Abstract
This work studies the quantum Hotelling game with elastic demand by means of an ad hoc simulation technique that allows to scrutinize how the entanglement of the players induces the emergence of the Pareto optimal solution in Nash equilibrium (NE), even when NE does not exist in the classic game due to the proximity of the players.
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Notes
In multi-objective optimization problems, a solution is called Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient), if none of the objective functions can be improved in value without degrading some of the other objective values.
When a group of firms cooperates to maximize their profits in the marketplace instead of competing with each other, this is known as collusion. Collusion gives firms an unfair advantage in the marketplace and collusive practices like price fixing are designed to unfairly benefit firms at the expense of the consumer. Thus, antitrust laws are intended to prevent collusion between companies.
\( p_2^c-p_1^c =p_2w_1(\gamma )+p_1w_2(\gamma )-(p_1w_1(\gamma )+p_2w_2(\gamma ))= p_2(w_1(\gamma )-w_2(\gamma ))-p_1(w_1(\gamma )-w_2(\gamma ))=(p_2-p_1)(w_1(\gamma )-w_2(\gamma ))=\) \((p_2-p_1)e^{-\gamma }\), because, \(w_1(\gamma )-w_2(\gamma )=e^{-\gamma }\).
\(u_1=p_1^cQ_1\), \(Q_1=(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(a{\overline{s}}-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)\). \(u_2=p_2^cQ_2\), \(Q_2=(\alpha -p_2^c)(L-{\overline{s}})+t(b(L-{\overline{s}})-(L-{\overline{s}})^2/2-b^2)\)
\(\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=\cosh \gamma [(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(a{\overline{s}}-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)]+p_1^c[-\cosh \gamma {\overline{s}}-\frac{e^{-\gamma }}{2t}(\alpha -p_1^c)+t(-a\frac{e^{-\gamma }}{2t}-{\overline{s}}\frac{e^{-\gamma }}{2t})]\).
\(a=b \rightarrow p_1=p_2=p \rightarrow p_1^c=p_2^c=pe^{\gamma } \rightarrow {\overline{s}}=L/2 \rightarrow \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial p_2}=0 \rightarrow \)
\(\cosh \gamma [\alpha L+t(aL-(L/2)^2-2a^2)]+pe^{\gamma }[-2L\cosh \gamma +e^{-\gamma }(L/2-a)-\frac{e^{-\gamma }}{t}(\alpha -pe^{\gamma })]=0 \rightarrow \)
\(e^{\gamma } p^2-[\alpha +t\left( a+2L\cosh \gamma e^{\gamma }-\frac{L}{2}\right) ]p+t\cosh \gamma [\alpha L+t(aL-L^2/4-2a^2)]=0\,.\)
\((p^c_{1,2})^\star =\) \({\frac{(\lambda '{-}\sqrt{\lambda '^2{-}4te^{\gamma } \cosh \gamma \left( \alpha L{-}2c\right) })(\lambda '+\sqrt{\lambda '^2{-}4te^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma \left( \alpha L{-}2c\right) })}{2(\lambda '+\sqrt{\lambda '^2{-}4te^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma \left( \alpha L{-}2c\right) })} =\frac{2te^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{\lambda '+\sqrt{\lambda '^2-4te^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}=}\)
=\(\frac{2t\left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{\frac{\lambda '}{e^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma }+\sqrt{\big (\frac{\lambda '}{e^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma }\big )^2-4t\frac{1}{e^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma }\left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}\). It is \(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \infty }\frac{\lambda '}{e^{\gamma }\cosh \gamma }=2Lt\). Thus, \(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \infty }(p^c_{1,2})^\star =\frac{2t\left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{2tL+\sqrt{4t^2L^2}}=\frac{2t(\alpha L-2c)}{4tL}=\frac{\alpha }{2}-\frac{c}{L}=p^{\bullet }\) .
The authors themselves of the seminal paper [5] qualify its quantum model as a “minimal” extension of the classic Cournot’s duopoly game into the quantum domain.
From Eq.(10), \(u^\bullet {=}(p_{1,2}^\bullet )^2\frac{L}{2}\) is maximized when \(p_{1,2}^\bullet =\alpha /2-c/L\) is maximized, thus when c is minimized, which occurs at \(a=L/4\). In which case, \(c=L^2/16\), \(\max p^\bullet =\alpha /2-L/16= 2.812\), \(\max Q^\bullet =2.812L/2=4.219\), \(\max u^\bullet =2.812\cdot 4.219=11.865\).
\(\underline{\alpha \le \alpha _1}~ Q{=}2(\alpha -p) , u=2(\alpha -p)p, u^\prime /2 =(\alpha -p) -p \rightarrow p^\bullet {=}\frac{1}{2}\alpha \rightarrow Q^\bullet =2(\alpha -\frac{\alpha }{2})=\alpha \).
\(\alpha {-}p^\bullet {=}a \rightarrow \alpha _1{=}2a.\) \(\underline{\alpha _1\le \alpha \le \alpha _2}~ Q{=}2a,~p^\bullet {=}\alpha -a\).
\(\underline{\alpha _2\le \alpha \le \alpha _3}~ Q{=}a+\alpha -p, u^\prime /2 =a+\alpha -p-p \rightarrow p^\bullet {=}(\alpha +a)/2 \rightarrow Q^\bullet =a+\alpha -(\alpha +a)/2 =(\alpha +a)/2. ~\alpha {-}p^\bullet {=}a \rightarrow \alpha _2{=}3a\).
