Abstract
This paper examines the notion of laws in chemistry. Vihalemm (Found Chem 5(1):7–22, 2003) argues that the laws of chemistry are fundamentally the same as the laws of physics they are all ceteris paribus laws which are true “in ideal conditions”. In contrast, Scerri (2000) contends that the laws of chemistry are fundamentally different to the laws of physics, because they involve approximations. Christie (Stud Hist Philos Sci 25:613–629, 1994) and Christie and Christie (Of minds and molecules. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 34–50, 2000) agree that the laws of chemistry are operationally different to the laws of physics, but claim that the distinction between exact and approximate laws is too simplistic to taxonomise them. Approximations in chemistry involve diverse kinds of activity and often what counts as a scientific law in chemistry is dictated by the context of its use in scientific practice. This paper addresses the question of what makes chemical laws distinctive independently of the separate question as to how they are related to the laws of physics. From an analysis of some candidate ceteris paribus laws in chemistry, this paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of ceteris paribus laws in chemistry; idealized and approximate chemical laws. Thus, while Christie (Stud Hist Philos Sci 25:613–629, 1994) and Christie and Christie (Of minds and molecules. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 34--50, 2000) are correct to point out that the candidate generalisations in chemistry are diverse and heterogeneous, a distinction between idealizations and approximations can nevertheless be used to successfully taxonomise them.
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Notes
See next section for a discussion.
This is the classic view taken by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) For example “All Metals Conduct Electricity” is a law because it is expressed in an unproblematic way as a universally quantified conditional. So let F stand for the metal and G the conduction of electricity, then this law can be expressed straightforwardly as ∀x (Fx → Gx). Importantly, this statement has wide scope is not restricted to spatio-temporal domains and it entails the counterfactual statement that if x were a metal then x would conduct electricity.
This is not the only cross-disciplinary question. Indeed, how the laws of chemistry relate to the laws of biology is also an interesting question. My aim in (1) and (2) is to try to show that we can ask the question as to what makes the laws of chemistry distinctive, in a domain specific way. It is a distinct question from how the laws of chemistry are distinctive to laws in other sciences (e.g. physics and biology).
Examples of nonstoichiometric compounds are magnetite and iron oxide.
See Scerri and Worrall (2001) for a discussion.
It certainly was useful since prior to Mendeleev’s formulation there was no systematic way of organising the chemical elements in a pedagogically significant way. Thus, chemistry textbooks were fast becoming unwieldy and so detailed that they lacked any overall theoretical framework that would sytematically reflect a useful way of organising the elements for chemistry students.
I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this ambiguity out.
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Tobin, E. Chemical Laws, Idealization and Approximation. Sci & Educ 22, 1581–1592 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9445-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9445-9