1 Introduction

Human flourishing is a concept with a rich philosophical pedigree dating back to the classical era, and, in particular, Aristotle’s ethical writings (Aristotle 1999). Interest in flourishing has been rekindled with the mid-twentieth century revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in moral philosophy as well as the focus on character and virtue in positive psychology and educational theory in recent decades. One might suggest that human flourishing is a more objective, holistic, stable, and universally applicable wellbeing construct than other constructs that focus on hedonic experience, preference satisfaction, or opportunity. What’s more, flourishing might be thought to capture dimensions of human wellbeing that other constructs in the social sciences, such as hedonic happiness and evaluative happiness, fail to track (VanderWeele, 2017).

Attempts to define human flourishing, however, have proved challenging. Part of the difficulty stems from Aristotle’s own notion of flourishing as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle describes the good life as rational activity in accord with virtue (NE 1098a15) but also argues that contemplation is the highest human activity (NE 1177b15–1178a10). In addition, he acknowledges the importance of ‘external goods’ (τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθα) – such as friendship, wealth, and political power – without which one could not realise the human good. It is not immediately obvious how we ought to view these external goods in light of Aristotle’s definition of flourishing as rational activity in accord with virtue, nor is it obvious how contemplation relates to other dimensions of rational activity that we might take to be constitutive of flourishing (Charles, 1999; Gasser-Wingate, 2020; Walker, 2018).

It is also not immediately clear how Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. Several distinct contemporary theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry, including perfectionist and so-called eudaimonist theories of wellbeing (Besser-Jones, 2016; Hurka, 1993; Kraut, 2009), Nussbaum and Sen’s capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2000), some versions of objective list theory (Finnis, 1980; Lauinger, 2021), along with some “life satisfaction” theorists such as Helliwell (2021) and hybrid theorists like Ryff and Singer (2008).

Given the heterogeneity of interpretations of Aristotelian flourishing, this article seeks to clarify how an Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia ought to be understood in light of contemporary philosophical categories of wellbeing. In Part I, we offer a textual account of Aristotle’s notion of human flourishing. In Part II, we consider how it ought to be understood in light of contemporary philosophical taxonomies of wellbeing. We tentatively suggest that Aristotle advances a theory of wellbeing that contains elements of moral and intellectual perfectionism as well as a list of external goods that are prerequisites of the flourishing life. In part III we discuss the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of wellbeing.

This article is not intended as a defence of Aristotle’s theory of wellbeing. It will, however, provide a critical analysis of what it means to invoke Aristotelian ancestry in one’s approach to wellbeing and illustrate significant differences between the various philosophical and social scientific theories of wellbeing that invoke an Aristotelian pedigree.

2 Part I: Aristotle on Human Flourishing

Before commencing a discussion of Aristotle’s notion of flourishing, it is worth acknowledging the possibility that Aristotle may not be entirely consistent in the way he develops his account of human flourishing. Indeed, considering the extensive textual debate that surrounds several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, this seems like a real possibility and one that ought to be taken seriously in any close reading of Aristotle. In a seminal commentary discussing the tension between Aristotle’s account of a life governed by practical reason and the life of contemplation (θεωρία), Kathleen Wilkes (1978, 566) argued that “Aristotle’s position is…not consistent”. Similarly, in a discussion of Aristotle’s use of the term makarios (μακάριος), Matthew Cashen (2012, 9) suggests that “Aristotle does not use the term blessedness in a consistent way”. In line with these analyses, one should at least leave open the possibility that Aristotle’s account of flourishing is pluralistic or at least partly context specific.Footnote 1

We are inclined to a more charitable view, namely, that Aristotle does not provide definitive answers to certain questions surrounding wellbeing but instead provides a survey of relevant issues without necessarily offering his own exhaustive answers. But more shall be said on this in due course.

The core of Aristotle’s notion of flourishing is the concept of eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). A direct translation of this word would be to have or be accompanied by a good daimon or good spirit – something that was thought to signify good fortune. In Ancient Greek thought certain individuals were said to be accompanied by a good spirit or minor deity that would keep them safe from threats and guide them in difficult times. For example, Socrates was said to be directed by a guardian spirit that would keep him safe from danger and chide him for bad judgment (Partridge, 2002). Aristotle, however, did not attach much importance to the notion of a daimon when developing his account of eudaimonia. As such, Aristotle’s term eudaimonia is often translated as the good life or the excellent or fine life.Footnote 2

Aristotle describes his inquiry into the human good as an exercise in political science. Political science aims at the realisation of the human good, both individual and collective, and Aristotle intends for his inquiry into the human good to not remain a mere theoretical exercise but also to inform the way in which communities go about cultivating virtue in citizens. Political science is the highest of the sciences, according to Aristotle, and we should see an inquiry into the human good as falling within the remit of political science rather than subordinate sciences like generalship, household management, and rhetoric (NE 1094b1–5).

