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Online Disinformation and Populist Approaches to Freedom of Expression: Between Confrontation and Mimetism

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Abstract

In this article, we shall explore how digital populists in Italy and the United States approach the ‘regulation’ of online disinformation in order to understand their approach to constitutions. The field of the measures adopted to combat disinformation seems to us an excellent case study to verify the populists’ constitutional approach. In this article, we will focus on the manipulative and instrumental approach that Italian and US digital populists employ with regard to constitutional texts by looking at the relationship between the instrumental use of freedom of expression clauses by digital populists and the attempts to fight online disinformation by private and public actors.

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Notes

  1. Habermas (2022), Jarren and Fischer (2021).

  2. Roznai (2017).

  3. Gardiner (2022).

  4. Gerbaudo (2018a).

  5. De Blasio and Sorice (2018a).

  6. Mazzoleni (2008).

  7. Gerbaudo (2018b).

  8. Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017), Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2021).

  9. Bassini (2020), De Blasio and Sorice (2018b).

  10. Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018).

  11. Taguieff (2002).

  12. Biancalana (2020), 225.

  13. Tarchi (2002), 133.

  14. Engesser, Ernst, Esser and Büchel (2017b), 1110.

  15. More recently, forms of regulation are being evaluated both in Europe and in Canada and other countries. For a general overview of the issue, see Koltay (2019).

  16. Bell (2016).

  17. Anselmi (2017), 83.

  18. Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson (2017a)

  19. De Blasio and Sorice (2020), 133.

  20. Hirschl (2014), 256 and ff.

  21. Ex multis: Pitruzzella and Pollicino (2020), Pollicino (2023), Sunstein (2021), Post and Maduro (2020).

  22. Indeed, we are not looking for solutions to the problem (as done, for instance, by Pollicino and De Gregorio [2022]), but we aim to focus on the constitutional approach of populists with a comparative law methodology.

  23. Voßkuhle (2018), Spadaro (2009).

  24. Spadaro (2009).

  25. Mény and Surel (2002), 9. When commenting on their thoughts, Anselmi argued that ‘While in the former it acquires institutionalized and mediating modalities, in the latter it finds a direct expression through a powerful capacity to delegitimize the status quo’ (Anselmi 2017, 6). ‘Constitutionalism is the dimension of protection and limitations to any discretionality of power, and is based on the defence of the rule of law and checks and balances. Populism, on the other hand, is characterized by the call to the power of the people in search of direct, top-down and leader-focused modalities of consensus and legitimization. It simplifies and erodes mediation systems, delegitimizes the rule of law, produces radical and maximalist perspectives based on overpromising’, (Anselmi 2017, 36).

  26. On illiberal democracies and the rule of law, see Palombella (2018), 5.

  27. For a similar view, see Chiarelli (2015), 177. However, the conclusions by Chiarelli are different from those advanced in this work.

  28. Corrias (2016), 8.

  29. Müller (2016).

  30. Corrias (2016), 8.

  31. ‘[C]ontemporary populism does not follow a single constitutional theory, but a pragmatic approach varying from country to country, and because the challenges it poses should be viewed as dependent from a malaise that affects the practice of democracy within European countries not less than the EU’, Pinelli (2019), 29.

  32. Blokker (2019), 540–541.

  33. Corso (2019a), 215.

  34. Alterio (2019), 273. See also Landau (2018), 523.

  35. Martinico (2021).

  36. Landau (2013).

  37. Taussig (1993), XIII.

  38. Entry ‘Parasitism: biology’. 2019. Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/science/parasitism. Accessed 7 March 2023.

  39. ‘Mimesis is an ambiguous term. It is at the same time cognition and evaluation. Its cognitive result is imitation. There is no imitation without difference. To describe an object in terms of mimesis is to acknowledge that there is no identity. It is not the thing itself. We call toy animals realistic, but not a zoo. If mimetic imitation were to be wholly at one with what it represents, it would cease to be a representation’, Hüppauf (2015), 134.

