigcap _{j=1}^{m_i} E_{ij}\). Then there exists \(i(n) \in \{1,...,l(n)\}\) such that \(Bel( E_{i(n)j} )=1\) for all \(j \in \{1,...,m_{i(n)}\}\). Note that \(A_n \supseteq \bigcap _{j=1}^{m_{i(n)}} E_{i(n)j}\) and thus \(\bigcap _{n \in {\mathbb {N}}} A_n \supseteq \bigcap _{n \in {\mathbb {N}}} \bigcap _{j=1}^{m_{i(n)}} E_{i(n)j}\). Since Bel is \(\sigma\)-consistent, \(\bigcap _{n \in {\mathbb {N}}} \bigcap _{j=1}^{m_{i(n)}} E_{i(n)j}\) is not empty and neither is \(\bigcap _{n \in {\mathbb {N}} } A_n\). Thus \(Bel^*\) is \(\sigma\)-consistent. (b) \(Bel^*\) is \(\sigma\)-additive: since it follows from completeness and \(\sigma\)-consistency of \(Bel^*\) that \(Bel^*(\bigcup_{n \in {\mathbb {N}}}A_n)=0\) iff \(Bel^*(A_n^c)=1\) for all \(n\in {\mathbb {N}}\), where \(A_n\)s are pairwise disjoint, we obtain \(Bel^*(\bigcup_{n \in {\mathbb {N}}}A_n)= \sum _{n \in {\mathbb {N}}} Bel^*(A_n)\). (c) Combining this with Carathéodory extension theorem yields the claim. (\(\leftarrow\)) It can be shown similarly to the proof of (\(\leftarrow\)) in part (i). \(\square\)

Lemma 2

In binarizing belief aggregation and judgment aggregation, the following holds:

  1. (1)

    Given CCS, CP implies ZP.

  2. (2)

    Given CCP, ZP implies CP.

  3. (3)

    Let \(W, \emptyset \in {\mathcal {A}}\). Then, \(F(\vec {P})(W)=1\) by CDC or CP, and \(F(\vec {P})(\emptyset )=0\) by CCS or ZP.

  4. (4)

    Let \(\emptyset \in {\mathcal {A}}\) and F satisfy CDC and CP. Then, F satisfies ZP iff F satisfies CCS.

Proof

  1. (1)

    Assume \(\vec {P}(A)=\vec {0}\), which is equivalent to \(\vec {P}(A^c)=\vec {1}\) since \(\vec {P}\) is a profile of probabilistic beliefs. By CP, we have \(F(\vec {P})(A^c)=1\), from which it follows that \(F(\vec {P})(A)=0\) by CCS.

  2. (2)

    Assume \(\vec {P}(A)=\vec {1}\), which is equivalent to \(\vec {P}(A^c)=\vec {0}\) since \(\vec {P}\) is a profile of probabilistic beliefs. By ZP, we have \(F(\vec {P})(A^c)=0\), from which it follows that \(F(\vec {P})(A)=1\) by CCP.

  3. (3)

    As noted already, CDC and CCS imply \(F(\vec {P})(W)=1\) and \(F(\vec {P})(\emptyset )=0\), respectively. The rest parts hold since \(\vec {P}(W)=\vec {1}\) and \(\vec {P}(\emptyset )=\vec {0}\).

  4. (4)

    (\(\leftarrow\)) ZP follows from CCS and CP by part (1). (\(\rightarrow\)) When \(\emptyset \in {\mathcal {A}}\), from ZP it follows that \(F(\vec {P})(\emptyset )=0\) by part (3), which is equivalent to CCS when we have CDC.

\(\square\)

Lemma 3

(Contagion Lemma) Let \({\mathcal {A}}\) be a non-trivial algebra and F be a BA with UD. If F satisfies CDC, ZP, CP, and IND, then it satisfies SYS.

Proof

By IND, we can let \(F(\vec {P})(A)=G_A(\vec {P}(A))\) for all \(\vec {P}\). We need to show that \(G_A=G_{B}\) for all \(A, B \in {\mathcal {A}}\).

(Case 1) \(\emptyset \ne A \subseteq B \ne W\)

By UD, \(\vec {P}\) given as in Fig. 4 can be an argument of F: since there exist possible worlds in A and \(B^c\), which are represented by dots in Fig. 4, due to UD, we can assign the probabilities \(\vec {a}\) and \(\vec {1}-\vec {a}\) to A and \(B^c\), respectively. Then B has the probabilities \(\vec {a}\). This gives the following:

  1. (i)

    If \(G_A(\vec {a})= F(\vec {P})(A)=1\), then \(F(\vec {P})(B)=G_B(\vec {a})=1\) by CDC (closure under superset).

  2. (ii)

    Since \(F(\vec {P})( A \cup B^c )=1\) by CP, if \(G_B(\vec {a})= F(\vec {P})(B)=1\), then \(F(\vec {P})(A)=G_A(\vec {a})=1\) by CDC (closure under intersection) since \((A \cup B^c) \cap B = A\).

