Abstract
This paper examines an electoral competition model where a candidate allocates his campaign efforts (resources) on two competing projects prior to election. A candidate is congruent if his objective is consistent with the wishes of his constituents and there is no potential political shirking. We show that a congruent candidate needs not exert any efforts towards successful implementation prior to election; however, a less than perfectly congruent candidate must exert efforts prior to election. In equilibrium, two campaign resource allocation strategies emerge; (1) concentrate resources on one project and (2) allocate resources evenly across both projects. We discuss potential inefficiencies that are resulted by these allocation strategies.
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Yi, D.T. Election campaign resource allocation. Public Choice 133, 91–105 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9179-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9179-4