Sām.ṃkhya’s Challenge to the Buddhist Claim of the Identity of a Pramān.ṇa and Its Result

Sāṃkhya, in its commentary Yuktidīpikā, responds to the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and a valid cognition (pramā), its result (phala), are identical. The response of Sāṃkhya was pioneering: it is one of the two earliest responses to the Buddhists in the lively polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. (The other of these two earliest responses is in the Ślokavārttika by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.) Sāṃkhya’s voice in this polemic is earlier than that of Nyāya, which is, as well as Mīmāṃsā, the main rival of the Buddhists in addressing this issue. This study provides a translation and detailed reconstruction of the Yuktidīpikā’s polemic with the Buddhist opponent, which has not been researched before, as well as a critical assessment of the Sāṃkhya position. The Yuktidīpikā polemicizes against Dignāga. It aptly questions the standpoint of the Buddhist opponent and presents an alternative standpoint, contrasting its own view with that of the opponent. Though the Sāṃkhya position formulated in the Yuktidīpikā evokes several critical remarks, the Yuktidīpikā’s response is an important contribution to Indian thought.


Introduction
One of the most lively polemics in Indian epistemology is devoted to the question of whether a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and valid cognition (pramā), its result (phala), are identical to or different from one another. The Buddhists, by which I mean here Dignāga and those who followed in his footsteps, claimed that a pramāṇa and its result are identical. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁ sakas were their main rivals.
It appears that Sāṁ khya, too, participated in this polemic. In my study, I explore Sāṁ khya's voice in this discussion. The aim of my research is to reconstruct and critically evaluate the position of Sāṁ khya.
Sāṁ khya's polemic against the Buddhists on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result is presented in the Yuktidīpikā (YD; ca. 7th c. CE; the author is unknown), 1 a classical Sāṁ khya commentary on Īśvarakṙṡṅa's Sāṃkhyakārikā (SK;. This commentary is unique. It is the most detailed and polemical of all classical Sāṁ khya commentaries. It sheds light on many issues not addressed in other Sāṁ khya texts. The polemic on whether a pramāṇa and its result are identical to or different from one another is part of the YD's commentary on the 5th kārikā of Īśvarakṙṡṅa's SK. Sāṁ khya's opponent is most likely Dignāga. The YD contains different polemics challenging Dignāga. 2 As to our polemic, the opponent's view is similar to the view of Dignāga formulated in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) with the autocommentary Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV). 3 It is necessary to emphasize that in the YD, we discover one of the two earliest responses to Dignāga. The other of these two earliest responses is in the Ślokavārttika by the great seventh-century Mīmāṁ saka Kumārila Bhat˙ṫa. It has not yet been determined by scholars which of these two texts-the Ślokavārttika or the YD-is earlier. 4 In any case, the YD's answer is earlier than that of Nyāya, the main rival of the Buddhists. Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara 5 does not propose a response to the Buddhist identification of a pramāṇa and its result in his Nyāyavārttika. The Nyāyavārttika includes, like the YD and the Ślokavārttika, different polemics against Dignāga, 6 but the Nyāyavārttika was probably composed earlier than those two texts. 7 1 The dates of all Sāṁ khya texts mentioned in this article are given according to Larson (1987, pp. 15-16, 19-22). See also the valuable observations of Mejor (2004) on the date of the YD. 2 For example, on whether reliable verbal testimony (āpta-vacana, śabda), Sāṁ khya's third pramāṇa, can be reduced to inference (anumāna). See YD 5 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 87.14-17) and 6 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 100.10-105.9). The critical edition prepared by Wezler and Motegi is cited by page(s) and line(s); thus, 100.10 means page 100, line 10. Harzer writes that the YD was created largely as a response to Dignāga's criticism of Sāṁ khya and an attempt to reform and modernize its system, especially epistemology, to make it less vulnerable to the criticisms of its opponents (2006, pp. 16-19). 3 As I do not read Tibetan, I rely on Steinkellner's reconstruction of the Sanskrit text and Hattori's English translation from Tibetan. 