It might be tempting to ‘short circuit’ a philosophical discussion of the good life with an appeal to happiness as the defining feature of what it means to live well. Yet Aristotle notes that it is not sufficient to simply settle for the analytic truth that the highest human good is happiness, if only because this is not particularly informative. He writes, “…presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently something [generally] agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the best good is” (1097b23–24).

It is also not entirely clear that happiness is the best translation for eudaimonia. As Moran notes, “When [Aristotle] introduces the term, he uses eudaimonia as a synonym for ‘doing/faring well’ (to eu prattein) and for ‘living well’ (to eu zēn)” (Moran, 2018, 98). As we shall see, it is a term that is focused on activity and the realisation of potential rather than subjective experience. But happiness in contemporary language:

...does not seem to be an activity of any kind, however satisfying or fulfilling the activity may be, but rather a state or condition of one’s life conjoined with the way it is experienced and regarded by the happy individual, i.e. it has both an objective and subjective element. (2018, 93)

As such, eudaimonia seems to be a distinct concept from what we understand by happiness, at least insofar as eudaimonia is focused on action whereas happiness includes an element of positive subjective experience. That being said, this specific question does not necessarily have a strong bearing on our argument. Suffice to say that there is significant disagreement about how best to translate eudaimonia into contemporary English. We will refrain from using the word “happiness” but we will sometimes make reference to translations that use “happiness” as a translation for “eudaimonia.”

Instead of seeking quick semantic solutions to the question of flourishing, Aristotle suggests that we ought to consider the “function (ἔργον) of a human being”. The good of a thing, for Aristotle, is indexed to its function – a claim that is sometimes described as the ‘function argument’. Thus, he writes:

just as the good, i.e., doing [well], for a flautist, a sculptor, and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human being. (1097b24–28)

According to Aristotle, the human person’s proper function is rational activity: “moreover, we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity and actions of the soul that involve reason” (1098a13–14). Flourishing, or eudaimonia, therefore, is to be found in the fulfillment of these activities and actions with excellence: “the human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with perfect virtue” (1098a16).

Aristotle suggests that his account of flourishing as virtuous rational activity coheres with other opinions according to which the human good resides in virtue, prudence, wisdom and pleasure. All of these goods can arguably be assimilated into a general account of rational activity in accord with virtue. Virtue, for Aristotle, refers to a “‘hexis’ (‘state’, ‘condition’, ‘disposition’)—a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings” (Kraut, 2022) (cf. (1105b25–6)). Importantly, Aristotle’s conception of virtue is not limited to moral excellences but also includes cognitive excellences or excellences of the mind such as practical wisdom (φρόνησῐς) and understanding (νοῦς) (1040a25–1141a7).

Yet he acknowledges the role of certain circumstantial and material goods in the attainment of eudaimonia: “we cannot easily do fine actions if we lack the resources”. Among these resources he includes, “first of all, friends, wealth, and political power”. He notes that “deprivation of certain [externals] – for instance, good birth, good children, beauty – mars our blessedness” (1099a28–1099b5). This is not to mention his extensive discussion of friendship in Book VIII and Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Flourishing is, fundamentally, an activity, as the good of a thing resides in its function (1097b25–27). As such, the circumstantial and material features of the good life are best understood as necessary conditions or resources that facilitate the realisation of the human good. It is not entirely clear whether we ought to think about these external goods as the context in which we exercise our rational capacities or whether they themselves play some integral role in the cultivation of practical rationality (MacIntyre, 1999). But we can certainly say that for Aristotle they are in some way necessary for human flourishing and that one cannot flourish without a sufficient amount of good fortune. Aristotle states in the Politics that “the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions” (1323b40–1324a1). As Gesser-Wingate writes, “we need a broad array of external goods as prerequisites for different kinds of virtuous activity—money, political power, health, honor, good birth, tolerable looks, decent children” (2020, 2).

It is important to emphasise the close connection in Aristotle’s writings between the flourishing of an individual person and their situatedness in society (specifically, the city-state). Aristotle writes that “man is a political animal”, and the Nicomachean Ethics might be described as a preface or supplement for the Politics. Aristotle was of the view that the “end (τέλος) of individuals and of states is the same” (1334a13) or, alternatively, that the “happiness (εὐδαιμονία) of the individual is the same as that of the state” (1324a5–6). The cultivation of both moral and intellectual virtue is a thoroughly social process, and the State, according to Aristotle, plays an important role in the moral cultivation of its citizens from youth until adulthood (as is evidenced in the final books of the Politics). But it is not just that participation in society is a prerequisite for human flourishing. One gets the impression that there is a kind of priority in Aristotle’s writings given to social participation as if it were constitutive of flourishing itself. Aristotle appears to have thought that the polis was in some sense naturally prior to the individual, though the precise way in which this claim ought to be interpreted is subject to debate (Miller, 1997, Ch. 2). On one interpretation, the individual belongs to the tate like a body part belongs to an organism. In any case, Aristotle was committed to the view that “individuals can attain perfection only if they are morally habituated under the polis and its laws” (Miller, 1997, 358). That is to say, perfection is only attainable in the context of civic life through the moral guidance of the State. We will not concern ourselves extensively with the Politics in this essay but certainly this should be born in mind as we proceed with our discussion.

