Abstract
In this paper, I’ll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant’s philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines (1) a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with (2) a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I’ll proceed as follows. First, I’ll describe the sorts of epistemological questions I’ll be focusing on, and the framework within which I’ll try to address them. Then I’ll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant’s own views. Next, I’ll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of “transcendental argument” allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I’ll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: (1) the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and (2) the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I’ll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities.
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Notes
I address some related interpretative questions in Schafer (2018b, forthcoming b).
Here I allude to the debate about whether logical laws are constitutive of rational thought or merely normative for such thought, according to Kant. The proper answer, I believe, is that they are both. Logical principles describe what it is to be a faculty for rational thought and how such a faculty as such must function. But, in virtue of this constitutive role, they also prescribe how these faculties ought to function in creatures, like us, in whom their functioning can be disturbed by external, sensible influences. For further discussion, see Tolley (manuscript), Nunez (2018).
Compare:
Among the many concepts, however, that constitute the very mixed fabric of human cognition, there are some that are destined for pure use a priori (completely independently of all experience), and these always require a deduction of their entitlement, since proofs from experience are not sufficient for the lawfulness of such a use, and yet one must know how such concepts can relate to objects that they do derive from any experience. I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental deduction… (B117/A85)
As this passage makes clear, although Kant is interested in the status of something like rationally basic forms of thought, the nature of this interest is different from the interests of contemporary epistemologists. For one, Kant’s worries here are primarily concerned with potential for a pure a priori use of certain concepts. And second, these worries have less to do with (say) how we can have evidence that we are not in some skeptical scenario, and more to do with how these concepts can be related to objects in the manner Kantian cognition requires. I discuss these interpretative issues in much more detail in Schafer (2017, forthcoming b).
Compare Dogramaci (2015). It might be thought that the distinction between “rationally basic” and “rationally derivative” methods won’t have a place in a reliablist view. But I think any plausible form of reliabilism will need to appeal to this distinction or something like it. In any case, these issues obviously take us beyond the scope of this paper.
For more on the sort of internalism I find attractive, which is quite modest, see Schafer (2014a, forthcoming c).
Compare Schafer (2018a, forthcoming a).
For a capacity-theoretic approach to perception, see Schellenberg (2018).
Compare Wedgwood (2015).
Note that view might be developed using either a reductive or a non-reductive conception of capacities and functions. E.g. we might provide a reductive account of these notions in terms of (say) evolutionary proper functions or terms of a notion of regulation by the relevant aim. Or we might take talk of a capacity’s function to characterize a basic and irreducible standard for evaluation of that capacity’s operation. This will matter, of course, if one is interested in reducing rationality to (say) purely naturalistic terms, but that isn’t my focus here. So, I’m going to remain neutral on these metaphysical questions, although, again, I think Kant is probably best read as developing a philosophical framework which tends to reduce other sorts of facts to facts about (rational) capacities, which are themselves treated as basic (for us at least).
Well, more precisely, the understanding is the faculty for synthesis or judgment, the function of which is to contribute to cognition (see, e.g., A69/B94, A119).
For reason and comprehension, see A311/B367. For the connection between reason and systematic unity, see (e.g.) A327/B383.
Compare Willashek (forthcoming).
As noted above, for Kant, characterizations of a faculty’s function involve both a constitutive and a normative dimension.
For more detailed discussion of this, see Schafer (2018a, forthcoming a).
Hopefully this is reminiscent of the relationship between (say) sensibility and the understanding in Kant’s account.
One might push back against this by arguing that there are some rational capacities that do not make any deep or essential contribution to understanding whatsoever. For example, it has recently been argued by Hills and others that one can never get understanding from testimony. But note, again, that I am not claiming that testimony ever suffices for understanding here. So there is no clear conflict between my claims and Hills’s view of the relationship between testimony and understanding. And, indeed, as I discuss elsewhere, Hills (2015)’s own view of understanding implies that understanding has an intersubjective dimension, which (in turn) is sufficient to explain the rationality of testimony on a view like my own.
More precisely, as I argue in Schafer (2018a, forthcoming a), we can establish the rationality of testimony on a view like mine via an indirect route. In particular, following Hills, I argue there that one aspect of understanding is its intersubjective character. That is, part of achieving understanding is transcending one’s particular or idiosyncratic point of view on the object understood (insofar as such transcendence is possible). But to achieve this aspect of understanding, we must reason in ways that are sensitive to whether other rational agents would share our reasoning. Thus, on the present conception of rationality as “aiming” at understanding, rational subjects will have priors that are “biased” towards intersubjective agreement. And this, in turn, will make them responsive to the views of other rational subjects, at least insofar as they are also engaged in the project of developing shared understanding. As a result, although testimony and deference to others are not particularly effective ways of gaining understanding on their own, someone who “aims” at achieving understanding will tend to be more responsive to testimony than they otherwise would be.
This isn’t to say that there is no relationship between the discussion to follow and this issue. For instance, if I am right that understanding is partially constituted by the acceptance of certain patterns of inference, then understanding can only be identical with some form of knowledge if that form of knowledge is also partially constituted by these patterns of inference. Personally I find such a view of, say, knowledge why quite plausible. But that is an issue for another time.