4 On this matter, which requires further research, see Mejor (2004). 5 For the dates of Uddyotakara and his Nyāyavārttika, see Potter (1977, pp. 9, 303-304); Bronkhorst (2019, pp. 318, 323). 6 For example, on the Buddhist theories of apoha and momentariness-see Nyāyavārttika II,2,66 and III,2,14,respectively. 7 Philosophers of different darśanas responded to Dignāga. Pre-Dharmakīrti philosophers polemicizing with Dignāga are mentioned by Hattori-see PS (1), (1968, pp. 15-16). understood as the instrument / instrumental cause (karaṇa) of valid cognition (see my translation and reconstruction of the polemic in the next chapter of this article). Harzer (2006, p. 79) and Kondō (2010Kondō ( , pp. 1134Kondō ( -1135 present the following argument for the difference of a pramāṇa and its result the author of the YD used in this polemic: a pramāṇa, which is located in the buddhi, and its result, which is located in puruṣa, have different substrata. 11 I would also like to mention Harzer's helpful observations on this polemic, contained mostly in the notes to her translation of YD 5. She correctly points out that the Buddhist opponent's position is the same as the position of Dignāga presented in his PS and PSV, chapter 1, kārikā 8cd with the commentary (2006, p. 79; 113, note 33). Harzer also observes that both the author of the YD and his Buddhist opponent share the sākāra theory, 12 according to which cognition assumes the form/shape (ākāra) of the object to be cognized, and that Sāṁ khya is sākāravādin and nirākāravādin at the same time because changeless puruṣa, unlike the buddhi, does not take on any ākāra (2006, p. 113, note 34). 13 Translation and Reconstruction of the Yuktidīpikā's Polemic against the Buddhist Position on the Relationship between a Pramān . a and Its Result Translation of the Polemic I will first cite the whole passage containing the YD's polemic and next provide its reconstruction. The editors of the YD Wezler and Motegi use boldface type to highlight the vārttikas. They distinguish two levels in the YD-the vārttika and the bhāṣya-functioning as parts of one whole and probably belonging to the same author. 14 [Sāṁ khya adherent]: 15 … Perception (dṛṣṭa) 16 is that which follows the modification (vṛtty-upanipātin) of the senses (indriya) that seized [their respective] objects; [perception is that which is] neither tamasic nor rajasic due to the preponderance of sattva [and] has the nature of light.
[Dṛṣṭa] means 'perception' (pratyakṣa). It is a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). 17 The favor done by it for the power of consciousness is the result (phala). The objects of valid cognition (prameya) are sound (śabda), etc. Below, too, the relation between a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and [its] result (phala) will be considered.
[  (jñāna), it is impossible to grasp that such things as a pot are thus formed (tad-rūpa) or not thus formed (atad-rūpa), in the same way, without puruṣa's intelligence, a cognition is 17 In this article, I translate Sanskrit terms jñāna, pramāṇa, and pramā as 'cognition', 'a means of valid cognition', and 'valid cognition', respectively. I am aware of the difficulties in finding their accurate English equivalents. Pramāṇa can also be translated as 'a means of knowledge', and pramā as 'knowledge'. To mention only some of the many important publications discussing these Sanskrit terms: Bilimoria (1985), Mohanty (2001), Matilal (2002), Balcerowicz (2009, pp. 139-144, note 4), and Ganeri (2018). neither having the form of the object nor devoid of the form of the object. And likewise [our] authoritative text (śāstra) will [further] say: "That is why due to their [puruṣa's and prakṛti's] contact (saṃyoga), unconscious subtle body (liṅga) is as it were endowed with consciousness (SK 20ab)." Hence, for Sāṁ khya, it is not established that cognition (jñāna) has the form of apprehension without puruṣa's intelligence. The discussion refers to the well-known [opposing] positions of both 18 [that is, of Buddhists and Sāṁ khyas]. If [you object] that it is incorrect (ayukta) because puruṣa does not exist, [we answer:] no, for it is substantiated later. We will substantiate the existence of puruṣa in this [kārikā]: "Because that which is an aggregate of parts exists for someone else" (SK 17a). Therefore, for an adherent of the theory that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is the ascertainment (adhyavasāya), [which is the modification of the buddhi], it is established that a [cognitive] result (phala) is different from the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). 