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A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

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Abstract

We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee. Contrary to findings in the FOMC literature (for example Havrilesky and Schweitzer in The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, pp. 197–210, 1990; Chappell et al. in Q. J. Econ. 108(1):185–218, 1993), the effects of members’ career backgrounds and the political channel of appointment on voting behavior are negligible, reflecting the distinct institutional constraints and incentives associated with UK monetary policy. Our findings also suggest that literature which characterizes voting behavior as being predominantly determined by members’ internal or external status is overly simplistic. This view is supported by econometric results appertaining to the introduction of member-specific fixed-effects, which account for possible unobserved heterogeneity.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia

    Mark N. Harris

  2. Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XJ, UK

    Paul Levine

  3. Department of Economics, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK

    Christopher Spencer

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  1. Mark N. Harris
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  2. Paul Levine
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  3. Christopher Spencer
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Correspondence to Christopher Spencer.

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Harris, M.N., Levine, P. & Spencer, C. A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members. Public Choice 146, 413–442 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9597-6

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