Aristotle argues that flourishing is a stable, diachronic property of a life as opposed to a momentary aspect of wellbeing. Our life is typically not made good by single actions or short periods of high wellbeing but rather by repeated actions over an extended period of time. Aristotle writes:

to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy. (1098a18–19)

Rather, happiness or blessedness are attained through the sustained practice of rational activity in accord with virtue over an extended period of time. It is in this life of rational activity in accord with virtue that happiness in the fullest sense is found.

But such a picture is complicated by comments that Aristotle makes elsewhere in Book I. Aristotle considers how great misfortune at the end of life can potentially mar an otherwise flourishing existence. He writes:

...happiness needs a complete life because life includes many reversals of fortune, good and bad, and the most prosperous person may fall into a terrible disaster in old age, as the Trojan stories tell us about Priam. If someone has suffered these sorts of misfortunes and comes to a miserable end, no one counts him happy. (1100a6–8)

One may, in other words, have a life that is for the most part characterised by virtue and suitably furnished with the trappings of success but still experience great misfortune at the end of life and not be considered blessed.

Aristotle’s discussion of Priam complicates the view that external goods merely furnish necessary conditions for flourishing rather than serving as constituents of it. Later in Book I he notes that “the happy man (ὁ εὐδαίμων) can never become miserable; though it is true he will not be supremely blessed (μακάριός) if he encounters the misfortunes of a Priam” (1101a6–7). Why does happiness require a complete lifetime? And why does a bad death spoil one’s chances of being “makarios”? In these cases, it seems as though external goods (e.g., success in politics or healthy children) are constituents of a fully flourishing life in their own right, such that their loss frustrates one’s flourishing even if it in no way inhibits one’s capacity for virtuous action (the dead being beyond the need for such action, at least in most domains).Footnote 3

We do not see this textual question as a problem for our reading of Aristotle insofar as, depending on the interpretation of the specific passages in question, Aristotle himself may not seek to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether external goods are simply prerequisites of the good life or whether they are in fact constitutive of it. Perhaps happiness and blessedness come apart in important ways in the life of someone who experiences sudden and grave misfortune (though this may be unlikely given the consensus view of Aristotle’s tendency to use makarios and eudaimonia interchangeably). Aristotle may be grappling with the fact that there is not an obvious formula for how intervals of eudaimonia add up to one's whole life being eudaimon or blessed. Or perhaps Aristotle sees Priam as an interesting though highly unusual exception to a general philosophical rule concerning the constituent features of happiness and blessedness. We do not see any of these interpretations as threatening the thought that virtue occupies a central place in the life of the flourishing and blessed man. The real question raised by the case of Priam is whether external goods are merely necessary for the good life or in fact play some constitutive role in it. We do not think this question can be easily resolved and, indeed, are not convinced Aristotle is entirely consistent. Suffice to say that external goods have at least some bearing on wellbeing understood in the context of the narrative arc of life; we shall leave to one side the question of whether they are just prerequisites for flourishing or whether they play a more constitutive role in the flourishing life.Footnote 4

In Book X, Aristotle expands his function argument to include the contention that contemplation is the highest human activity and therefore equivalent to human flourishing. Aristotle writes:

…if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. …And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as agreeing both with the results already reached and with the truth. For contemplation is at once the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals are the highest things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously than we can carry on any form of action. (1177a 12–20)

Contemplation, in other words, is that activity that most perfectly encapsulates rational activity in accord with virtue which is the proper function of the human person. As such, contemplation ought to be regarded as the highest human good and the constitutive feature of the flourishing life.

Much has been written exploring how this section of the Nicomachean Ethics ought to be reconciled with Aristotle’s earlier reflections on the human good. Some scholars have questioned, for example, how an account of the human good of contemplation can be reconciled with an account of the human good as virtuous activity (Charles, 1999; Nagel, 1972). Nussbaum (1986, 374) contends that Nicomachean Ethics 10.6–8 “does not fit with its context and that is in flat contradiction with several important positions and arguments of the EN as a whole,” and that “the text of [Nicomachean Ethics Book X] seems to be oddly composed, giving rise to suspicion that Chapters 6–8 are not originally part of the same whole”. Moral virtues seem to be concerned with external goods (Nussbaum, 2001, 373). But if contemplation is the ultimate good, and it is an activity internal to an agent, then it is not apparent why we would need to concern ourselves with virtuous activity if we could attain a perfectly contemplative state. Aristotle notes that it would not make sense for the gods, being self-sufficient beings, to concern themselves with virtuous action, as the gods have no need of external goods (NE 1178b9–25).