19 18 I am not sure about the meaning of "both" (ubhaya) and present here two interpretations that seem possible to me. The first one, proposed by Hattori, is that "both" refers to Yogācāras and Sautrāntikas. Hattori notices that the theory "that the sākāra cognition is both pramāṇa-phala and pramāṇa" we deal with in Dignāga's PS and PSV (chapter 1, kārikā 8cd) "is amenable to both schools (ubhaya-naya)" of Buddhism. Hattori mentions the YD fragment from our polemic that presents this Buddhist theory (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.11-15). See Hattori's note to his translation of the PS with PSV: PS (1), (1968, p. 98), note 1.55. The second interpretation is that Buddhists and Sāṁ khyas are what is meant by "both" in this context. In this case, the translation is as follows: "The discussion refers to the well-known In the YD, like in Dignāga's PS with its autocommentary and in Kumārila Bhaṫt˙a's Ślokavārttika (IV, 74-79), 20 who responds, like the author of the YD, to Dignāga, the passage on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result is embedded within the discussion of perception. Dignāga deals with this issue in the first chapter of his PS and PSV, which is a chapter on perception (pratyakṣa). He explicates his position that a pramāṇa and its result are identical in section 1 of this chapter, kārikās 8cd-10 together with the commentary. 21 This is a section containing a general presentation of the Buddhist theory of perception. He returns to this issue in two other sections of the chapter on perception: in section 3, devoted to a critical examination of the Nyāya theory of perception, kārikās 3cd-4 with the commentary, 22 and in section 6, devoted to a critical examination of the Mīmāṁ sā theory of perception, kārikā 9 with the commentary. 23 However, the Sāṁ khya perspective in the YD that a pramāṇa and its result are different from one another refers to all three pramāṇas. This follows from the YD's passage, as well as from Sāṁ khya epistemology in general. In this passage, the author of the YD holds that a pramāṇa is a modification of the buddhi and its pramā is this modification transmitted to puruṣa. In Sāṁ khya, every valid cognition is a modification of the buddhi transmitted to / influenced by puruṣa.
I did not find any passage in which Sāṁ khya says that a pramāṇa and its result are identical. Indeed, I did not find any such comment in extant classical Sāṁ khya texts or in the following postclassical Sāṁ khya texts: the Tattvasamāsa (ca. 14th c. CE) with its commentary Kramadīpikā (ca. 14th c. CE) and the Sāṃkhyasūtras (ca. 15th c. CE) with Aniruddha's commentary Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti (ca. 15th c. CE). Extant classical Sāṁ khya texts comprise the SK and eight commentaries on it: the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha 24 (composed ca. 500 CE, translated into Chinese between 557 CE and 569 CE), the Sāṃkhyavṛtti (ca. 6th c. CE), the Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (ca. 6th c. CE), the Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya (or Gauḍapādabhāṣya; ca. 6th c. CE) by Gauḋapāda, the Yuktidīpikā (YD; ca. 7th c. CE), the Jayamaṅgalā (ca. 700 CE or later), the Māṭharavṛtti (ca. 800 CE or later) by Māṫhara, and the 20 For a translation, Sanskrit text, and analysis of the whole Ślokavārttika chapter (IV) devoted to perception (pratyakṣa), see Taber (2005).   26 Sāṁ khya refers to the etymology of the word pramāṇa, which means 'measure', that is, an instrument/tool for measuring, and compares achieving valid cognition (pramā) by pramāṇas-perception (ḍṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and reliable/authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana, śabda)-to measuring different things (like corn and sandalwood) by using the measure appropriate for themsee, for example, Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya 4, YD 4 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 67.11-13), 27 Māṭharavṛtti 4, Kramadīpikā 22. For Sāṁ khyas, a pramāṇa is an instrument (karaṇa) for achieving a valid cognitive result, and an instrument cannot be identical to the result of the act carried out by this instrument. I cite the YD, "That by which something is validly cognized (pramīyate) is called 'an instrument of valid cognition' (pramāṇa). [The affix] lyuṭ 28 denotes an instrument (karaṇa)" (YD 4;Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 67.6-7) 29 . Much as how the measure called prastha can be identical with neither the corn measured nor with the result of the act of measuring, a pramāṇa can be identical neither with the object to be cognized (prameya) nor with the cognitive result achieved by it (pramā). In the YD's polemic explored in this study, too, the author of the YD understands a pramāṇa as an instrument/instrumental cause (karaṇa) of valid cognition; he holds that an instrument cannot be identical with the result of this instrument's act (YD 5;Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.16). 