(Case 2) \(A {\setminus } B \ne \emptyset\) and \(B {\setminus } A \ne \emptyset\)

Let \(v \in A {\setminus } B\) and \(w \in B {\setminus } A\) as in Fig. 5. We can use \(C \in {\mathcal {A}}\) such that \(\{v,w\}\subseteq C\ne W\) since \({\mathcal {A}}\) is a non-trivial algebra. (Take the union of two elements in \({\mathcal {A}}\) one of which includes v and one of which includes w. We can find such two elements whose union is not W because \({\mathcal {A}}\) is non-trivial: if there were no such two elements, it means that \((A-B) \cup (B-A) = W\), hence \({\mathcal {A}}=\{ \emptyset , A,B, W \}\) where \(B=A^c\), which contradicts the non-triviality of \({\mathcal {A}}\).) By the result of (Case 1), we have \(G_A = G_{A \cap C}=G_C= G_{C \cap B}=G_B\).

(Case 3) We can let \(G_{\emptyset } = G_A\) and \(G_W = G_A\), for any \(A(\ne \emptyset , W) \in {\mathcal {A}}\) since \(G_A(\vec {0})=0\) by ZP and \(G_A(\vec {1})=1\) by CP. \(\square\)

Fig. 4
figure 4

A dot \(\bullet\) represents a possible world

Fig. 5
figure 5

The triangles \(\scriptstyle \Delta\) indicate all possible locations at one of which a possible world is ensured to exist so that \(C \ne W\)

Theorem 4

(Triviality Result) Let \({\mathcal {A}}\) be a non-trivial algebra. The only BA satisfying UD, ZP, CP, IND, CDC, and AN is the unanimity rule.

Proof

It is easily seen that the unanimity rule satisfies all mentioned properties. For the other direction, by Lemma 3 we have SYS and thus, we can let \(F(\vec {P})(A) = G(\vec {P}(A))\) where \(G(\vec {1})=1\) by CDC (in particular \(F(\vec {P})(W)=1\)) or CP. Now suppose that \(G(\vec {a})=1\) for some \(\vec {a}\ne \vec {1}\) and pick up any \(a_i \ne 1\) in \(\vec {a}\). To derive a contradiction, we take the following three steps.

[Step 1] We show the following:

(Fact 1) if \(\vec {a} \le \vec {b}\) and if \(G(\vec {a})=1\), then \(G(\vec {b})=1\)

(Fact 2) if \(\vec {a}+\vec {b}-\vec {1} \ge \vec {0}\) and if \(G(\vec {a})=1\) and \(G(\vec {b})=1\), then \(G(\vec {a}+\vec {b}-\vec {1})=1\)

Since \({\mathcal {A}}\) is non-trivial, we have at least 3 non-empty elements of \({\mathcal {A}}\) that have no intersections with each other. We represent each possible world of such elements by a dot in Fig. 6. Since \({\mathcal {A}}\) is an algebra, there are A and B in \({\mathcal {A}}\) as in the left figure and A, B and \(A \cap B\) as in the right figure. By UD, we can assign to A and B, respectively, the probabilities \(\vec {a}\) and \(\vec {b}\) such that \(\vec {a} \le \vec {b}\), as in the left figure. In the right figure, by UD we can assign to A, B and \(A \cap B\), respectively, the probabilities \(\vec {a}\), \(\vec {b}\), and \(\vec {a}+\vec {b}-\vec {1}\) where \(\vec {a}+\vec {b}-\vec {1} \ge \vec {0}\). The left figure gives us (Fact 1) by closure under superset from CDC and the right figure gives us (Fact 2) by closure under intersection from CDC.

[Step 2] We show that \(G(\vec {a}[a_i \mapsto 0, a_l \mapsto 1 \text { for all } l \ne i])=1.\)

By (Fact 1), we can substitute \(a_i\) and \(a_l\) with any higher value keeping the value of G as 1 and by mixed applications of (Fact 1) and (Fact 2), we can substitute \(a_i\) with any lower value using the fact that for any \(\vec {a} \ge (0.5,...,0.5)\),

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ if } G(\vec {a})=1 \text{ then } G(\vec {a}+ \vec {a} - 1)=1 \end{aligned}$$
(2)

as follows. By (Fact 1), we can substitute all other components \(a_l\) (i.e., \(l \ne i\)) that are not 1 with 1 and so we have \(G((1,...,1, a_i, 1,...., 1))=1\). This process enables us to focus on the i-th component of vectors when we apply (2) because \(1+1-1=1\). Now employ (Fact 1) and (2). (i) If \(a_i \le 0.5\), we have \(G(1,...,1, 0.5, 1,...,1)=1\) by (Fact 1) and \(G(1,...,1, 0, 1,...,1)=1\) by (2). (ii) Now let \(a_i > 0.5\). After applying (2) to \(G((1,...,1, a_i, 1,...., 1))=1\) k times, we have \(G((1,...,1, a_i^{(k)}, 1,...., 1))=1\) where \(a_i^{(k)}=1-2^k(1-a_i)\) and there must be k such that \(a_i^{(k)} \le 0.5\). Then, we can use (i) and obtain \(G(1,...,1, 0, 1,...,1)=1\).