For this view of cognition in Kant, see Schafer (2018b, forthcoming b). For the connection between Begreifen and reason, see Tolley (manuscript).
Alternatively, we might describe theoretical understanding as understanding of the truth and practical understanding as understanding of the good. I share with Kant the view that these formulations (once properly understood) are equivalent. But that raises complicated questions about, e.g., the guise of the good. For more discussion, see Schafer (2013).
See: “But if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law proves it to be, it is still only one and the same reason which, whether from a theoretical or a practical perspective, judges according to a priori principles; …” (5:121).
For more discussion of this see Schafer (forthcoming a).
The focus on constitutive, as opposed to merely necessary conditions is important here so that, for example, it does not turn out to be the case that digestion is rationally required for creatures like us. In general, when I talk about “necessary conditions” here, I should be read as referring to conditions that are necessary in the constitutive sense.
Compare Wedgwood (2015).
Stroud (1968). For one, we will be investigating conditions on understanding in these arguments. So these investigations will not necessarily begin with a “X” that is beyond skeptical doubt. Nor, at least in the first instance, are the necessary conditions I am interested in “worldly ones”. For both these reasons, Stroud’s critique of more “ambitious” transcendental arguments is not relevant to my arguments here.
Although it is worth noting the dialectical force of a focus on understanding in many skeptical contexts. In particular, it is difficult to see how some skeptics can reject this as an epistemic aim, given the very nature of the investigations that drive their skepticism. For example, Hume’s “consequent skepticism” is plainly the result of an attempt to better understand the nature of the human mind. So he would be hard placed to reject this aim as epistemically irrelevant. For more discussion of Hume and his conception of the aims of inquiry and their relationship to the passion of curiosity, see Schafer (2014b).
Compare Stern (2000). There are, of course, potential exceptions to these claims, such as the Refutation of Idealism in the theoretical sphere and the argument of Groundwork III in the practical one. In both cases, I ultimately think that the arguments in question are somewhat less ambitious (in this sense) than they are often taken to be. But that is a complicated issue, to be sure.
“In my view, it is a brute fact of epistemic rationality, once properly understood so as to appreciate its extent, that it mandates certain assumptions…” Coliva (2015).
Of course, complete or full understanding is something finite creatures like us will presumably nevers achieve. In this sense, it is akin to Kant’s conception of the “ideas of reason” (see A574/B602).
It is important to stress that factive understanding would remain the telos of rationality on such a conception. It would simply be the case that we would not expect individuals to fully achieve this telos for the purposes of thinking about what they are rationally required to do/believe.
This version of my arguments would share some important features with the view in McDowell (2006).
Whether this additional step is required here will, of course, depend somewhat on one’s views about the possibility of “rational dilemmas”. I include it here to sidestep these issues.
As above, it is important to understand the references to “understanding” in this schema to refer to the sort of understanding that is expected of individuals in the relevant context.
Importantly, the elements of this “list” of forms of thought will often be quite indeterminate or disjunctive—since there may be a variety of forms of thought which individuals in W make use of to constitute understanding. Moreover, the rules at issue in this second case will often be implicitly global as opposed to local in character. Or, in so far as they are local, they will be defeasible.
Here again I draw upon Schafer (forthcoming a).
One might worry that this procedure will result in a list of rationally permissible methods that are too “consequentialist” in the sense of allowing us to trade-off local forms of irrationality for global increases in understanding. But I think this is not the case. Consider first the requirements of ideal rationality, where these are unconcerned with the limitations of real world subjects. In this case, there will be no need for such trade-offs, since an ideally rational subject can achieve complete understanding everywhere. In the case of non-ideal rationality, on the other hand, we will be allowing the limitations of finite agents to inform which methods are rational for them. Given this, the methods that are most conducive to understanding will always limit these sorts of trade-offs, simply because the search for trade-offs itself would exhaust a finite subject’s cognitive resources.
Note that I’m not using “ground” in any technical sense here. Thus, I mean to be neutral here on what these sorts of basing relations involve, and I certainly don’t mean to commit myself to any claims about the relationship between inference to the best explanation and “grounding” in the contemporary metaphysical sense of the term.
Clearly the references to “sufficiency” and “defeasbility” are doing a non-trivial amount of work in these claims. Even so, as has been pointed out to me, these claims will make the connection between explanation and prediction tighter than many philosophers of science find plausible. So it certainly is possible that the sense in which “explanation is a guide to prediction” may be weaker than this. But provided that some connection of this remains, the basic point I am making here will apply. For more discussion of this issue, see White (2005).
Thus, “taking one belief to ground another” need not necessarily involve any further explicit higher-order beliefs. All it requires is that one connect these beliefs together via a network of inferences of the appropriate sort. Of course, whether these inferences, in turn, require the satisfaction of some further “taking condition” is a further question. For discussion of this issue, see Boghossian (2008).
