Abstract
The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl’s work, bind together our shared social world (“the spiritual world”) with shared intentionality. It is claimed that, by sharing experiences, persons create social reasons and that these reasons impose a normative structure on the social world. Because there are two ways in which persons can share experiences (depending on whether these experiences rest on mutual communication or on group’s identity), social normativity comes in two kinds. It is either directed (it has an addressee) or it is collective or absolute (it applies to all group members). Social normativity should be distinguished from axiological normativity: The first is grounded in shared intentionality, the second in values.
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Notes
“The scientific rigor of all these disciplines, the convincingness of their theoretical accomplishments, and their enduringly compelling successes are unquestionable,” see Husserl (1954, Eng. trans. p. 4).
It is hard to overlook the fact that Husserl is here putting forward very similar claims to those of Searle (1995), which almost 80 years later (re-)ignited the debate on social ontology. On the phenomenological approach to social ontology, see Salice (2013), Salice & Schmid (2016), Moran & Szanto (2016).
The paper focuses exclusively on Husserl, leaving aside the discussion on the foundation of the social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) Husserl was engaging with in his work.
Husserl (1952, p. 197).
“Of course, it is possible to conceive an isolated entity of a human species and, therefore, it is possible to conceive a purely individual culture. But the way the human actually is, he is only and from the very beginning in a communal relation […] All doing and producing of an individual […] eventually becomes somehow socially significant” Husserl (2012, p. 113).
In talking of experiences as the relata of motivation, I refer (somewhat ambiguously) to both, their noetic and noematic components, leaving more fine-grained discussions for another time. For focused treatments of Husserl’s notion of motivation, see Mulligan (2021) and Walsh (2013). On various theories of motivation in realist phenomenology (esp. Pfänder, Geiger, and Stein), see Uemura & Salice (2019).
Another reason for distinguishing the two relations is that something you have no awareness of does not have motivational power, but can very well have causal power, see Husserl (1952, p. 231).
See Husserl (1952, p. 221). Strictly speaking, this claim does not apply to motivation tout court, but only to motivation that holds between attitudes (Stellungnahmen) like judgments, emotions, or acts of the will. In this context, Husserl speaks of rational motivation (Vernuftsmotivation).
See Husserl (1952, p. 189).
Husserl (1952, Eng. trans. p. 241).
See Husserl (1952, p. 166).
Husserl (1973b, pp. 175, 201).
See (Husserl 1973, p. 182).
Against the background of philosophical debate on collective intentionality, it is admittedly idiosyncratic to reserve the phrase “collective intentionality” to characterise the forms of interaction within large-scale communities; in fact, the paradigmatic examples of collective intentionality in that debate have been taken to be small I-Thou interactions (painting a house, dancing tango, walking together, etc.). However, this usage aligns with the way the phrase is employed nowadays especially by Tomasello, see his (2016).
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Yankees_appearance_policy (last accessed 11.06.2021).
Husserl (1973b, p. 165).
The expression “social acts” is used with a cognate meaning already by Thomas Reid. Although Kurt Peters—a member of the Munich Circle—submitted a dissertation on Reid (1909), there is no historical indication that Reinach adopted that locution from Reid, see Mulligan (1989, p. 33). On the history of social acts from Aristotle, passing through Reid, to phenomenology, see Smith (1990).
Despite the adoption of the same terminology, there are substantial differences between the theories of Reinach and Husserl. It exceeds the purposes of this paper to elaborate on these points, but briefly: Reinach argues that, in virtue of their essence, social acts generate normative relations (claims, obligations, etc.), when they are understood (“heard”) by their addressees. This model is different from the one articulated by Husserl, who emphasises the communicative intention of the speaker and the importance for this intention to be grasped by the hearer (this view resonates with Grice’s “intentionalist” model of communication, Grice (1957)). In fact, as far as I know, nowhere does Husserl assign a proper essence to the various types of social acts, but spells these types out in terms of the internal acts that accompany the communicative intentions.
Husserl (1984, Eng. trans. mod. p. 189).
Husserl (1984, Eng. trans. mod. p. 189).
Husserl (2005, p. 87, my emph.).
See (Husserl 1984, p. 40).
See Husserl (1952, p. 235).
Husserl (1973b, p. 211).
Husserl (1973b, p. 369).
The point can be generalised to all communicative acts. For instance, after hearing me asking you what time it is, you take my desire of knowing the time as a reason for answering my question; after hearing my report about mental state (“I am feeling sad”), you have a reason for believing that I am feeling sad.
Interestingly, testimony appears to work differently: If I tell you that p, you have a reason to believe that p. And yet Pam, whom I am not addressing, now seems to have a reason to believe that p if she hears our conversation. (I am thankful to Genki Uemura for raising this point.)
Husserl (1973b, p. 183, see also p. 168).
See Husserl (1973b), p. 170).
Note that symmetry and reciprocity do not accompany all personalities of higher-order. Those personalities that rely on collectively (rather than dyadically) shared intentionality do not (see the next section).
Husserl (1973b, p. 194). Sometimes, reciprocal I-thou relations are also called “practical communities of will.” see in particular Husserl (1973b, p. 169). Interestingly, the metaphor of an I-Thou “touching” and, indeed, the very idea of two distinct kinds of communities—I-Thou and collective we-communities—is at the centre of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s social ontology; see von Hildebrand (1930) and Salice (2016).
