Abstract
During a time when religious animosities were reaching their peak in Medieval Europe leading up to the violent crusades, Christians, Jews, and Muslims residing in close proximity in Medieval Spain experienced a period of relative peace, prosperity, and cultural exchange. This historical episode, referred to as La Convivencia, or the coexistence, is a puzzle to many period historians. This paper argues that this anomalistic period arose due to the emergence of commerce, which generated cooperation and mitigated conflict among these heterogeneous groups, à la the Doux-Commerce Thesis of the Scottish Enlightenment. Commercial exchange between Christians, Jews, and Muslims was established through the use of safe-conducts, a promise of protection sold to foreign merchants. This paper details the operation of safe-conducts and the civilizing role that commerce played among Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Medieval Spain.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For instance, even into the 14th century, the established legal codes reflected this. The Siete Partidas explicitly stated that Muslims could live “…among the Christians, keeping their own law, and not contemning ours” (Partida, VII, xxv, I as quoted in Castro 1954, 226).
What is commonly referred to as “Christian Spain” was actually a collection of independent city-states and principalities (Catlos 2004, 4 & 13). Even with the recognition of a substantial degree of polycentrism, one must be careful not to ascribe too large of a role to the weak and ill-defined territories of lords and barons. As Scott (2009) finds in his history of Southeast Asia, history is often state-centric due the fact that governments often left the biggest piles of rubble and surviving paper trails, so governments are granted a larger role in historical and archaeological accounts than they really deserve (see also Hayek 1988, 44).
This practice was eventually outlawed in Christian Spain in 1309 by Ferdinand IV (Neuman 1942, 208).
In addition to the assurances offered by a system of private law utilized amongst the merchants at the Champagne fairs (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990)
Safe-conducts were also issued in order to assure that an accused criminal could be safely brought to trial. Often, a local representative would “…stand surety for the accused” for a certain length of time in order that a peaceful arrangement could be made between the accused and the accuser (Burns 1995, 60 & 62). The historian Francisco Roca Traver found Safe-conducts issued in Tortosa to be all issued by private citizens dealing with legal issues in their courts (Burns 1995, 62). For example, a banker from Valencia, Pons Fibra, had fled in 1296 and obtained a safe-conduct to come back in order to settle accounts with his creditors (Burns 1995, 63). They were also used to protect witnesses slated to testify at trials (Burns 1995, 87).
References
Abu-Lughod, J. (1989). Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250–1350. New York: Oxford University Press.
Anderson, T., & Hill, P. (2004). The not so wild, wild west. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ashtor, E. (1972). Banking instruments between the Muslim East and the Christian West. The Journal of European Economic History, 1(3), 553–573.
Assis, Y. (1997). The golden age of aragonese Jewry: Community and society in the crown of Aragon, 1213–1327. Portland: Vallentine Mitchell.
Baer, Y. F. (1961). A history of the Jews in Christian Spain, volume 1 (schoffman, trans). Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.
Benson, B. (1988). Legal evolution in primitive societies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144(5), 772–778.
Bernstein, L. (1992). Opting out of the legal system: Extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry. Journal of Legal Studies, 21(1), 115–157.
Boettke, P. J. & Smith, D. J. (2013). The theory of social cooperation historically and robustly contemplated. SSRN working paper. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2173338
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., & Leeson, P. T. (2008). Institutional stickiness and the new development economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67(2), 331–358.
Boorstin, D. J. (1983). The discovers: A history of man’s search to know his world and himself. New York: Random House.
Brodman, J. (1999). Fable and royal power: The origins of the Mercedarian foundation story. Journal of Medieval History, 25(3), 229–241.
Burns, R. (1984). Muslims, Christians and Jews in the crusader kingdom of Valencia: Societies in symbiosis. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
Burns, R. (1995). The guidaticum safe-conduct in medieval arago-catlonia; a mini-institution for Muslims, Christians and Jews. Medieval Encounters: Jewish Christian, and Muslim Culture in Confluence and Dialogue, 1, 51–113.
Carpenter, D. (1986). Alfonso X and the Jews: An edition and commentary on “siete partidas” 7.24 “de los judios. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Castro, A. (1948). Espana en su Historia. Mexico City: Porrua.
Castro, A. (1954). The structure of Spanish history (E. King, trans). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Catlos, B. A. (2004). The victors and the vanquished: Christians and Muslims of Catalonia and Aragon, 1050–1300. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Clay, K. (1997). Trade without law: private-order institutions in Mexican California. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 13(1), 202–231.
Collier, P. (2009). Wars, guns, and votes: Democracy in dangerous places. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Collins, R. (1995). Early medieval Spain: Unity in diversity, 400–1000 (2nd ed.). New York: St. Marten’s Press.