Note that this is not primarily a point about how the relevant network of beliefs is acquired. For example, it might well be possible to simply “implant” an understanding of certain topics into someone’s mind. The point here is not that this is impossible, but that part of what would have to be “implanted” in such a case is the acceptance of certain patterns of reasoning connecting these beliefs together. In other words, the acceptance of certain patterns of inference is important here because it provides “unity” to one’s network of beliefs, and not so much because it is the explanation of these belief’s original acquisition.
For more on this aspect of cognition, see Schafer (forthcoming b). For determinacy as a necessary condition on cognition, see (for example): “Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of a given representation to an object.” (B137) And, “… the categories are not restricted in thinking by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unbounded field, and only the cognition of objects that we think, the determination of the object, requires intuition.” (B166, compare A258/B314).
See, e.g. Burge (2010), Peacocke (2003), Campbell (2002) for related discussion. Schellenberg (2018) develops a similar line of thought about the function of our perceptual capacities in much more detail. In future work, I plan to discuss how her views connect up with the present way of thinking about rationality in general.
One could object to P3, by trying to argue that a reliance on perception is required for the acquisition of such concepts, but not for their continued use. To my mind, this involves a failure to correctly characterize the manner in which the possession conditions for perceptual concepts involves a continuing receptivity to perceptual experience. But in the end this is just one of the many issues in the philosophy of perception that this section raises, but cannot fully answer, given the limitations of space.
A particular issue here is how this argument relates to the various sensory modes involved in perception. Considering this question would take us too far afield. But note that there is some plausibility to the idea that if we take certain sensory modes at face value, it will be arbitrary and so irrational for us not to do so for other sensory modes (in absence of evidence of their unreliability). But spelling out this idea is something that will have to wait for another time.
Particularly important here is the question of whether this account can deliver intuitive results, not just about the rationality of general methods of perceptual belief formation, but also about the rationality of particular token perceptual beliefs. My view is that most ordinary token perceptual beliefs are not rationally basic in the sense we have been discussing—rather, their rationality is explained by the rationality of general methods of belief formation of the sort I have been discussing here. Thus, the sorts of “transcendental arguments” I have been discussing here should not be expected to directly deliver a verdict on the rationality of such beliefs. Instead, these arguments will (if all goes well) explain the rationality of methods, which then in turn will explain the rationality of such token beliefs.
See, for example: “I will merely precede this with the explanation of the categories. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments.” (A94/B128)
See e.g. Pryor (2001).
Compare Silins (2008).
Although, again, the rationality of non-basic beliefs will be explained in terms of the rationality of either basic methods or basic assumptions (or both). Presumably most of our ordinary token beliefs are non-basic. So in most cases, the rationality of a particular belief will be explained by the rationality more basic, and more general, feature of our psychology—be this the use of a method or a general basic belief. In this sense, the approach here is much closer to what is sometimes called “methodism” as opposed to “particularism”.
For a view about the nature of normative theorizing in general that would help to explain this conclusion, see Sayre-McCord (manuscript). I’m very sympathetic to Sayre-McCord’s line of argument there.
I discuss this argument against hinge epistemology in more detail elsewhere.
Also note the related distinction between the count and mass uses of “my evidence supports P”. The sense of this phrase that seems to me to be essentially connected with epistemic rationality or justification is (roughly speaking) the mass sense. And this use does not, I think, license an inference from “my evidence supports P” to “I have some particular piece of evidence that supports P”. In cases where we have an a priori propositional entitlement to P, we can continue to say that our “evidence” corroborates the truth of P (in this mass sense)—even though we cannot point to any particular piece or pieces of evidence that play this role. For on this use, the phrase “my evidence supports” is simply a way of describing what my current situation makes epistemically rational.
It’s a further question whether this procedure will be able to establish conditions on the rationality of other doxastic attitudes, but I’m optimistic about this question. Consider, for example, the attitude of suspending judgment. In cases like this one, I acknowledge that things are somewhat more complicated than in the case of belief, since suspension of judgment does not seem to be directly constitutive of understanding in the manner that possessing certain beliefs plausibly is. Nonetheless, in a manner similar to the case of the rationality of testimony, I believe that we can establish rational requirements on suspension of judgment via a more indirect route on the present account. In particular, we can show that there are such requirements by (1) establishing that the use of certain methods is constitutive of understanding and then (2) showing that the use of these methods requires a credence function that itself commits one to the rationality of suspending judgment in certain situations. Unfortunately, working this out in detail would require discussing what suspension of belief is and the degree to which it is governed by epistemic as opposed to practical norms. So fully developing an account of this issue would require far more space than we have here. That being said, hopefully the brief discussion of the testimonial case above gives one a sense of how such account might work.
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Acknowledgements
This paper draws on material that I have presented to a diverse range of audiences over the last few years, but this paper in particular has been much improved by the feedback I received from audiences at the University of California, Irvine and New York University, Abu Dhabi. Special thanks are also due to Yuval Avnur, Sinan Dogramaci, Chuck Goldhaber, and several very helpful anonymous referees.
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Schafer, K. A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments. Synthese 198 (Suppl 13), 3113–3136 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02005-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02005-8