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Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action

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Abstract

In formal analysis of collective action, usually attention is focused on problems arising in aggregating the separate orderings into coherent collective results. Our concern is not with the aggregation problem. Instead, our focus is on the particular characteristics of the alternatives themselves. Alternatives in collective actions are fundamentally different from alternatives in market choice (apples and oranges). Regardless of motivation, collectivization forces attention on the distribution of benefits and costs among others in the sharing community. We first examine the formal structure of alternatives as these are confronted by a participant in the collective action. The second feature involves distributional patterns made necessary by collectivization.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    J. M. Buchanan

  2. Virginia Polytecnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    J. M. Buchanan

  3. Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Y. J. Yoon

Authors
  1. J. M. Buchanan
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  2. Y. J. Yoon
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Correspondence to J. M. Buchanan.

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Buchanan, J.M., Yoon, Y.J. Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action. Public Choice 153, 9–16 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9936-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9936-x

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