  40. Remarks by Giuseppe Conte to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 2018. Voltaire Network. http://www.voltairenet.org/article203153.html. Accessed 7 March 2023.

  41. Art. 1 of the Italian Constitution.

  42. V. Orbán’s speech at the XXV Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp, 26 July 2014, Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő). 2014. The Budapest Beacon. https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/. Accessed 7 March 2023.

  43. Blokker (2019), 537.

  44. Urbinati (1998); Fournier (2019).

  45. ‘The populist rhetoric manipulates the rule of law and the majoritarian pillars of constitutional democracy by convincing a fictional majority that constitutional democracy gives rise to a tyranny of minorities. Populism in action represents the second facet of the populist strategy. It corresponds to a specific constitutional strategy of legal and constitutional reforms aiming at disrupting constitutional democracy’, Fournier (2019), 363.

  46. In similar terms: ‘As the only subject that deserves representation is a unified people, which is equated with the majority, there is no need for a higher law that mediates between and integrates different social forces that compete for political power’, Blokker (2019), 544.

  47. Blokker (2019), 541.

  48. Orsina (2013).

  49. ‘Berlusconi, in his speech, also made ample use of football metaphors, both due to the huge popularity of this sport and because he himself was the president of a football team. As in the case of other populist leaders, the language and attitudes that are unusual in the political realm (such as the jokes and the gaffes during important institutional occasions) were used by Berlusconi to underline the difference with the political and party élite’, Biancalana (2020), 224.

  50. ‘He was able to present himself to anti- Left voters as the “man of providence” who had entered the lists at precisely.

    the right time to prevent the country’s government ending up in the hands of the ex-communists’ Tarchi (2002), 132.

  51. The many trials of Silvio Berlusconi explained. 2014. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12403119. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  52. Calise (2007), Raniolo (2006), McDonnell (2013).

  53. Tarchi (2002), 133.

  54. Manin (1997), 218.

  55. Taguieff (2002), 27.

  56. Finchelstein (2019), 242.

  57. Mola, Giancarlo. 2001. Berlusconi: “La mia biografia in tutte le famiglie italiane”. LaRepubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/campagnacinque/libro/libro.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  58. ‘At this level, Berlusconi’s experience represents an early case of proto-populism in power that skillfully exploited the political potential of the media—a topic that has generated an endless literature over the past few years across a variety of fields—and managed to be, at once, anti-partisan (against previous parties and current antagonists) and hyper-partisan (stretching the identification between his holistic “non-party” party, its leader, and the nation as much as he could)’, Ragazzoni (2020), 225.

  59. Pertici (2016).

  60. Art. 41, Italian Constitution: ‘Private economic enterprise is free. It may not be carried out against the common good or in such a manner that could damage safety, liberty and human dignity. The law shall provide for appropriate programmes and controls so that public and private-sector economic activity may be oriented and coordinated for social purpose’.

  61. La Costituzione è di ispirazione sovietica. 2003. LaRepubblica, https://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/berluparla/torino/torino.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023. Our own translation.

  62. Berlusconi: ‘Costituzione ideologizzata’. 2009. CorrieredellaSera. https://www.corriere.it/politica/09_febbraio_07/berlusconi_costituzione_bd1e8990-f53f-11dd-a70d-00144f02aabc.shtml. Accessed on 7 March 2023. Our own translation.

  63. On Berlusconi’s approach to constitutional politics, see Pizzorusso (1999).

  64. ‘What I have called a “politics of immediacy” often shows itself in a plea for the means of direct democracy (e.g., referenda): these serve to get confirmation from “the people” for what is, according to the populist, a fortiori the only morally right political position. Again, I argue that this aspect of the constitutional theory of populism is not in accordance with contemporary constitutional theory. It fails to take into account the constitutive role of representation in a democracy’, Corrias (2016), 12.

