This brief commentary on the papers by A. M. Ivanitsky and D. N. Razeev makes an attempt to show why the problem of free will cannot be solved “in the context of neuroscience.” An approach to solving this problem in the logic of conscious activity is proposed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Allakhverdov, V. M., “The mind and consciousness in the logic of cognition,” Vestn. St. Peters. Gos. Univ. Ser. 16. Psikhol. Pedag., No. 1, pp. 35–36 (2016).
Allakhverdov, V. M., Consciousness as a Paradox, DNK, St. Petersburg (2000).
Allakhverdov, V. M., Experience of Theoretical Psychology (in the genre of the scientific revolution), Pech. Dvor, St. Petersburg (1993).
Allakhverdov, V. M., Gershkovich, V. A., Karpinskaya, et al., “The heuristic potential of Ya. A. Ponomarev’s concept,” Psikhol. Zh., 36, No. 6, 24–34 (2015).
Bargh, J. A. and Ferguson, M. J., “Beyond Behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes,” Psychol. Bull., 126, No. 6, 925–945 (2000).
Ivanitsky, A. M., “Determinism and freedom of choice in the operation of the brain,” Zh. Vyssh. Nerv. Deyat., 65, No. 4, 503–512 (2015).
Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Collected Works [Russian translation], Choro, Moscow (1994), Vol. 4, pp. 153–246.
Razeev, D. N., “The problem of free will in the context of neuroscience research,” Zh. Vyssh. Nerv. Deyat., 67, No. 6, 721–727 (2017).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Translated from Zhurnal Vysshei Nervnoi Deyatel’nosti imeni I. P. Pavlova, Vol. 67, No. 6, pp. 734–738, November–December, 2017.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Allakhverdov, V.M. Consciousness and the Problem of Free Will. Neurosci Behav Physi 49, 625–628 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11055-019-00780-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11055-019-00780-6