Abstract
When a Christian refers to the future full realization of the kingdom of God in an afterlife, it is typically assumed that she is expressing (or implying) beliefs about the existence and activity of God in conjunction with supernatural beliefs about an otherworldly realm and the possibility of one’s personal survival after bodily death. In other words, the religious language is interpreted in a realist fashion and the religious person here is construed as a religious believer. A corollary of this widely-held realist view is the assumption that if one were to conclude that there is no good reason to believe the asserted claims—for example, no reason to believe that we may survive our bodily deaths in a heavenly realm—then there is no reason to engage in the use of such religious language and the practices which accompany it. I argue that this assumption is false—that there is a meaningful way to use such language in a religious context that does not rest on believing supernatural claims. Against the backdrop of Kant’s discussion of a kingdom of ends understood as a regulative ideal, I argue that religious discourse about the kingdom of God being brought to fruition may be reinterpreted as a useful fiction to draw our attention to and engage our emotions with a distinctive ideal of restorative justice. Though I and others have previously offered fictionalist accounts of language about God, I extend the view here to some religious language about the afterlife.
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Notes
The first of these quotations comes from the Nicene Creed. The second is taken from what is widely known amongst Christians as the “Lord’s Prayer,” based on Matthew 6:5–15.
That is, if there is nothing distinctively religious about the goal served by such a revision, then the case for continuing to engage in religious practice using such language is significantly diminished (though perhaps not entirely extinguished).
That is, the beliefs representing such propositions ought to be held or rejected on the basis of whether the propositions are judged to be true or false. As discussed below, highlighting this aspect of religious belief in addition to the truth-aptness of religious statements is important because on the fictionalist view, such statements may be truth-apt but the appropriate corresponding attitude may not be truth-normed (Jay 2014, pp. 209–210; Deng 2015, p. 197).
Mikel Burley has helpfully reminded me that although many have regarded Phillips’ view as non-realist, he sought to resist the characterization since he questioned the coherence of the realist position with which non-realist views are juxtaposed (Phillips 1993). Nonetheless, labels aside, insofar as Phillips clearly rejects the realist view and seems to offer his own view as an interpretation of rather than a revision of the common use of religious language, his view remains a helpful reference point in staking out the conceptual territory. See Burley (2012) for a helpful overview and defense of the Wittgenstein-inspired approach to religious belief.
For some additional arguments against hermeneutical varieties of religious non-realism, see Keller (2014).
There may be varieties of fictionalism that are available to religious realists as well (Jay 2014), but I am focusing on those that may be adopted by an atheist.
An anonymous reviewer has helpfully reminded me to highlight the fact that outwardly, the religious realist and religious non-realist may be indistinguishable in their language and practice, just as a moral realist may be indistinguishable from a moral non-realist in language and practice. Thus, to be clear, the revision concerns a change in how one understands the aim of the discourse and accompanying practice. As described below, the change for the revisionary fictionalist will be a change in the attitude adopted toward the relevant propositional content. In discussions of fictionalism in other philosophical domains, some refer to these as “revolutionary” forms of non-realism, but here the more modest characterization seems apt to me given the fact that even after the revision, there likely will be substantial overlap in the way the realist and non-realist use religious language. Some find this claim of overlap to be contentious (Cordry 2010, pp. 80–5 and Deng 2015, pp. 209–210). I have discussed this to some extent in earlier work (Eshleman 2010) and offer some further elaboration later in this paper.
In categorizing non-realist views in this way, I have been influenced by Le Poidevin (1996, chap. 8).
This also may be the form of acceptance that Jay (2014) has in mind in articulating a Kantian form of fictionalism that could be adopted by a realist.
This aspect of the view is discussed further below.
I thank Eric Steinhart for drawing my attention to this parallel.
Perhaps it goes without saying, but there is no assumption here that all those in the Abrahamic traditions share a single conception of the afterlife. Similarly, there is no assumption that conceptions of an afterlife across traditions embody the same moral ideals. For a discussion of a fictionalist interpretation of the law of karma and rebirth, see Perrett (1998, pp. 73–78).
According to a poll of citizens in 23 countries conducted for Reuters, slightly more than half of those responding said that they believe in some form of an afterlife (Ipsos 2011).