Some scholars have cogently argued that contemplation is eminently compatible with the vita activa, and that Aristotle’s notion of contemplation can be taken to refer to a reflective form of living in the world. In a similar manner to Socrates, Aristotle contends that the unexamined life is not a fully human life, and that we do well to reflect on and seek to construct meaning from the varied experiences of our life (Annas, 2011, 121–122). Human processes of self-reflection whereby one seeks to make sense of one’s life as whole can be seen as contemplative activities. Self-reflection does not serve a utilitarian purpose or seek to produce some external good but rather is a disinterested activity that has value in and of itself. As such, the contemplative life is compatible with the practice of virtue and action in the world.

One might argue, however, that there is a conflict between these remarks and Aristotle’s contention in Book I that the proper function of the human person is rational activity in accord with virtue. Contemplation is permanent, disinterested, and unalloyed in a way that other uses of human rationality might not be. As Aristotle writes,

...the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems…to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity. (X.7)

He contrasts this with the activity of the practical virtues exhibited in political and military affairs, which he takes to be “unleisurely” and “not desirable for their own sake”.

One might, therefore, be inclined to a rather different solution of this puzzle, which essentially applies Nicomachean Ethics Book 1–9 to the embodied human composite, and book 10 to the disembodied intellect. That is to say, Aristotle’s account of embodied and temporal flourishing could be said to be distinct from his account of divine, contemplative flourishing. Temporal flourishing involves the excellent use of practical reason in human affairs. Divine flourishing involves the use of theoretical reason to contemplate eternal realities.Footnote 5 Both activities are proper to the human person but contemplation is a more excellent activity and to be prized above the excellent use of practical reason.

This may seem unsatisfactory to some readers, but it is worth considering how religious accounts of flourishing do appear to differ significantly from secular and naturalistic accounts of flourishing such that one can end up with a very different account of the virtues and human goods. The idea that one can conceivably lack material resources or be subject to bad fortune and nevertheless live a contemplative life is a basic commitment of later Christian accounts of the blessed life. One can make the same ascription to other religious traditions such as Buddhism and other philosophical traditions such as Stoicism. And it also seems that contemplation, precisely because of its transcendental character, could perdure even in the face of bad fortune and material difficulties (Gasser-Wingate, 2020). Perhaps the dual account of flourishing that Aristotle offers is, then, a strength rather than a weakness of his account. He recognises the ways in which these dual accounts of flourishing diverge and how a contemplative life is not dependent on worldly goods in the same way as an active life.

This is not to say that there is an absolute and necessary split between the active life of an embodied subject and the contemplative life. Indeed, we are inclined to adopt the view that contemplation and moral action are both constitutive of flourishing insofar as they both consist in rational activity in accord with virtue. In the case of contemplative activity, the human person cultivates the intellectual virtue of sophia. In the case of moral action the human person exercises practical rationality or phronesis and directs the emotions and passions in such a manner that they function in concert with reason and facilitate the realisation of human goods.

To this end, it is worth considering Bryan Reece’s solution to the puzzle arising from Book X.6–8. Reece (2020) argues that, for Aristotle, contemplation is what is most proper to a human being but that a life of virtue and activity is also proper to a human being in a secondary sense. He offers a slightly different translation of perhaps the most important passage that speaks of the kind of “life that is proper” to a human being (10.7, 1178a2–10.8, 1178a23). Reece translates Aristotle as stating that:

…life in accordance with intellect is proper to a human being, since this is a human being most of all. So, this life also is happiest. Life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is proper to the human being in a secondary way, for activities in accordance with this kind of virtue are properly human.

By ‘the other kind of virtue’, Reece suggests Aristotle is referring to the moral virtues that a human being qua composite of body and soul performs in the world. This can be contrasted with the intellectual virtues of nous and episteme that are practiced in contemplation and that are proper to the human being in a primary sense as an intellectual creature. This distinction between a primary and secondary function proper to the human being is our preferred interpretation of how NE Book X.6–8 can be reconciled with the preceding nine books.

Much more could be said on this question, but It would be beyond the scope of this essay to attempt to resolve all of the interpretative issues surrounding Aristotle’s discussion of contemplation in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. Suffice to say here that there is a sense in which contemplation does not presuppose inactivity nor is it somehow incompatible with an account of flourishing that includes moral virtue. On the contrary, it is the highest form of activity that a human person can engage in, but it is also at least partially compatible with an active life and a life of virtue. How far one can concern oneself with the affairs of the world and still attain contemplation is perhaps a less easily resolved matter.

