Abstract
This paper analyzes the issue of security provision by an alliance against the threat of a rogue nation. Proactive security effort by an alliance member is assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable, so the results of the effort jointly accrue to every other member. This effort has both positive and negative effects, as security measures mitigate the threat, but also involve loss of commercial benefits, collateral damages, and infringement on human rights. In this paper I suggest an institutional structure for the alliance which would lead to the achievement of the efficient level of world security through multilateral participation.
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Gupta, R. Structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security. Public Choice 144, 169–197 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9510-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9510-3