30 25 According to Acharya, Vācaspati composed his famous works, including the TK, in the second half of the 10th c. (2006, p. XXVIII). 26 Sāṁ khya texts from Īśvarakṙṡṅa's SK till Aniruddha's Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti express the same system of philosophy. The next text Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya (ca. 1550-1600 CE) by Vijñāna Bhikṡu, which is a commentary on the Sāṃkhyasūtras, treats Sāṁ khya not as an independent darśana but as part of the Vedānta system of this philosopher. On Vijñāna's attitude toward Sāṁ khya and its place in Vijñāna's hierarchy of teachings, see Larson (1987, pp. 35-41) and Nicholson (2014, pp. 84-123). Nicholson's (2014) excellent monograph explains Vijñāna's role in Indian philosophy and culture, his attitude toward different darśanas, and his interpretation of āstika darśanas as complementary ones. Sāṁ khya texts that have been composed since the time of Vijñāna need to be examined by researchers (see Krishna, 2006, pp. 97-120). The questions whether they contain important material not found in earlier works and whether they are Sāṁ khyan should be answered. The revival of Sāṁ khya-Yoga by Hariharānanda Ā raṅya  and his followers is worth special attention (see Jacobsen's and Jakubczak's publications, of which I mention only two: Jacobsen 2018; Jakubczak 2020). 27 The YD's explanations of the kārikās are usually more extensive than the explanations of the kārikās or sūtras by other Sāṁ khya commentaries, which is why when citing the YD, I also give the page and line numbers of Wezler's and Motegi's edition besides the numbers of the kārikās. 28 The author of the YD refers to the rule formulated in sūtra III, 3, 117 of Pāṅini's Aṣṭādhyāyī (Aṡṫādhyāyī 2002, p. 546). According to this sūtra, the kṛt suffix lyuṭ can be added after a verbal root to derive nouns that denote instruments (karaṇa) and loci (adhikaraṇa). Lyuṭ is the technical term for the suffix ana-see the rule formulated in Aṣṭādhyāyī VII, 1, 1, by which the suffix yu is replaced with the suffix ana (Aṣṭādhyāyī 2003, pp. 1-3). Thus, the word pramāṇa (literally, 'a measure') is derived from pra-√mā (literally, 'to measure'), to which the suffix ana is added to form a noun that denotes an instrument (pramāṇa is a measuring instrument). 29 pramīyate 'neneti pramāṇam / karaṇa-sādhano lyuṭ / The last sentence of the YD's polemic may seem to evidence that it discusses the relationship between perception (dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa) and the result of this pramāṇa, not the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result in general. It may seem so because the term adhyavasāya ('ascertainment'), used in the Sāṁ khya definition of perception, appears in this sentence. SK 5 defines perception (dṛṣṭa) as prativiṣayādhyavasāya. The last sentence of our polemic runs as follows: "Therefore, for an adherent of the theory that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is the ascertainment (adhyavasāya), [which is the modification of the buddhi], it is established that a [cognitive] result (phala) is different from the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)." From the Sāṁ khya perspective, however, not only perception but each of its three pramāṇas can be characterized as adhyavasāya-for we read in SK 23: adhyavasāyo buddhir … ("the buddhi is the ascertainment"). Each of the pramāṇas is a sāttvika modification (vṛtti) of the buddhi, and therefore each of the pramāṇas is adhyavasāya. During the discussion of the Sāṁ khya definition of perception and right before the polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result, the author of the YD cites adhyavasāyo buddhir from kārikā 23 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.4), which confirms that he keeps in mind that according to Sāṁ khya, not only perception but also other pramāṇas are adhyavasāya. Thus, the appearance of the term adhyavasāya in the last sentence of the polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result does not evidence that the polemic deals with perception only.