3 Part II: Aristotelian Flourishing and Contemporary Philosophical Accounts of Wellbeing

In this section we consider how Aristotelian flourishing ought to be understood in light of contemporary philosophical categories of wellbeing. There are a range of theories of wellbeing that claim Aristotelian ancestry. We will argue, however, that Aristotle’s approach to some extent transcends the categories presented to us by contemporary analytic philosophy. Eudaimonia most closely resembles a form of moral and intellectual perfectionism, but it is perhaps best conceived of as a distinct but potentially complementary theory of wellbeing to existing philosophical theories of wellbeing. Aristotle’s framework differs from alternative theories insofar as it is concerned with the active, virtuous realisation of one’s potential as a rational and social animal rather than a passive and individualistic experience of pleasure or desire satisfaction or the possession of objective goods.

In subsection one, we will provide a taxonomy of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. In subsection two, we will argue against interpreting Aristotle as a hedonist or desire satisfaction theorist. In subsection three, we will discuss the elements of an objective list theory in Aristotle’s writings while in subsection four we will consider to what extent Aristotle can be considered to be advancing a perfectionist account of wellbeing. Ultimately, we believe that a perfectionist account of wellbeing is most in line with Aristotle but even it requires some specification vis-a-vis the active character of Aristotelian flourishing as well as relation to external goods.

3.1 A Contemporary Philosophical Taxonomy of Wellbeing

Contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing are seen as answering the question: “what would be best for someone, or would be most in this person’s interests, or would make this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible?” (Parfit, 1984, app. I). Importantly, this question is focused on the good for someone rather than just good in the abstract. Depending on how we frame the question, we might focus more or less on the objective good of a person or their subjective life plans or preferences of the person.

This raises the question of the difference between objective and subjective wellbeing. According to Heathwood (2014), subjective theories of wellbeing “maintain that something can benefit a person only if he wants it, likes it, or cares about it, or it otherwise connects up in some important way with some positive attitude of his”. In contrast, objective theories of wellbeing deny this, “holding that at least some of the things that make our lives better do so independently of our particular interests, likes, and cares” (202). We can say, then, that subjective theories are concerned with an agent’s experience or attitudes whereas objective theories hold that in at least some cases things can be good for us independent of our experiences or attitudes.

The objective-subjective distinction notwithstanding, answers to Parfit’s wellbeing question are typically divided into three categories: hedonistic theories, desire satisfaction theories, and objective list theories.Footnote 6 Hedonistic theories argue that wellbeing is concerned with the subjective experience of pleasure or pain and, in the case of so-called preference hedonism, those pleasure or pain states that are preferred by an agent. Desire satisfaction theories assume that wellbeing is about the satisfaction of an agent’s desires. Desire satisfaction differs from hedonism as some of our desires are not concerned with pleasure or pain (e.g., the desire not to be deceived about the world). One could also draw a distinction between desire satisfaction theories that require knowledge of the fulfillment of a desire and desire fulfillment theories that do not require that an agent be subjectively aware of the fulfillment of desires. Objective list theories of wellbeing posit potentially heterogeneous lists of basic objective goods that are essentially constitutive of well-being and are viewed as such independent of whether people desire them or not.

Some taxonomies also include so-called perfectionist theories, or theories that define wellbeing in terms of “the development of certain characteristically human capacities” (Bradford, 2015, 124). Perfectionism holds that certain states or capacities of human beings, and, in particular, the realisation of one’s individual potential in different domains of human excellence, is the basic feature of human wellbeing. We believe that this theory comes closest to what Aristotle had in mind by eudaimonia, but even it may sometimes be presented as a static and individualistic conception of wellbeing neglecting the active and social character of Aristotelian flourishing, and not fully capturing Aristotle’s conception.

3.2 Aristotle, Hedonism, and Desire-Satisfaction

In this brief section, we discuss why Aristotle should not be thought to be a hedonist or desire satisfaction theorist despite surface interpretations that might suggest otherwise.

Superficially, someone could argue that Aristotle is advancing something like a desire hedonistic or desire satisfaction view. Aristotle notes that the life of the flourishing individual is “in itself pleasant”:

Pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant…Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. (1099a7–8; 1099a11–13)

The virtuous man, in other words, has a pleasant life and experiences pleasure at the performance of virtuous actions. Thus, one might argue that pleasure is fundamental to Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia.

Pleasure, however, is best understood as being part of the broader architecture of rational activity in accord with virtue rather than a stand-alone, basic constituent of wellbeing. There is an alignment between emotions, the will, and reason in the virtuous person such that they are attracted to the good. But virtuous activity is basic to flourishing rather than the experience of pleasure that results from virtuous activity. To suggest that Aristotle is a hedonist is to reify the effects of virtue and wrongly to ascribe a central role to pleasure in eudaimonia.