  65. Kentish, Benjamin. 2017. Donald Trump slams “archaic” US constitution that is “really bad” for the country. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-us-constitution-archaic-really-bad-fox-news-100-days-trump-popularity-ratings-barack-obama-a7710781.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  66. Cummings, William. 2020. Here's what the Constitution's 10th Amendment says about Trump's claim to have total authority over states. USA Today. https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/14/trump-claim-total-authority-claim-10th-amendment/2988013001/. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  67. Bechtold (2020).

  68. Gold, Hadas. 2016. Donald Trump: We're going to 'open up' libel laws. Politico. https://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  69. Trial Memorandum of Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America. 2021. Washingtonpost.com. https://context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/9fc7df1f-2945-4be7-80bc-7e0f928c78b2/note/4430abec-b677-4bfd-9232-d45145aca1cb.#page=1. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  70. Romero (2016). ‘Trump has mocked the First Amendment’s right to freedom of religion by calling for a ban on Muslims from entering the country and criticized those who believe in the freedom of speech as “foolish people”. He has endorsed attacks on protesters and the imprisonment of people who burn the flag. He has attempted to silence and marginalize his critics by forcing staff, and even interns, to sign unconstitutional non-disclosure agreements and revoking, or threatening to revoke, the security clearances of former administration officials. His administration has also proposed to dramatically limit the right to protest near the White House and on the National Mall’, Tashman (2017).

  71. Urbinati (2018).

  72. Urbinati (2018).

  73. Corso (2019b), 469.

  74. Mishra, Stuti. 2021. Ex-Trump aide calls Fauci ‘father’ of Covid and suggests he helped China genetically engineer virus. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/peter-navarro-fox-news-fauci-covid-b1824852.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  75. Sorice (2020). ‘In this context, social media play a non-secondary role in the legitimation, penetration, and diffusion of the “populist discourse”, even if they are not the activators of those processes; at the same time, however, these platforms can be “used” as propaganda instruments by populist leaders’, De Blasio and Sorice (2020), 139.

  76. Martens, Aguiar, Gomez Herrera and Muller (2018), 15.

  77. Using the wording (and prophecy) of Floridi (1996).

  78. Bartlett (2014), 93-94.

  79. Waisbord (2018b), 25.

  80. Waisbord (2018b), 29.

  81. Grzymala-Busse, Kuo, Fukuyama and McFaul (2020), 4; see also S. Waisbord (2018a), 17.

  82. Nichols (2017).

  83. Aisch, Gregor, Jon Huang and Cecilia Kang. 2016. Dissecting the #PizzaGate Conspiracy Theories. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/10/business/media/pizzagate.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  84. Boschi e Boldrini ai funerali di Riina. La sottosegretaria: “Fake news, passato il limite”. Il M5s prende le distanze. 2017. ilfattoquotidiano.it. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/11/22/boschi-e-boldrini-ai-funerali-di-riina-la-sottosegretaria-fake-news-passato-il-limite-il-m5s-prende-le-distanze/3995358/. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  85. For the US and Netherlands cases, see Hameleers (2020); for the Italian case, see Monti (2020a); for the Brazilian case, see Santos Ferreira (2020).

  86. ‘Not only was trust in institutions and official information higher during earlier eras of democracy, there were comparably fewer media channels through which official information passed. The combination of higher trust and fewer public information sources enabled both authorities and the press to exercise more effective gatekeeping against wild or dangerous narratives from the social fringes or foreign adversaries’, Bennett and Livingston (2018), 128.

  87. Waisbord (2018a), 4.

  88. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542–43 (2012). Ex pluribus: Sunstein (2014), 106.

  89. West (2014), 2439.

  90. See Mindich (1998); cf. Dorf and Tarrow (2017).

  91. American Press Institute, “The lost meaning of ‘objectivity’”, available at americanpressinstitute.org (last accessed on 7 June 2023).

  92. ‘[I]t is well known and consistent in the case law of this Court, the acknowledgment of the peculiar diffusion and pervasiveness of the television message (judgment No 225 of 1974, No 148 of 1981, No 826 of 1988), so as to justify the adoption, strictly of broadcasting station, of a rigorous discipline capable to prevent any inappropriate conditioning in the formation of the will of the voters’, Constitutional Court, judgment no. 155/2002. Our own translation. See Casarosa and Brogi (2014), 101.

