Abstract
In this paper we will consider the existing notions of bilateralism in the context of proof-theoretic semantics and propose, based on our understanding of bilateralism, an extension to logical multilateralism. This approach differs from what has been proposed under this name before in that we do not consider multiple speech acts as the core of such a theory but rather multiple consequence relations. We will argue that for this aim the most beneficial proof-theoretical realization is to use sequent calculi with multiple sequent arrows satisfying some specific conditions, which we will lay out in this paper. We will unfold our ideas with the help of a case study in logical tetralateralism and present an extension of Almukdad and Nelson’s propositional constructive four-valued logic by unary operations of meaningfulness and nonsensicality. We will argue that in sequent calculi with multiple sequent arrows it is possible to maintain certain features that are desirable if we assume an understanding of the meaning of connectives in the spirit of proof-theoretic semantics. The use of multiple sequent arrows will be justified by the presence of congruentiality-breaking unary connectives.
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Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Heinrich Wansing has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement ERC-2020-ADG, 101018280, ConLog.
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Wansing, H., Ayhan, S. Logical Multilateralism. J Philos Logic 52, 1603–1636 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09720-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09720-9