Abstract
In this article, we tackle the phenomenon of what seems to be a misunderstanding between science education theory and philosophy of science—one which does not seem to have received any attention in the literature. While there seems to be a consensus within the realm of science education on limiting or altogether denying the explanatory role of scientific laws (particularly in contrast with “theories”), none of the canonical models of scientific explanation (covering law, statistical relevance, unification, mechanistic-causal, pragmatic) lends any support to this view of laws. We will reconstruct three different versions of this demotion of laws (i.e., laws are merely descriptive; laws are explanatory only of singular events, not of laws; laws are explanatory but only in a “superficial” way), propose possible grounds for them, and illustrate why these perspectives pose a conceptual challenge as they contrast with epistemological approaches to the problem of explanation. We will also suggest the potential negative outcomes that would arise from science teachers adopting these approaches in the classroom when aiming to assist students in moving beyond mere description and towards explanation.
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Notes
Toulmin’s model (1958) establishes that everyday argumentations do not follow the classical rigorous model of deductive logic and develops one suitable for analysing any type of argumentation in the framework of social discourses. It considers that an argument is a complex structure that involves a movement from evidence (grounds) to an assertion (claim) through a warrant that enables the connection.
In Hempel’s proposal, historical explanation of a certain event “aims at showing that the event in question was not ‘a matter of chance,’ but was to be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of general laws” (Hempel, 1942, p. 39. Emphasis ours). This is exemplified, among other instances, by McConnell’s explanation of why government offices and bureaus tend to “fortify themselves” and “enlarge the scope of their operations”: the explanation appeals to general laws such as those according to which “People who have jobs do not like to lose them; those who are habituated to certain skills do not welcome change” (Hempel, 1942, p. 40), and so on. But, of course, the same model is applicable to the explanation of physical events, such as the cracking of a car radiator during a cold night, which appeals to general laws such as the one which establishes the temperatures at which water freezes and increases the pressure it exerts (Hempel, 1942, p. 36). Explanations by means of subsumption under general laws can also be found, according to Hempel and Oppenheim, in other realms: it is by means of laws that we explain why the prices of cotton suddenly dropped in 1946, or why northern and southern France have such different linguistic resources to say “bee” (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, pp. 140–141).
“Nomological” is technical jargon for “lawful,” from the Greek “nomos,” “law.”
Note here, by the way, how Salmon is well aware that not all laws are empirical. There are also theoretical laws—a point which will be central below, in Section 6.
Of course, we are not claiming that teachers themselves commit the kinds of misunderstanding we are reviewing here. However, insofar as theoretical proposals in science education at least aim at guiding the actual practice of science teaching, it is perfectly reasonable to assess what would be the consequences of the approaches we are considering, if they were taken up by teachers (whether they currently do or not is an empirical question which goes beyond the scope of this article).
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Edelsztein, V., Cormick, C. Who Says Scientific Laws Are Not Explanatory?. Sci & Educ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-023-00465-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-023-00465-0