The same can be said for desire satisfaction theories, at least insofar as, for Aristotle, desire and pleasure are two dimensions of the same phenomenon. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle provides this account of desire:

Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason. By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as ‘natural’; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment; and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. (1370a18–27)

Human desire, then, is a seeking after pleasure or satisfaction of some aspect or other of our nature. There are lower-order desires pertaining to our body and senses, and higher order desires pertaining to reason that has in turn been shaped by custom and society. But crucially, desire is a seeking after the satisfaction of some aspect of human nature, and pleasure is a movement “towards a natural state of being” (1370a4).

We can say, then, that desire satisfaction theories ought to be regarded in the same way we viewed hedonistic theories. It is not that Aristotle leaves no space for the value of the satisfaction of human desires. But it would be wrong to ascribe to desire satisfaction a central place in the architecture of rational activity in accord with virtue.

3.3 Aristotle and Objective List Theories

Another approach to wellbeing are so-called objective list theories of wellbeing. An objective list theory of wellbeing – in contrast to hedonistic or desire-satisfaction theories – presupposes that “certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things” (Parfit, 1984, 499). Alternatively, one might define an objective list theory as a “theory of well-being [that] holds that a plurality of basic objective goods directly benefit people” (Rice, 2013). Rice notes that “[t]he objective list theory is pluralistic (it does not identify an underlying feature shared by these goods) and objective (the basic goods benefit people independently of their reactive attitudes toward them)” (196).Footnote 7

Aristotle’s approach to flourishing has affinities to an objective list theory. It might be thought that the various virtues that characterise Aristotle’s moral psychology are features of an objective list of human goods. Or, alternatively, Aristotle’s list of external goods necessary for flourishing might be said to be part of an objective list theory of wellbeing.

Yet we cannot neglect the fact that Aristotle’s account of flourishing has a hierarchical structure. All goods are not equal. The virtuous activity of the rational soul is central to Aristotle’s account of wellbeing. Other goods appear to be subservient to this, and, on at least some interpretations, are only goods insofar as they are the necessary conditions for the virtuous activity of the rational soul. Aristotle, then, can be distinguished from an objective list approach that is pluralistic in the sense of identifying no underlying shared feature between the goods that are conducive to wellbeing. Aristotle’s account has a vertical character that marks it out from other theories that posit a horizontal plane of distinct, equally valuable (or, alternatively, incommensurate) objective goods (cf. Finnis, 1980).

3.4 Aristotle And perfectionism

Rather than being a hedonistic or desire satisfaction theory or some version of an objective list, we would argue that eudaimonia is closest to a version of moral and intellectual perfectionism. On this view, Aristotle sees flourishing or wellbeing as consisting in the cultivation of theoretical and practical reason as well as emotions and desires. Eudaimonia is not about preferences, but rather the realisation or actualisation of powers or capacities of the human organism. Aristotle’s account is a metaphysics of living well, and unlike other philosophical theories of wellbeing which focus on positive cognitive states, Aristotle is more concerned with the objective actualisation of the powers of a thing – in the case of human beings, their rational powers:

If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to expect that it is in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the best element. (NE 1177a)

The best element in human beings is rationality and virtue involves the excellent use of practical and theoretical rationality.

Aristotelian flourishing is active – about something that you do – as opposed to passive – i.e., something that happens to you. As Besser-Jones writes:

whereas other theories of well-being take well-being to be a largely passive state – something we experience – eudaimonism takes well-being to be an active process of living well, of well functioning. (2016, 187–188)

Perhaps the best way of expressing this insight is that Aristotle is, as a rule, more concerned with the metaphysical actualisation of powers rather than an agent’s mental states. He does not think that subjective states like the experience of pleasure are irrelevant. Yet unlike hedonistic theories of wellbeing, he does not limit wellbeing to the experiences of pleasure and pain. On the contrary, he focuses primarily on the actualisation of powers and capacities, and the proper role of pleasure in the flourishing life being the pleasures arising out of virtuous action.

Furthermore, it is not sufficient to merely have the opportunity to actualise one’s capacities. One must act on this opportunity. It is thus appropriate here to distinguish traditional Aristotelian approaches from a contemporary capabilities account of wellbeing. The capabilities approach defines human wellbeing in terms of capabilities and functionings of the human person (Nussbaum, 2011). It argues that freedom to achieve wellbeing is of primary importance and that wellbeing ought to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities – their ability to do and be certain things. What’s more, our ability to realise certain capabilities depends on a range of personal, sociopolitical and environmental factors. These factors condition the extent to which we are able to realise our own vision of the good life.

Ironically, the capabilities approach is less focused on capabilities and more focused on liberty than other more classical Aristotelian accounts of wellbeing. Bradford writes:

…The capabilities approach stresses the significance of liberalism and sees the capability to choose how and whether to exercise one’s capabilities is a central freedom. (2015, 134)

What matters is not so much whether one realizes one’s capacities but rather whether one has the liberty to realise these capacities if they choose and however they choose.