As to Mīmāṁ sā, Kumārila Bhaṫt˙a's position that a pramāṇa and its result are different from one another, defended in the Ślokavārttika's chapter devoted to perception, encompasses all pramāṇas. This follows from his treating a pramāṇa as a means (sādhana) / an instrument (karaṇa) and from his view that a means / an instrument must be different from the result produced by it (Ślokavārttika IV, 74-75, 77).
In Nyāya, too, its position that a pramāṇa and its result are not identical refers to all pramāṇas. Nyāya, as well as Mīmāṁ sā, is the main rival of the Buddhists in the polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result, but it joined the polemic later than Mīmāṁ sā and Sāṁ khya. For Nyāya, too, a pramāṇa is a karaṇa and an instrument is not the same as the result achieved by it. Neither Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika nor Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā participates in this polemic against the Buddhists. Jayanta Bhat˙ṫa (840-900) 31 includes the polemic in his Nyāyamañjarī (1969, pp. 38-45), in its first chapter (āhnika), which is devoted to a general investigation of pramāṇas. Disagreeing with the Buddhists that hold that a pramāṇa is identical with the pramā achieved by it, Jayanta argues that a pramāṇa is an instrument (karaṇa) by which we get a valid cognitive result, and an instrument cannot be identical with the result produced by it (Nyāyamañjarī 1969, pp. 38-39). 32 It is very probable that also the Buddhist opponent's position in the YD covers not only perception but also inference, that is, both of the pramāṇas that are accepted by Dignāga and his followers. Dignāga's pupil Śaṅkarasvāmin in his Nyāyapraveśa (or Nyāyapraveśakasūtra) directly says that in the case of both perception and inference, a pramāṇa and its result are identical (Nyāyapraveśa 4.3). 33

Reconstruction of the Content of the Polemic
The Buddhist opponent asks whether the cognitive result achieved by a pramāṇa, a means of valid cognition, is different from it or not. He next states that a pramāṇa and its result are identical. He gives the following substantiation: because the cognitive result has the form of apprehension (adhigama-rūpa). 34 According to the text's editors Wezler and Motegi, this substantiation belongs to the vārttika level of the YD. The bhāṣya explains: the cognition (jñāna), that is, the cognitive result, having the form of apprehension, is achieved through the rise of this very cognition, or apprehension; if the cognitive result is achieved through its own rise, the cognitive result cannot be different from the pramāṇa causing it. The Buddhist opponent holds that a valid cognition is produced by itself and therefore a valid cognition is at the same time the pramāṇa that produces this cognition. 35 This is the 33 The Buddhist view that a pramāṇa and its result are identical evokes the question how this view can be applied to inference (anumāna). Buddhists accept two pramāṇas-perception and inference. Perception (pratyakṣa) is a means of valid cognition of the momentary, unique particulars (sva-lakṣaṇa, 'own feature,' 'that which is its own attribute'), which are the only reals. Perception is understood first of all as pure sensation, free from conceptual constructions (kalpanā) and linguistic elements. Inference (anumāna) is a means of valid cognition of the universals (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, 'common feature'), which are mental constructs. The Buddhists claim that a pramāṇa and its result are identical because a pramāṇa is itself a cognition having the image/copy of the object to be cognized. How should the object's image/copy that is a pramāṇa causing a valid cognitive result (pramā) should be interpreted in the case of inference, whose object to be cognized is sāmānya-lakṣaṇa? How can cognition take the form of the object to be cognized in the case of inference? I will cite the explanation proposed by Stcherbatsky: "When we, e.g., infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, we imagine the fire, it is prima facie a fire in general. But the second step in this act of cognition will be to imagine it as a real fire, a possible object of purposive action, a possible sense-datum. Thus the particular sense-datum will also be an object cognized ultimately through inference, but indirectly. The result (pramāṇa-phala) of both modes of cognition … is the same …" (Stcherbatsky 1962, p. 38, note 3). A critical analysis of the Buddhist view lies beyond the scope of my study.