Constable, O. (1996). Trade and traders in Muslim Spain. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Constable, O. (1997). Medieval Iberia: readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish sources. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Cox, G. W., North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (2013). The violence trap: A political-economic approach to the problems of development,” working paper. Available online: http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/the_violence_trap_a_politicaleconomic_approach o_the_problems_of_development/
Coyne, C. (2008). After war: The political economy of exporting democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Delong, B., & Shleifer, A. (1993). Princes and merchants: European city growth before the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Law and Economics, 36(2), 671–702.
Dixit, A. (2004–5). Two-tiered market institution. Chicago Journal of International Law 5(10), 139–155.
Djankov, S., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2006). Does foreign aid help? Cato Journal, 26(1), 1–28.
Djankov, S., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The curse of aid. Journal of Economic Growth, 13(3), 169–94.
Easterly, W. (2001). Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4), 687–706.
Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. New York: The Penguin Press.
Edwards, J., & Ogilvie, S. (2012). What lessons for economic development can we draw from the Champagne fairs? Explorations in Economic History, 49(2), 131–148.
Ellickson, R. (1989). A hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms: evidence from the whaling industry. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 5(1), 83–97.
Ellickson, R. (1991). Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epalza, M. (1999). Negotiating culture: Bilingual surrender treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror. Boston: Brill Academic Publishers.
Frey, B. (2005). Functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions: Redrawing the geographic borders of administration. European Journal of Law Reform, V(3/4), 543–555.
Frey, B., & Eichenberger, R. (2001). Federalism with overlapping jurisdictions and variable levels of integration: The concept of FOCJ. In J. von Hagen & M. Widgren (Eds.), Regionalism in Europe: geometries and strategies after 2000 (pp. 3–21). Boston: Kluwer.
Frey, L., & Frey, M. (1999). The history of diplomatic immunity. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Friedman, D. (1979). Private creation and enforcement of law – A historical case. Journal of Legal Studies, 8(2), 399–415.
Glick, T. (1992). Convivencia: An introductory note. In V. Mann, T. Glick, & J. Dodds (Eds.), Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in medieval Spain (pp. 1–10). New York: The Jewish Museum.
Goitein, S. (1973). Letters of medieval Jewish traders. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Grayzel, S. (1966). The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth century. New York: Hermon Press.
Greif, A. (2002). Institutions and impersonal exchange: From communal to individual responsibility. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158(1), 168–204.
Greif, A. (2005). Commitment, coercion, and markets: The nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange. In C. M´enard & M. Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of New institutional economics (pp. 727–786). Netherlands: Springer.
Hayek, F. A. (1988). The fatal conceit: The errors of socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hirschman, A. (1982). Rival interpretations of market society: Civilizing, destructive, or Feeble? Journal of Economic Literature, 20(4), 1463–1484.
Kamen, H. (1997). The Spanish inquisition. London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd.
Khadduri, M. (1955). War and peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
Kim, K. (2000). Aliens in medieval law: The origins of modern citizenship. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Knack, S. (2004). Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-country empirical tests. Southern Economic Journal, 68(2), 310–29.
Kyriaciou, A. (2006). Functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions and ethnic conflict management. Kyklos, 59(1), 63–83.
Landa, J. (1981). A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: an institutional alternative to contract law. Journal of Legal Studies, 10(2), 349–362.
Landa, J. (1983). The enigma of the Kula Ping: Gift-exchanges and primitive law and order. International Review of Law and Economics, 3(2), 137–160.
Landa, J. (1994). Trust, ethnicity, and identity: Beyond the new institutional economics of ethnic trading networks, contract law, and gift-exchange. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Leeson, P. (2005). Endogenizing fractionalization. Journal of Institutional Economics, 1(1), 75–98.
Leeson, P. (2006). Cooperation and conflict: Evidence on self-enforcing arrangements among socially heterogeneous groups. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 65(4), 891–907.
Leeson, P. (2007a). An-arrgh-chy: the law and economics of pirate organization. Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1049–1094.
Leeson, P. (2007b). Balkanization and assimilation: examining the effects of state-created homogeneity. Review of Social Economy, 65(2), 141–164.
Leeson, P. (2007c). Trading with bandits. Journal of Law and Economics, 50(2), 303–321.
Leeson, P. (2008). Social distance and self-enforcing exchange. Journal of Legal Studies, 37(1), 161–188.
Lesson, P. (2009). Law of lawlessness. Journal of Legal Studies, 38(2), 471–503.
Lewis, B. (1987). The Jews of Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lewis, B. (2001). The Muslim discovery of Europe. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Lieber, A. E. (1968). Eastern business practices and Medieval European commerce. The Economic History Review, 21(2), 230–243.
Lindo, E. (1848). The history of the Jews of Spain and Portugal. London: J. Wertheimer.
Lourie, E. (1990). Crusade and colonisation: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Medieval Aragon. Aldershot: Variorum (Gower Publishing Group).
MacKay, A. (1977). Spain in the middle ages: From frontier to empire, 1000–1500. Houdmills: Macmillan.