But this is clearly different from what a conventional reading of Aristotle on wellbeing tells us. Aristotle notes that “happiness is activity in accord with virtue” (1177a11). This vision of happiness is not compatible with passivity or inactivity. We need to use our human capacities and powers and use them in an excellent manner. The capabilities approach, however, is partially silent on whether one ought to use their capacities and powers. What matters for capabilities theorists is that people have various capabilities and the liberty to realise their human capacities should they so choose.

Perhaps we can put the point more strongly. The capabilities approach appears to see wellbeing in a way that emphasises opportunity over action. What matters for wellbeing is not what someone does but what someone is able to do. As such, the political liberal capabilities approach to wellbeing articulated by Sen and Nussbaum departs from Aristotle in significant ways.Footnote 8

Aristotle’s notion of rational activity in accord with virtue might thus come closest to a perfectionist account of wellbeing, but one with certain qualifications and additions. Aristotle, according to our interpretation, posited that the virtuous activity of the rational soul was the height of wellbeing. It would appear that he saw related concepts such as prudence, wisdom, and pleasure, as capable of being assimilated into a broader account of rational activity in accord with virtue (1098b23–1099a30).Footnote 9 On the topic of pleasure, for example, he notes that “actions in accord with virtue are pleasant by nature” (1099a10). The pleasures are a part of flourishing, but follow from the actions in accord with virtue which are what is most central.

There are also certain goods without which one could not live a flourishing life. These include goods like wealth, friendship, political power, family, and good fortune (1099a27–1099b5). These goods are certainly prerequisites of eudaimonia for Aristotle. On some interpretations, however, they also are constitutive of eudaimonia insofar as they actually form part of rational activity in accord with virtue. Friendship, for example, is one context in which we practice human virtues and actualise our potential as rational but also social creatures.

We close our discussion with an excerpt from the Nicomachean Ethics that aptly captures the active character of Aristotelian flourishing in contrast to the passive character of most contemporary accounts of human wellbeing:

...it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good results, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic games, it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life. (1099a1–5)

It is not sufficient, then, to merely possess virtue and have a lovely family and several very close friends. One must be actively engaged in all these aspects of one’s life to be considered to be flourishing. The action of the State, furthermore, in establishing a civic culture that is conducive to the cultivation of virtue, is a sine qua non for individual flourishing (if, indeed, it is possible to draw a distinction between the flourishing of individuals and the flourishing of the State).

4 Part III: Implications for the Philosophical and Social Scientific Study of Wellbeing

We wish to close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophy and social science of wellbeing.

There is something inadequate, from an Aristotelian perspective, about the way in which each of the dominant philosophical theories attempt to categorise human wellbeing. Insofar as we see wellbeing as limited to either hedonism, desire satisfaction or an objective list, or even notions of perfectionism, we are missing aspects of wellbeing that seem worthy of consideration. For hedonistic and desire satisfaction theories, this is the active cultivation of one’s rational and moral capacities in the context of social life. For objective list theories, it is the hierarchical nature of Aristotle’s understanding of well-being and what is to be prioritized. For perfectionist theories, it is the external goods that are necessary for flourishing including material resources and circumstances, but also friendship. With related capabilities approaches, it is the virtuous exercise of one’s rational capacities, rather than merely having capabilities, that ought to be the focus. Moreover, Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia, focusing on realised capacities and projects, can only be fully assessed and attained in the context of an entire life, and, as such, cannot be reduced to some momentary or timeslice account of wellbeing.

A contemporary theorist of wellbeing may argue that Aristotle was just wrong and that well-being can, in fact, be captured by some hedonic or desire-based account or some appeal to objective goods. But we would argue that there is something very course-grained about these categories that seems to miss important aspects of lifetime wellbeing. Indeed, what we are concerned with is a human-specific kind of wellbeing that is not available to other creatures. As Besser-Jones writes, “[eudaimonism] presents a theory of well-being that does not collapse into other, perhaps more familiar forms of well-being that are subjective and is instead meant to capture a unique form of life, available only to humans” (2016, 195). The risk of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing is that they reduce wellbeing to some amorphous phenomenon that is common to all living things. We believe that this fails to adequately capture the meaning-infused world of human life and the kinds of life projects in which human beings are uniquely capable of engaging in.

We turn to the implications of our argument for social science. A number of social scientists have claimed Aristotle as the intellectual precursor to their approach to wellbeing. These include hedonic wellbeing theorists (Helliwell, 2021) and wellbeing theorists who provide a pluralist or hybrid account of the wellbeing (Ryff & Singer, 2008). Given this, it is appropriate to consider how the empirical instantiations line up with Aristotle’s thought.

Helliwell (2021) attempts to establish an Aristotelian genealogy for the use of life evaluation surveys as a central tool for measuring wellbeing. The thread of his argument is, admittedly, not entirely clear, but he appears to appeal to the fact that Aristotle advocated the use of data from everyday life to assess the plausibility of theories of eudaimonia. He quotes the following passage from the Nicomachean Ethics Book X:

We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonises with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose it to be mere theory.