[Step 3] We show, by induction, \(G((0,...,0))=1\), which contradicts ZP.

We have \(G((0,1,...,1))=G((1,0,1,...,1))=...=G((1,...,1,0)\) by UD, AN and (Step 2). Let \(\vec {a}_k\) be a vector (0, ..., 0, 1, ..., 1) where the first k components are 0 and the others are 1. For \(k=1\), we have \(G(\vec {a}_1)=1\). Assume \(G(\vec {a}_k)=1\). Since \(G((1,...,1,0,1,...,1))=1\) where all components are 1 except for the (k+1)-th one, which is 0, we have \(G(\vec {a}_{k+1})=1\) by (Fact 2). \(\square\)

Fig. 6
figure 6

The left one is for (Fact 1) and the right one is for (Fact 2)

Theorem 5

(Oligarchy Result) Let \({\mathcal {A}}\) be a non-trivial algebra. The only BAs satisfying UD, ZP, CP, IND, and CDC are the oligarchies.

Proof

It is obvious that an oligarchy satisfies the properties. For the other direction, to construct the set M of oligarchs in Definition 11, we employ [Step 1] and [Step 2] in the proof of Theorem 4. (By UD, ZP, CP, IND and CDC, we have SYS by Lemma 3, and [Step 1] and [Step 2] follow from UD and CDC. Note that in the proof of Theorem 4, we did not use AN except in [Step 3].) Consider the set \(G^{-1}(1):=\{ \vec {a} \vert \ G(\vec {a})=1 \}\) where G is a function satisfying \(F(\vec {P})(A) = G(\vec {P}(A))\). We collect individuals i such that \(a_i=1\) for all \(\vec {a} \in G^{-1}(1)\) and define the set M of such individuals: \(M:=\{ i \in N \vert \ a_i=1 \text{ for } \text{ all } \vec {a} \text{ such } \text{ that } G(\vec {a})=1\}\). We will show (i) and (ii) in the following.

  1. (i)

    M is non-empty.

    Suppose M is empty. Then \(G(0,1,...,1)=G(1,0,1,...,1)=...=G(1,...,1,0)=1\) by [Step 1] and [Step 2], and we have \(G(0,...,0)= 1\) using the same way of [Step 3], which contradicts ZP.

  2. (ii)

    \(a_i=1\) for all \(i \in M\) iff \(G(\vec {a})=1\).

    (\(\leftarrow\)) It is obvious by the construction of M. (\(\rightarrow\)) Since we have (Fact 1) in [Step 1], it is enough to show that \(G((\mathbbm {1}_M (i))_{i \in N})=1\) where \(\mathbbm {1}_M (i) = 1\) if \(i \in M\), otherwise \(\mathbbm {1}_M (i) = 0\). For any \(j \notin M\), there is \(\vec {a}\) such that \(G(\vec {a})=1\) and \(a_j \ne 1\), by definition of M. By [Step 2],

    $$\begin{aligned} G(\vec {a}[a_j \mapsto 0, a_l \mapsto 1 \text{ for } \text{ all } l \ne j ])=1 \end{aligned}$$
    (3)

    Now, we proceed by induction analogously to [Step 3]. Enumerate individuals who are not in M, like \(j_1, j_2,...,j_{\vert N \vert - \vert M \vert }\) and let \(\vec {a}_k\) be a profile where \(a_{j_1}=0,..., a_{j_k}=0\) and other components are all 1. For \(k=1\), we have \(G(\vec {a}_1)=1\). Assume \(G(\vec {a}_k)=1\). Since by Equation (3) we have \(G(1,...,1,0,1,...,1)=1\) where 0 is the \(j_{k+1}\)-th component, by (Fact 2) in [Step 1], we have \(G(\vec {a}_{k+1})=1\). Therefore, we have \(G(\vec {a}_{\vert N \vert - \vert M \vert })=G((\mathbbm {1}_M (i))_{i \in N})=1\)

\(\square\)

Corollary 6

(Non-existence Result) Let \({\mathcal {A}}\) be a non-trivial algebra. There is no BA satisfying UD, CP, IND, CCP, and CCS.

Proof

Since CDC follows from CCP and CCS, and ZP follows from CCS and CP, the only possible BAs satisfying the above conditions would be the oligarchies by Theorem 5, which do not satisfy collective completeness. \(\square\)

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Wang, M. Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result. Theory Decis (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09968-2

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