For an argument that this practical faith be interpreted as a form of religious fictionalism, see Jay (2014, pp. 213–217). My interest is instead on why Kant regarded the relevant ideal as being religious in quality.
See also Murdoch (1970, p. 84) for a similar point about the moral significance of having one’s perspective enlarged through the experience of natural beauty.
I take these last two points to be quite independent of the particular content of Kant’s regulative ideal. That is, I am not here endorsing Kant’s understanding of what morality demands of us.
The podcast text was transcribed by this author since it was not available from the producer.
As does Patricia’s compassion for her victimizer in the midst of the robbery.
Of course, Kant’s view contains at least one historical strand insofar as he believed that justice entailed a retributive conception of punishment.
The reference to a “new heaven and earth” is first made in Isaiah 65:17. The theme of renewal is reiterated in many passages in both the Hebrew and Christian bible, culminating in the eschatological vision reported in Revelation 21:1 of the Christian New Testament.
For a helpful canvassing of these developments in the biblical narrative, see Segal (Segal 2004, chaps. 6–7).
See, for example, Mark 1: 15. Though the phrase, “kingdom of God,” does not appear in the Hebrew bible, there are references to the kingship of God and “his kingdom” once the Israelites have a king of their own and begin to think of YHWH not simply as their god but as a cosmically sovereign king with authority over all of heaven and earth (see e.g., I Chronicles 29: 10–12).
See T.M. Scanlon’s recent treatment of blame, wherein he highlights the way it often involves a modification of our relation with others (Scanlon 2008, chap. 4).
In the case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, providing amnesty to those willing to give a full account of their human rights violations was thought to be the only way to persuade de Klerk and his followers to accept the radical restructuring of society being proposed. Making such a “deal” failed to yield true justice in the aftermath, in either a retributive or restorative sense. However, it was perhaps justified both as a means of possibly avoiding a full-scale civil war and in promoting the future possibility of genuine reconciliation between the peoples of South Africa. Surely, Mandela’s decision to not seek retribution against those who imprisoned and tortured him is to be credited with keeping the latter future possibility alive (Lang 2009).
The literature on forgiveness has expanded rapidly in recent decades. For discussion of the difficulty in making room in the Kantian view for forgiveness (and for a helpful suggestion about how it might be done), see Sussman (2005). Nevertheless, the topic of reconciliation, or moral repair, remains relatively underdeveloped. Important recent exceptions include Govier (2002) and Walker (2006).
I thank Chris Blakey, Avery Fouts and Daniel Speak for drawing my attention to this objection.
For defense of such a view, see Adams (1999, especially chap. 1).
Deng (2015, p. 211) similarly argues against my earlier claim (Eshleman 2010) that there can be considerable overlap between realists and fictionalists in the functions performed by religious language. The present argument is meant to further support the possibility for an important degree of overlap.
Adams seems to acknowledge this possibility: “In worlds where no such God exists, nothing would have that property, and therefore nothing would be excellent. But beings like us in such a world might have a concept subjectively indistinguishable from our concept of excellence, and there might be an objective property that corresponded to it well enough, and in a sufficiently salient way, to be the property signified by it, though it would not be the property that we in fact signify by ‘excellent’ (Adams 1999, p. 46).
Hector Black makes reference to his Christian practice in his victim impact statement (see earlier quoted material), but I am not familiar with his deeper theological commitments. Vaclav Havel and Nelson Mandela are, arguably, prominent examples of such a secular faith in the moral potential of their oppressors.
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Acknowledgments
This project/publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. The grant was a sub-award of The Immortality Project, a project directed by John Martin Fischer at the University of California, Riverside. I am grateful for this support and for comments received from audience members when earlier versions of this paper were presented at the capstone conference for the Immortality Project, as well as at the “Workshop on Naturalism: Methodological Challenges,” Federal University of Pelotas, Brazil. I am also thankful for helpful feedback on earlier drafts received from: Christopher Blakely, Andre Buckareff, Mikel Burley, Helmut Heit, Jan Thomas, Avery Fouts, Chris Hoeckley, Patricia McShane, Sruthi Rothenfluch, Daniel Speak, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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Eshleman, A. The afterlife: beyond belief. Int J Philos Relig 80, 163–183 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9565-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9565-2