\(Q^\bullet =(\alpha +a)/2 = L/2 \rightarrow \alpha _3{=}L-a\). \(\underline{\alpha \ge \alpha _3}~Q{=}L/2,~p^\bullet {=}\alpha -(L/2-a)\). If \(a>L/4\), a is to be replaced by \(L/2-a\) in Eq.(19).
\(u_1=p_1^cQ_1, Q_1=(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(a{\overline{s}}-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)\). \(\frac{\partial {\overline{s}}}{\partial p_1}=-\frac{1}{2t}(\cos \gamma -\sin \gamma )\equiv -\frac{1}{2t}\Delta (\gamma ). \) \(\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=\cos \gamma [(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(a{\overline{s}}-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)]+p_1^c[-\cos \gamma {\overline{s}}-\frac{\Delta }{2t}(\alpha -p_1^c)+t(-a\frac{\Delta }{2t}+{\overline{s}}\frac{\Delta }{2t})]\)
\(a=b \rightarrow p_1=p_2=p \rightarrow p_1^c=p_2^c=p(\sin \gamma +\cos \gamma )=p\Sigma \rightarrow {\overline{s}}=\frac{L}{2} \rightarrow \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=0 \rightarrow \)
\(\cos \gamma [(\alpha -p\Sigma )\frac{L}{2}+t(a\frac{L}{2}-(\frac{L}{2})^2/2-a^2)]+p\Sigma [-\cos \gamma \frac{L}{2}-\frac{\Delta }{2t}\big (\alpha -p\Sigma +t(a-\frac{L}{2}\big )\big )]=0\rightarrow \)
\(p^2\Sigma ^2\Delta +\Sigma \big [-Lt\cos \gamma -Lt\cos \gamma -\Delta \big (\alpha +t(a-\frac{L}{2})\big ]p + t\cos \gamma \big [L\alpha +t(aL-\frac{L^2}{4}-2a^2)\big ]=0\,,\) \(\Sigma \Delta =\cos ^2\gamma -\sin ^2\gamma =\cos 2\gamma \).
\((p^\star _{1,2}(\gamma ))^c=\frac{2t\Sigma \frac{\cos \gamma }{\cos 2\gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{\lambda '+\sqrt{\lambda '^2-4t\Sigma \frac{\cos \gamma }{\cos 2\gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}= \frac{2t\Sigma \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{(\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos \gamma })+\sqrt{(\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos \gamma })^2-4t\Sigma \frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos \gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}\). It is \(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \pi /4}\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos \gamma }=2L\Sigma t\). Thus,\(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \pi /4}(p^\star _{1,2})^c= \frac{\alpha L-2c}{2L}=\frac{\alpha }{2}-\frac{c}{L}=p^\bullet \).
\(u_1=p_1^cQ_1\), \(Q_1=(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(a{\overline{s}}-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)\). \(\frac{\partial {\overline{s}}}{\partial p_1}=-\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{2t}.\) \(\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=\cos ^2\gamma [(\alpha -p_1^c){\overline{s}}+t(as-{\overline{s}}^2/2-a^2)]+p_1^c[-\cos ^2\gamma {\overline{s}}-\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{2t}(\alpha -p_1^c)+t(-a\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{2t}+{\overline{s}}\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{2t})]\). \(a=b \rightarrow p_1=p_2=p \rightarrow p_1^c=p_2^c=p \rightarrow {\overline{s}}=\frac{L}{2} \rightarrow \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial p_1}=0 \rightarrow \)
\(\cos ^2\gamma [(\alpha -p)L+t(aL-(\frac{L}{2})^2-2a^2)]+p\big [-\cos ^2\gamma L -\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{t}[(\alpha -p)+t(a-\frac{L}{2})]\big ]=0\rightarrow \).
\(\cos 2\gamma p^2+\big [-2t\cos ^2\gamma L -\cos 2\gamma [\alpha +t(a-\frac{L}{2})]\big ]p+t\cos ^2\gamma [\alpha L+t(aL-(\frac{L}{2})^2-2a^2)]=0\).
\((p^\star _{1,2}(\gamma ))^c=\frac{2t\frac{\cos ^2\gamma }{\cos 2\gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{\lambda '+\sqrt{\lambda '^2-4t\frac{\cos ^2\gamma }{\cos 2\gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}= \frac{2t\left( \alpha L-2c\right) }{(\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos ^2\gamma })+\sqrt{(\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos ^2\gamma })^2-4t\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos ^2\gamma } \left( \alpha L-2c\right) }}\). It is \(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \pi /4}\lambda '\frac{\cos 2\gamma }{\cos \gamma }=2Lt\). Thus,\(\lim _{\gamma \rightarrow \pi /4}(p^\star _{1,2}(\gamma ))^c=\frac{2(\alpha L-2c)}{2L+2L}=\frac{\alpha }{2}-\frac{c}{L}=p^\bullet \).
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Acknowledgements
This work has been funded by the Spanish Grant PID2021-122711NB-C21. The computations of this work were performed in FISWULF, an HPC machine of the Int. Campus of Excellence of Moncloa, funded by the UCM and Feder Funds.
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Garcia-Perez, L., Grau-Climent, J., Losada, J.C. et al. The quantum Hotelling–Smithies game. Quantum Inf Process 22, 38 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-022-03780-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-022-03780-7