Abstract
In the present enterprise we take a look at the meaning of Autonomy, how the word has been employed and some of the consequences of its use in the sciences of the artificial. Could and should robots really be autonomous entities? Over and beyond this, we use concepts from the philosophy of mind to spur on enquiry into the very essence of human autonomy. We believe our initiative, as does Dennett's life-long research, sheds light upon the problems of robot design with respect to their relation with humans.
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Very often in his writings, Daniel Dennett focuses on the creation of life-like computationally driven creatures and the bounds put on such technology by our perception of it. He has been known for referring to the challenge of building a robot having beliefs, intentions and consciousness as a 'sporting event'. We should not confuse a sporting event with a scientific endeavour. Do artificially autonomous robots constitute a scientific endeavour?
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Schmidt, C.T.A., Kraemer, F. Robots, Dennett and the autonomous: a terminological investigation. Mind Mach 16, 73–80 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-006-9014-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-006-9014-6