He claims that Aristotle is advocating “the use of data from everyday life…to see how [t]heories cohere or compete in supporting people’s judgments about how their lives are going” (2021, 30). He uses this as a justification for the claim that life evaluations “provide a central mediating device” (30) to “establish the relative importance of various values and experiences, to measure the quality of life, and to support policy choices likely to improve human flourishing” (30).

We are not averse to the use of life satisfaction measures to contribute to our understanding of the flourishing of different groups of individuals. But we would push back against Helliwell’s sweeping assertion that Aristotle provides justification for making subjective life evaluations the centrepiece of the social scientific assessment of human wellbeing. This strikes us as a distorted account of what Aristotelianism supports in terms of contemporary social scientific approaches to wellbeing. If anything, Aristotle provides support for not reducing our understanding of wellbeing to one index like life satisfaction. Rather, a close reading of Aristotle would seem to support a focus on one’s active cultivation of moral and rational capacities and one’s participation in human communities and political life (broadly understood) and would push closer towards an understanding of flourishing in which all aspects of a person’s life are good (VanderWeele, 2017) with a particular priority given to character and virtue. Understood thus, assessments of flourishing will always be partial and imperfect but, from an Aristotelian perspective, flourishing is certainly not reducible to life satisfaction.

Ryff and Singer (2008) attempt to provide a reconstruction of the kernel of Aristotle’s thought in the Nicomachean Ethics for our understanding of psychological wellbeing. They note that Aristotle was “clearly not concerned with the subjective states of feeling happy” (2008, 17). As such, they anticipate and address interpretations such as that of Helliwell (2021). Ryff and Singer, however, go on to claim that Aristotle’s “conception of the highest good towards which we all should be reaching was the task of self-realization, played out individually, each according to his or her own disposition and talent” (2008, 17). They essentially argue for a synthesis of Aristotle’s thought with the liberal individualist account of flourishing found in the work of John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell. What one ends up with in their essay is a vision of flourishing that no longer clearly resembles Aristotle but instead is a syncretic attempt to reconcile conflicting schools of thought on the nature of human flourishing.

It is our contention that scholars like Ryff and Singer (whose project is a familiar one in contemporary psychology) should be more cautious about invoking an Aristotelian pedigree for their account of wellbeing. One might still claim Aristotelian inspiration, but at the very least, we need to be conscious of how deeply foreign the liberal individualist assumptions of our culture are from the virtue-focused, communitarian account of flourishing that one finds in Aristotle’s corpus.

Similar considerations arguably pertain to the capacities approach of Nussbaum and Sen. As argued above, what is central in Aristotle is not just the acquisition of various capabilities and the liberty to realise human capacities should someone so choose, but rather the actual use of these capacities in rational virtuous action. We certainly do not mean to discourage the deployment of a capabilities approach in human development studies or economic theory; we do believe it is a fruitful way in which to assess the extent to which societies and economies create or frustrate human opportunity. Furthermore, if one were to accept the “fact of reasonable pluralism” (as Nussbaum and Rawls do), then robust human flourishing may not seem to be an appropriate political aim since it may involve coercing (violating the autonomy of) others to pursue a vision of the good life with which they disagree. Augmenting capabilities may be a more feasible aim of policy and law. But it is only fitting to distinguish this approach and more classically Aristotelian approaches to wellbeing. Opportunity is best thought of as a pathway to Aristotelian flourishing rather than being constitutive of it.

5 Conclusion

The goal of this paper was two-fold. First, we offered an overview of Aristotle’s notion of human flourishing, focusing primarily on the Nicomachean Ethics. Second, we sought to situate Aristotle within the context of contemporary philosophical taxonomies of wellbeing. We argued that Aristotle is best understood as presenting a theory of wellbeing that includes elements of moral and intellectual perfectionism as well as a list of external goods that are, at the very least, prerequisites for flourishing. We emphasised, however, the active and social character of Aristotelian flourishing and how this conflicts with much of contemporary analytic philosophical thought on the nature of wellbeing. We closed with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of wellbeing.

We do not pretend to have offered an exhaustive analysis of how contemporary philosophical or social scientific theories of wellbeing intersect with Aristotle’s writings. We do, however, hope to have provided some clarity on how an Aristotelian notion of flourishing ought to be understood and interpreted. We hope that this analysis will prompt a more nuanced assessment of the extent to which contemporary theories of wellbeing resemble an Aristotelian account of wellbeing. One might argue that the remit of Aristotle’s ethical project is broad and can yield insights for a range of approaches to conceptualising human wellbeing. Flourishing, furthermore, is a protean concept. But we advocate a cautious and subtle approach. Hence why we believe it is instructive to return to the earliest sources of philosophical reflection on flourishing to work towards greater conceptual precision to this burgeoning area of multidisciplinary research.