  93. Constitutional Court, judgment no. 155/2002. In an obiter dictum, after recalling the declarations of the International Congress of Journalists in Bordeaux in May 1954, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the right to publish and submit news to the public has to comply with the substantial truth of the facts. Constitutional Court Judgment no. 16/1981. The Italian Constitutional Court has also considered the crime of diffusion of false news to be constitutionally legitimate if the disinformation could cause a danger to public order. Constitutional Court, judgment no. 19/1962, Judgment. no. 199/1972 and Judgment. no. 210/1976.

  94. Ex pluribus: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom App no. 13585/88 (26 November 1991), § 59; Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53; Fuchsmann v. Germany App no. 71233/13 (19 October 2017), § 43. On the proportionality test: Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria App no. 15974/90 (26 April 1995), § 37. GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v Switzerland App no. 18597/13 (9 January 2018), § 68. From this point of view, it is necessary to consider the reference of Art. 52 para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the ECHR: more recently, the Tribunal of the EU has also recognised the relationship between the protection of the free press and the dissemination of truthful information (recalling the ECtHR case law): EU Tribunal, RT France v Conseil, judgment T-125/22, § 53.

  95. Koltay (2019), 45.

  96. Morelli and Pollicino (2020), 642.

  97. For example, following the caselaw of the Italian Constitutional Court, it can be noted how the criminal censorship (under Article 656 of the Criminal Code) of disinformation, i.e., news disseminated to the public even by non-journalists, has been limited to those cases in which the false news may create problems for public order (according to the presence of an actual danger). See Constitutional Court, Judgments no. 19/1962, no. 199/1972 and no. 210/1976. On the contrary, other forms of censorship, such as rectification on media (see Art. 10 of law no. 223/1990 concerning rectification on radio and television; see Art. 8 of the no. 47/1948 for the rectification of the press; see Article 2 of law no. 69/1963, The Journalists' Code of Ethics) or administrative sanctions for disinformation in the economic-financial field (Art. 187-ter, Testo Unico sulla Finanza), have never met any constitutional complaints of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.

  98. Pollicino (2019).

  99. Federal Agency of News LLC v Facebook Inc WL 137154 (ND Cal 2020). See also Federal Agency of News LLC v Facebook Inc WL 3254208 (ND Cal 2019).

  100. Slovin (2022).

  101. Goldman (2019); Glynn (2018).

  102. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG), 2017. The NetzDG is not really an anti-fake news legislation: Claussen (2018).

  103. Loi no. 1202/2018. See Ponthoreau (2019), p. 30.

  104. The bills presented at the Parliament were ‘disegno di legge’ (Ddl) Gambaro (Atto Senato n. 2688), Ddl Zanda-Filippin (Atto Senato n. 3001); Ddl De Girolamo (Atto Camera: 4692).

  105. EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018); Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation (2022).

  106. Monti (2020b), 214.

  107. The Executive Order stated: ‘Today, many Americans follow the news, stay in touch with friends and family, and share their views on current events through social media and other online platforms. As a result, these platforms function in many ways as a twenty-first century equivalent of the public square (…). As President, I have made clear my commitment to free and open debate on the internet. Such debate is just as important online as it is in our universities, our town halls, and our homes. It is essential to sustaining our democracy. Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national discourse’, Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship, Infrastructure & Technology, Issued on 28 May 2020.

  108. Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D.N.Y.) and Knight First Amendment Inst at Columbia Univ v Trump No 18-1691-cv (2nd Cir 2019).

  109. Perhaps the US Supreme Court could embrace these theses in the future; see the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Joseph. R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al. v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, et al. 593 U. S. ____ (2021). On these doctrines and the power of platforms, see Klonick (2018); Gillespie (2018).