Stcherbatsky's monumental publication Buddhist Logic includes his translations of passages from Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers in which they discuss the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result (Stcherbatsky 1962, pp. 341-400). As to Brahmanical philosophers, Stcherbatsky translated the passages from Vācaspati Miśra's Mīmāṁ sā work Nyāyakaṇikā and from Udayana's Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi. 34 In the PS and PSV, the term adhigama appears also in section 6 of chapter 1, in the Vṙtti's commentary on the 9th kārikā-see footnote 36, in which I cite this kārikā together with part of the commentary on it. We also find the term adhigama, for example, in Ś aṅkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa 4.3, where it occurs, like in the YD, in the compound adhigama-rūpa. 35 In this polemic, a cognition (jñāna), that is, a valid cognitive result, and "the rise of the cognition" (jñānasya utpattiḥ) are both described as adhigama-rūpa ('having the form of apprehension') by the Buddhist opponent (see Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 77.14 and 77.18, respectively). It is because for him, a cognitive result, jñāna, and that through which it is achieved, jñānasya utpattiḥ, are not different from one another. In his opinion, the rise of a cognition is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. On jñānasya utpattiḥ, see footnote 37 below. first of the two Buddhist opponent's arguments for the identity of a pramāṇa and its result. 36 The author of the YD asks his opponent how there can be an instrument / instrumental cause (karaṇa) of valid cognition in this case. In Indian philosophy, generally speaking, achieving a valid cognitive result, or knowledge, requires an instrument (karaṇa), and a pramāṇa is this instrument. If a pramāṇa is the same as its result, pramā, how can a pramāṇa be the instrument of achieving the pramā? The same argument is used by Kumārila Bhat˙ṫa in his attempt to refute the Buddhist position that a pramāṇa and its result are identical. Kumārila says that the Buddhist position contradicts the common practice to differentiate between a means (sādhana) and the result (sādhya) achieved by it: in ordinary life, people do not identify an axe with the cutting off done by the axe (Ślokavārttika IV, 74-75).
The Buddhist opponent responds by distinguishing between the worldly point of view (loka), or general opinion (prasiddhi), and the ultimate point of view (paramārtha). From the worldly perspective, a pramāṇa is different from its result, pramā. The existence of a karaṇa of valid cognition is merely a general opinion. From the worldly point of view, which is caused by the conceptual construction 36 Dignāga expresses this argument in section 6 of the first chapter of his PS and PSV, kārikā 9. He polemicizes there with Mīmāṁ sakas. Cf. the YD passage, Wezler and Motegi (1998, p. 77.14-15), to the citation from the PS and PSV I attach below. Dignāga argues that a pramāṇa and its result are identical. I cite the kārikā together with part of the commentary on it (namely, with the commentary on 9cd). This is Hattori's translation of the text (I used the boldface type to highlight the kārikā)-see PS (1), (1968, pp. 68-69): 9a. if one holds to "the rise of cognition" (buddhi-janman) [as a definition of perception]-9b. a result that is different [from this means] could not be found. 9cd. inasmuch as the cognition itself has arisen, there would be no result other than that [cognition]. That which results from the means of cognition is the apprehension (adhigama) [of an object], which, however, is nothing other than the cognition (buddhi) itself. Therefore, were the cognition [itself to be regarded as] a means of cognition, there could be no result [to be distinguished from the means of cognition].
