Abstract
A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission’s resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice models. Our results indicate that, contrary to the Commission’s objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being challenged. We also find that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect upon the Commission’s final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.
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Avalos, M., De Hoyos, R.E. An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy. Rev Ind Organ 32, 113–130 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9168-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9168-x