Mann, V. B., Glick, T. F., & Dodds, J. D. (1992). Convivencia: Jews, Muslims and Christians in Medieval Spain. New York: George Braziller, Inc.
Mansfield, E. D., & Synder, J. (2005). Electing to fight: why emerging democracies go to war. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Menocal, M. (2002). The ornament of the world: How Muslims, Jews and Christians created a culture of tolerance in Medieval Spain. New York: First Bay Back.
Meyerson, M. (2004). Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom: Society, economy, and politics in Morvedre, 1248–1391. Boston: Brill Academic Publisher.
Milgrom, P., North, D., & Weingast, B. (1990). The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics, 2(1), 1–24.
Montesquieu (1748[2009]). The Spirit of the Laws (A. M. Cohler, B.C. Miller, & H. S. Stone, Eds.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Moss, T., Pettersson, G., & Van de Walle, N. (2008). An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in Sub-Saharan Africa. In W. Easterly (Ed.), Reinvesting foreign aid (pp. 255–82). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Munquiz, R. H. (2001). Encounters in crisis. In S. Charles (Ed.), Jewish-Muslim encounters. St. Paul: Paragon House.
Netanyahu, B. (1995). The origins of the inquisition in fifteenth century Spain. New York: Random House.
Neuman, A. (1942). The Jews in Spain: Their social, political and cultural life during the middle ages (Vol. 1). Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.
Nirenberg, D. (1996). Communities of violence: Persecution of minorities in the middle ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., & Weingast, B. R. (2013). In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics, and the problems of development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
O’Callaghan, J. F. (1975). A history of Medieval Spain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pedan, J. (1977). Property rights in Celtic Irish law. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1(2), 81–95.
Ploger, K. (2003). England and the Avignon Popes: The practice of diplomacy in late Medieval Europe. Great Britain: Modern Humanities Research Association and Maney Press.
Rajan, R. (2004). Assume anarchy: Why an orthodox economic model may not be the best guide for policy. Finance & development, September: 56–57. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/09/pdf/straight.pdf
Ray, J. (2005). Beyond tolerance and persecution: reassessing our approach to Medieval Convivencia. Jewish Social Studies, 11(2), 1–18.
Ray, J. (2006). The Sephardic frontier: The Reconquista and the Jewish community in Medieval Iberia. Ithaca: Cornell University.
Rehrmann, N. (2003). A legendary place of encounter. In D. Hoerder, C. Harzig, & A. Shubert (Eds.), The historical practice of diversity (pp. 35–53). New York: Berghahn Books.
Reilly, B. (1993). The Medieval Spains. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
Reilly, B. (1995). The contest of Christian and Muslim Spain. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
Rodriguez, J. (2007). Captives & their saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon. Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press of America.
Roth, N. (1994). Jews, Visigoths and Muslims in Medieval Spain: Cooperation and conflict. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Roth, N. (2005). Daily life of the Jews in the middle ages. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Salter, M. (2003). Rights of passage: The passport in international relations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Scott, J. (2009). The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Strayer, J. R., & Munro D. C. (1921[1959]). The middle ages: 395–1500, fourth edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
Valerian, D. (1999). Ifrîqiyan Muslim merchants in the Mediterranean at the end of the Middle Ages. Mediterranean Historical Review, 14(2), 47–66.
Wansbrough, J. (1971). The safe-conduct in Muslim chancery practice. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 34(1), 20–35.
Wansbrough, J. (1996). Lingua franca in the Mediterranean. Richmond: Curzon Press.
Wasserstein, D. (1985). The rise and fall of the party-kings: Politics and society in Islamic Spain, 1002–1086. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Webb, D. (2000). Pilgrimage in Medieval England. London: Hambledon and London.
Williamson, C. R. (2009). Informal institutions rule: Institutional arrangements and economic performance. Public Choice, 139, 371–387.
Wolf, K. (2009). Convivencia in Medieval Spain: A brief history of an idea. Religion Compass, 3(1), 72–85.
Young, A. T. and Sheehan, K. M. (2013). Foreign aid, institutional quality, and growth. SSRN Working Paper. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2058567
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Peter J. Boettke, Christopher Coyne, Thomas K. Duncan, Alexander Fink, David J. Hebert, Thomas L. Hogan, Peter T. Leeson, Douglas B. Rogers, David B. Skarbek, Daniel Sutter, Sasha Volokh, Richard E. Wagner, and two anonymous referees for useful comments on earlier drafts. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Graduate Student Paper Workshop at George Mason University, the Southern Economic Association Annual Conference, and the Association of Private Enterprise Education Annual Conference. The generous financial support of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University is gratefully acknowledged. The helpful research assistance of Rania Al-Bawwab is also gratefully acknowledged.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Smith, D.J. Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain. Rev Austrian Econ 27, 183–197 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-014-0251-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-014-0251-2