If "the rise of cognition" (buddhi-janman) is accepted [by you as part of your definition of perception, which is given in Mīmāṃsāsūtras I, 1, 4 (kalpanā), "the rise of the cognition" (jñānasya utpattiḥ) 37 is understood as encompassing the karaṇa and its operation (vyāpāra). However, from the ultimate point of view, there is no karaṇa of valid cognition, and a pramāṇa is identical to its result. In fact, "the rise of the cognition" (jñānasya utpattiḥ) bears "the semblance (nirbhāsa) of the object [to be cognized]" and occurs due to this semblance (image, copy-nirbhāsa). The same jñāna is both the instrument of valid cognition and this cognition.
The above argument, stating that a pramāṇa is itself a cognition possessing the copy, or image, of the object to be cognized (prameya), is the second of the Buddhist opponent's arguments for the identity of a pramāṇa and its result. We know that according to Dignāga's PS together with PSV, a valid cognition (pramā) is caused by a mental image of the object to be cognized, and thus a pramā, a cognitive result (phala), is not different from the pramāṇa that causes it. A pramāṇa is a mental image of the object to be cognized. From the worldly point of view, it is endowed with activity, or function (vyāpāra), to produce a valid cognitive result (see the PS and PSV, chapter 1, kārikā 8cd). 38 37 The term jñānasya utpattiḥ appearing in the YD probably has its roots in the compound buddhijanman from the Mīmāṃsāsūtras' definition of perception, given in sūtra I, 1, 4. This compound, which can be interpreted in different ways, was widely discussed by Indian philosophers. In Mīmāṁ sā, it is considered in Śābarabhāṣya, Ślokavārttika, and other texts-see Taber (2005, pp. 17-15, 66-70). In the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, too, the definition of perception speaks about perception as the cognition that arises, though the word "cognition" is omitted-see Taber (2005, p. 188, note 55). It is quite probable that both the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and Vaiśeṣikasūtras understood perception not as a karaṇa producing a valid cognitive result but as a process of cognizing that arises due to appropriate factors. See also the Nyāyasūtras' (I, 1, 4) definition of perception, which describes perception as the cognition (jñāna) that arose (utpanna). In the PS and PSV, the meaning of the compound buddhi-janman from the Mīmāṁ sā definition of perception is discussed in chapter 1, section 6, kārikās 6b and 9-10 (kārikās 39b and 42-43 in PS (2), 2005). See footnote 36, in which I attach kārikā 9 from section 6 of chapter 1. 38 Cf. the YD passage, Wezler and Motegi (1998, p. 77.17-19), to the PS and PSV passage. I cite the PS, chapter 1, kārikā 8cd, together with part of the commentary. Hattori's English translation runs as follows -see PS (1) Though it is not my task to assess the arguments of the Buddhist opponent, I will present one critical remark on each of them. The first of these arguments says that a pramāṇa and its result are identical because the cognitive result is achieved through the rise of this very cognition, that is, through its own rise. This argument assumes that the rise of the cognition, treated as a pramāṇa with its operation (vyāpāra) from the worldly point of view, is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. If we look critically at this argument, we can object that a cognition that is arising (i.e., coming into being) is not identical to this cognition after it has arisen. A state of coming into being of a mental or physical phenomenon is not identical to the state of its actual existence. Objecting to the Buddhist opponent, we can also add that even from the worldly point of view, it is inappropriate to treat a cognition that is still coming into being as a pramāṇa. A cognition must first come into being, and only after that it can function as a pramāṇa, or a karaṇa producing a valid cognitive result. In Sāṁ khya epistemology, the rise of a valid cognition is in fact a cognitive process with different stages. For example, the rise of perceptual cognition, that is, the process of perceptual cognizing, includes such stages as a sense organ's getting into contact with its object and carrying out its own specific function by different cognitive organs/faculties/ powers, the highest of which is the buddhi. However, for the Buddhist opponent, who advocates the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), the rise of the cognitive result is momentary, it has no duration in time, which means that we deal with a single cognitive event, indivisible into stages. For the Buddhist opponent, the state of a cognition's coming into being and this cognition's fully manifest state are not two separate states but the same momentary state.