Husserl (1973b, p. 193). Are these attitudes unified in the sense that a collective attitude is a (one) structure consisting of many individual attitudes or in the sense that it is a numerically single attitude? If one sticks to the reconstruction offered so far and, in particular, to the idea that personalities of higher order are founded in recursions of empathic acts, then one can only opt for the first option. However, there are passages in Husserl’s texts which lend themselves to a different interpretation: “Communication creates unity. Particular things remain external, they can lie together and touch each other, but then can never have anything identical in common. However, consciousness actually coincides [sich deckt] with consciousness; consciousness, comprehending another consciousness, constitutes the same in itself of what the other has constituted; both are one in the same” Husserl (1973b, p. 199, my emph.).
Husserl (1973b, p. 183).
See Husserl (1952, p. 316).
(Husserl 1973, p. 182).
Another possible way of cashing out the distinction between personal and impersonal communities is to conceive of large scale personal communities as personalities of higher order (like a nation state [Staatsvolk] or an association [Verein]). These communities, while being larger social units than the I-Thou communities discussed in the previous section, retain a unified perspective thanks to I-centeredness (Ichzentrierung) and lasting habituality, see Husserl (1973b, p. 405). On this characterization, impersonal communities do not qualify as personalities of higher order.
Husserl’s main example is about the emergence of reasons from family life: “Every member of the family is responsible subject; a subject, which has an I-ought [Ich-soll], which is generally outlined, determined in the particular case, [and] belonging to this generality” Husserl (1973b, p. 180).
“The normal [das Übliche] as such already has, in a certain sense, its norm, the norm of the familiar [Gewohnten], according to which one again expects the familiar under similar circumstances. The unfamiliar bothers […] We react with disapproval when humans speaks differently from how ‘one’ speaks, from how it is normal” Husserl (1973b, p. 229). On the intersection between normality and normativity, see Taipale 2012.
Another, I believe, equally important way to generate collective reasons should be assigned to the role of models (Vorbilder) and the way in which the conduct of models play an exemplary role for community members. On this idea, see esp. Scheler (1986).
Husserl (1952, Eng. trans. p. 192). In a similar vein one can also read, in relation to epistemic communities, “We know of ourselves reciprocally as ‘judging’ the same […]” Husserl (1973b, p. 193) and, in relation to practical communities (or communities of the will—Willensgemeinschaften), “in this community not only each [of the members] strives, but each is also objectively given to himself as striving, he is not only pre-given to himself as such, but also objectively given. Of course, not objectively as a theoretical theme […]; but practically objectively, i.e., belonging to the practical theme” Husserl (1973b, p. 171). If my interpretation is correct, the way in which subjects “know of themselves” or are “given to themselves” is as co-subject (co-judgers or co-agents); meaning: as group members.
This quote highlights another important point: Dyadic and collective intentionality are not mutually exclusive. While collective intentionality and dyadic intentionality can be exemplified separately, it is possible for members of I-Thou communities to activate collective intentionality and, vice versa, for members of large, potentially impersonal, communities to entertain I-Thou relationships. However, note that, if Zahavi (2015) is correct in suggesting that the group members acquire their sense of membership primarily in virtue of recursive empathy, then dyadically shared intentionality is prior to collective intentionality.
The terminology is inspired by Reinach (2012) and Darwall (2013, esp. pp. 20-40), who respectively talks of “absolute obligations” and “obligations period” to refer to obligations that have no addressees (note, however, that while Reinach distinguishes between moral and non-moral absolute obligations, the notion of obligation period, for Darwall, is moral all the way through).
Husserl (1973a, p. 105). A few lines later, Husserl seems to suggest that linguistic communities work differently. But just slightly differently: “Things are somehow different in the case of language. ‘One [Man]’ expresses oneself this way, one speaks in the linguistic community this way. One does that obviously, nobody follows here a felt duty and sense an entitlement against the addressor” Husserl (1973a, p. 105). Note that the difference here is not about the collective nature of the reasons that are followed by the speakers of a linguistic community. The difference rather consists in the way these reasons are experienced—they do not present themselves as duties or entitlements (demanding compliance), but they are always already followed (in an “obvious” way).
What then generates moral normativity? The answer, I submit, is that moral reasons are grounded in values (and not in psychological capacities of the mind). Although the question of how to articulate this idea and whether (or to what extent) Husserlian phenomenology supports it can only be the topic for another paper, there are indications that Husserl’s position is at least compatible with this solution. Consider the following ideas: First, modal predicates like “ought/should” or “ought/should not” are argued by Husserl to be grounded in values, see Husserl (1975, p. 53) and also Reinach (2012, p. 49, fn 11). On this understanding, “ought/should” are modal deontic predicates. For instance, you ought/should not torture babies because that is cruel, where cruelty is understood as a disvalue. (Of course, this idea is not uncontroversial as one could claim that the modality of “ought/should” is not deontic, but aretaic, and that it thereby prescribes the best possible action one can do, rather than the right action one ought to do. For obvious reasons, I am not in a position to defend my interpretation here.) Second, because values are disclosed in affective and volitive attitudes (see Husserl 2004, p. 73), and because, as mentioned, communities can be subjects of collectively affective and volitive attitudes, (see Husserl 1973b, p. 192), communities stand under the moral demand to act rightfully (see Husserl 2004, p. 282).
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Acknowledgements
This paper has been presented at the workshop on “Husserl and Community” (2021, Copenhagen), where I received much appreciated feedback from the audience. I am also thankful to Genki Uemura and Jason Dockstader, who have read previous versions of this paper. My gratitude also goes to three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
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Salice, A. Husserl on shared intentionality and normativity. Cont Philos Rev 56, 343–359 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-022-09593-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-022-09593-w