Abstract
Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political, processes for making collective choices. The border between “what is mine” and “what is ours” is contested, but it is unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social choice and individual values. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1st edition published by Wiley (1951).
Black, D. (1958). The theory of committees and elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan, G., & Lomasky, L. (1993). Democracy and decision: the pure theory of electoral preference. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1968). The demand and supply of public goods. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
Buchanan, J. M. (1977). The limits of liberty: between anarchy and leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, J. M., & Faith, R. (1980). Subjective elements in Rawlsian Agreement on distributional rules. Economic Inquiry, 18, 23–38.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Clarke, E. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11, 17–33.
Clarke, E. (1977). Some aspects of the demand revealing process. Public Choice, 29(2), 37–49.
Clarke, E. (1980). Demand revelation and the provision of public goods. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
Demsetz, H. (1967). Towards a theory of property rights. The American Economic Review, 57, 347–359.
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41, 587–602.
Groves, T., & Ledyard, J. (1977). Some limitations of demand revealing processes. Public Choice, 29, 107–124.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
Hardin, R. (1995). One for all: The logic of group conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hayek, F. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35, 519–530.
Hurwicz, L., & Walker, M. (1990). On the generic nonoptimality of dominant-strategy allocation mechanisms: A general theorem that includes pure exchange economies. Econometrica, 58, 683–704.
Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., & Schkade, D. (1999). Economic preferences or attitude expressions?: An analysis of dollar responses to public issues. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 203–235.
Kropotkin, P. (1955/1914). Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. Boston: Extending Horizons Books.
Lindahl, E. (1958). Just taxation: A positive solution. In R. A. Musgrave & A. T. Peacock (Eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. New York: Macmillan; (Originally Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, 1999; German. Trans. by Elizabeth Henderson).
Locke, J. (1690/1988). Two Treatises on Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1988 (1932/1844)) The meaning of human requirements. In The economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 and the communist manifesto. (Trans. by Martin Milligan), pp. 115–134.
Munger, M. (2000). Five questions: An integrated research agenda for public choice. Public Choice, 103, 1–12.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Riker, W. (1981). Liberalism Against Populism. Chicago: Waveland Press.
Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism—a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. Waveland Press.
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217.
Schlapfer, F., Roschewitz, A., & Hanley, N. (2004). Validation of stated preferences for public goods: a comparison of contingent valuation survey response and voting behaviour. Ecological Economics, 51, 1–16.
Sen, A. (1987). On ethics and economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tideman, T. N., & Tullock, G. (1976). A new and superior process for making social choices. Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1145–1159.
Tideman, T. N., & Tullock, G. (1981). Coalitions under demand revealing. Public Choice, 36(2), 323–328.
Tullock, G. (1977). Demand-revealing process, coalitions, and public good. Public Choice, 29(2), 103–105.
Weingast, B. R. (1997). The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. American Political Science Review, 91, 245–63.
Weingast, B. R. (2005). Self-enforcing constitutions: with an application to democratic stability in America’s first century. (Internet manuscript). Stanford: Department of Political Science. http://polisci.stanford.edu/faculty/documents/weingast-self-enforcing%20constitutions.pdf.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Paper Prepared for the Gerst Program in Political And Economic Studies 7th Annual Conference, Homo Politicus and Homo Economicus, April 27–28, 2006.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Munger, M.C. Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits. Public Choice 137, 507–522 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9353-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9353-3