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Hrafn Asgeirsson: The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 203

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Notes

  1. Mark Greenberg, “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents” in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (eds.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 39–106.

  2. Ibid, p. 76.

  3. See, for example, Nicos Stavropoulos, “Words and Obligations” in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards (eds.) Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 123–153: ‘For any consideration, including the content of the language of a statute, something must assign it some role in the explanation of its impact on obligation … There is a variety of considerations, linguistic and other, which compete as candidates for a role in the fundamental explanation of [that] impact … and assigning any of these some such role seems to require appeal to considerations of political morality’ (p. 153).

  4. Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 111–112.

  5. John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 149–150.

  6. Ibid, p. 150.

  7. Greenberg describes the point as ‘obvious’, taking it to be ‘fundamental to the nature of morality that if, all-things-considered, one is morally required to take some action, it cannot be the case that other reasons make it permissible not to take the action’: Greenberg, “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents”, p. 82.

  8. Ibid, p. 101.

  9. As Endicott argues: Timothy Endicott, “The Value of Vagueness” in Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 14–30.

  10. Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness Has No Function in Law”, 7 Legal Theory 385 (2001).

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    Joshua Pike

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Pike, J. BOOK REVIEW. Law and Philos 40, 463–469 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09413-x

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