ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Akins, K. (1993): `What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic’, in Dahlbom (1993)
Armstrong D.M. (1981). The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Bieri, P. (1995): `Why is Consciousness Puzzling?’, in Metzinger (1995)
Block, N., Flanagan, O. and Guzeldere, G. (eds.) (1997): The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press
Bransen J. and Cuypers S.E. (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
Byrne, A. (2004): `Something About Mary Grazer Philosophische Studien’, forthcoming
Carruthers P. (2003). Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Chalmers D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Chalmers, D. (2003): `The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief’, in Jokic and Smith (2003)
Chalmers, D. (2004): `Imagination, Indexicality and Intensions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVIII(1)
Churchland, P. (1985): `Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’, Journal of Philosophy 82
Churchland, P. (1989): `Knowing Qualia’ Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, Guzeldere. (1997)
Conee, E. (1994): `Phenomenal Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H. (1990): ‘There is no Question of Physicalism’, Mind 99(394)
Dahlbom B. (1993). Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge
Dennett, D. (1991): Consciousness Explained, Little Brown and Co
Flanagan O. (1992). Consciousness Reconsidered. MIT Press, Cambridge
Gertler, B. (1999): `A Defense of the Knowledge Argument’, Philosophical Studies. 93
Gillet, C. and Loewer, B. (eds.) (2001): Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Graham, G. and Horgan, T. (2000): ‘Mary Mary, Quite Contrary’, Philosophical Studies 99
Hanna, J.F. (2004): `The Scope and Limits of Scientific Objectivity’, Philosophy of Science 71
Hellie, B. (2004): `Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument’, in Ludlow, Nagasaka and Stoljar (2004)
Horgan, T. (1984): `Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia’, The Philosophical Quarterly 34(135)
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2001): ‘Deconstructing New Wave Materialism’, in Gillet and Loewer (2001)
Jackson, F. (1982): `Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly XXXII, 127
Jackson, F. (1986): `What Mary Didn’t Know’, The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII, 5
Jackson F. (1998). Mind, Method and Conditionals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Jolley, K.D. and Watkins, M. (1998): ‘What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 48(191)
Kim, J. (1998): `Reasons and the First Person’, in Bransen and Cuypers (1998)
Lewis, D. (1979): `Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Philosophical Review 88
Lewis D. (1999). What Experience Teaches in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Levine, J. (1993): ‘On Leaving out What It’s Like’, Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, Guzeldere., (1997)
Levine J. (2001). Purple Haze. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Loar, B. (1997): `Phenomenal States’, in Block, Flanagan and Guzeldere (1997)
Loewer, B. (2001): `From Physics to Physicalism’, in Gillet and Loewer (2001)
Lockwood M. (1989). Mind, Brain and the Quantum. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lycan, W. (1990a): `Consciousness as Internal Monitoring’, Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, Guzeldere. (1997)
Lycan, W. (1990b): `What is the ‘Subjectivity’ of the Mental?’, Philosophical Perspectives 4
Maxwell, G. (1978): `Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity’ in Savage (1978)
McConell, J. (1994): `In Defense of the Knowledge Argument’, Philosophical Topics 22
McGinn C. (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Mind 98: 891
McLaughlin, B. (2001): `In Defense of New Wave Materialism’, in Gillet and Loewer (2001)
Metzinger, T. (ed.). (1995): Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schoning Imprint Academic
Moran R. (2001). Authority and Estrangement. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Nagel T. (1979a). What is it Like to be a Bat? in Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nagel T. (1979b). Subjective and Objective in Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nagel T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Nemirow, L. (1980): `Review of Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions’, Philosophical Review 89(3)
Nida-Rumelin, M. (1998): `On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(1)
Papineau D. (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Perry J. (2001). Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge
Perry, J. (2004): `Replies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVIII(1)
Popper K. (1968). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 2nd edn. Harper and Row, New York
Raffman, D. (2004): `Even Zombies can be Surprised’, Philosophical Studies, forthcoming
Robinson, W.S. (2002): `Jackson’s Apostasy’, Philosophical Studies 111
Rosenthal, D.M. (1997): `A Theory of Consciousness’, in Block, Flanagan, Guzeldere (1997)
Rosenthal, D.M. (2004): `Subjective Character and Reflexive Content’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVIII(1)
Savage C.W. (1978). Perception and Cognition. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
Scheffler, I. (1982): Science and Subjectivity. 2nd edn, Indianapolis: Hackett
Searle J. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Stoljar, D. (2001): `Two Conceptions of the Physical’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 62
Strawson G. (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge
Thau M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Thompson E. (1995). Colour Vision. Routledge, London
Tye M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge
Van Gulick, R. (1995): `What would count as explaining Consciousness?’, in Metzinger (1995)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Howell, R.J. The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity. Philos Stud 135, 145–177 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9077-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9077-0