  110. Mr. Grillo sustained that elites were attempting to act as ‘the new inquisitors of the web’ and that they wanted to create ‘a court to control and condemn [those] who disgrace them’. Campo, Marcello. 2016. Antitrust, stop alle bufale sul web. Grillo: “Volete l'inquisizione”. Ansa.it. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2016/12/30/antitrust-stop-bufale-web.-grillovolete-inquisizione_66ed11a3-67df-4714-b96b-882e14d4f7d8.html. Accessed 7 March 2023.

    Our own translation.

  111. In the session of 5 April 2017 at the EU Parliament, Mr. Salvini, regarding the EU proposal to fight disinformation, affirmed ‘It’s going badly for you, you can't buy brains anymore, you can't control the newspapers, the news, the radio. In Great Britain, they voted as they wanted; in the United States, they voted as they wanted; in Italy, they voted as they wanted, and you are going crazy. So, what are you inventing? Facebook gag, Internet gag, punishment – 1 million, 5 million, 50 million! You invent George Orwell's Ministry of Truth, the Ministry of Propaganda. I am waiting for the European Parliament to pay for psycho-police to investigate the psycho-crimes of those who are not aligned with the single thought and the single currency. You can come up with all the gags you want. The only thing you can do is to pack your bags and go and look for a real job, because no one can stop freedom, neither here nor elsewhere. Thank you and long live the net, long live Facebook’, Matteo Salvini (ENF), P8_CRE-REV(2017)04–05(3–708-0000), Session of Wednesday 5 April 2017. Our own translation.

  112. In this regard, while the censorship of online disinformation in Europe and Italy has not directly affected populist politicians, it has nevertheless hit disinformation groups linked to populist disinformation propaganda. See Facebook chiude pagine che sostenevano Lega-M5S, fake news. 2019. Ansa.it. https://www.ansa.it/europa/notizie/europarlamento/news/2019/05/13/facebook-chiude-pagine-che-sostenevano-lega-m5s-fake-news-_4332b6f2-762e-4d0b-9aa8-40a0fd324da2.html. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  113. The 5SM supported an anti-disinformation parliament committee to inquire about the issue and develop solutions: Lattanzio and others: ‘Establishment of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry concerning the massive dissemination of false news through the information and communication system, the guarantee of the right to information and the critical use of the media and communication technologies’ (2213) (Submitted on 24 October 2019, announced on 25 October 2019). Our own translation.

  114. Salvini on Twitter stressed in January 2021: ‘#Salvini: Twitter is a private company, but it has a public function. Does it gag Trump? Enrico Letta also spoke about it, I wonder: where are we going? Who decides what can and cannot be said? Violence should be condemned but I never like censorship. #mezzorainpiù’. Twitter. 2021. https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1348277986110398466. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  115. Indeed, Salvini commented on Musk's takeover of Twitter and the end of content moderation policies: ‘Good news for the Net, for Democracy and Freedom. I love Elon Musk’. Twitter. 2022. https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1585897324332580866. Accessed on 7 March 2023. Salvini also celebrated Donald Trump's readmission on social networks: Twitter, Salvini: ‘Grande Musk ha riammesso Trump’. Adnkronos. 2022, https://www.adnkronos.com/twitter-salvini-grande-musk-ha-riammesso-trump_7aIg5DhOYoXoUjtGsYkaPu. Accessed on 7 March 2023.

  116. Kuo (2019), 576.

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  1. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy

    Giuseppe Martinico

  2. LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy

    Matteo Monti

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This paper is the result of joint reflections; however, Giuseppe Martinico wrote par. 2; Matteo Monti wrote par. 3; while paras. 1 and 4 were jointly elaborated. Many thanks to Edoardo Bressanelli, Roberta Bracciale and Giulia Gentile for their comments.

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Martinico, G., Monti, M. Online Disinformation and Populist Approaches to Freedom of Expression: Between Confrontation and Mimetism. Liverpool Law Rev 45, 143–169 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-023-09343-9

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