The second argument of the Buddhist opponent for the identity of a pramāṇa and its result is that a valid cognition is caused by a mental copy (image, semblance) of the object to be cognized. A pramāṇa is this mental copy, which is a valid cognition (pramā) itself. We can object to this argument that even if this mental image had In this PSV passage, the word viṣayākāratā appears. A marginal note of two YD manuscripts is worth attention. It says that "being a pramāṇa is indeed being the form of the object" (viṣayākārataiva pramāṇatvam)-see Wezler and Motegi (1998, p. 77, note [1]). This comment explains how a pramāṇa is understood by the Buddhist opponent.
PS and PSV 8cd-11ab was translated by Dreyfus and Lindtner (1989, pp. 36-37). Their translation is based on Hattori's edition of these texts, published in PS (1), 1968. Most of PS and PSV 8cd-12 was translated by Kellner (2010), who cites Steinkellner's reconstruction PS (2), 2005 and takes into account also the Tibetan translations, Jinendrabuddhi's Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, and other important sources. In this article, Kellner presents a careful and detailed analyses of Dignāga's exposition of the relationship between a pramāṇa and its phala. The most recent translation known to me is in Yiannopoulos' doctoral dissertation. The dissertation contains a translation of PS and PSV 2-16 (2020, pp. 505-515); the kārikā numbers are given according to Steinkellner's reconstruction: PS (2), 2005. Yiannopoulos writes that the translation was done by him in the co-authorship with J. Dunne (2020, p. 505). In his dissertation, Yiannopoulos provides a thorough analysis of Dignāga's and his followers' view on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. His main focus is the position of Dharmakīrti (2020, pp. 157-230). already been present in our psyche before the cognitive event occurred, it had been unconscious. Even if all mental images are in our psyche, not all of them become conscious pramā. An unconscious mental trace is not the same as a vivid conscious pramā, and a real karaṇa, being something different from the unconscious mental image, is needed to make this trace a conscious pramā.
What is the YD's response to the Buddhist opponent? The response contains two arguments. Both of them rely on the basic premises of the Sāṁ khya doctrine. The first argument is the following: a pramāṇa and its result are different from one another because their substrata (adhikaraṇa) are different. A pramāṇa is located in the buddhi, which means that it is located in prakṛti, whereas the pramā, the result, is located in puruṣa. Prakṛti and puruṣa are the two ultimate, eternal, and fundamentally different principals of Sāṁ khya dualist ontology. A pramāṇa is a modification (vṛtti) of the buddhi ('intellect,' 'discernment'), the highest and subtlest psychic organ, which is a product of prakṛti. As to pramā, a pramāṇa's result, the author of the YD calls it the 'favor' (anugraha) 39 done for puruṣa by a pramāṇa.
Why does the difference of the substrata of a pramāṇa and its result prove that they are different from one another? It is because according to Sāṁ khya, any prakṛtic physical or mental phenomenon is a transformation of its substratum; it is this substratum itself, not anything else. The buddhi's cognition is not a quality that is different from the buddhi itself, its substratum, or bearer. A pramāṇa is the buddhi itself. Unlike the buddhi, puruṣa does not undergo transformations and cannot assume the form of the object.
The second argument of the author of the YD is the following: the Buddhist opponent's view that both a pramāṇa and its result are the same cognition (jñāna) that has the form of apprehension (adhigama-rūpa) is unproved. In the opinion of the author of the YD, not every cognition has the form of apprehension. A cognition cannot be an apprehension without puruṣa's intelligence (pratyaya). A mere jñāna, without puruṣa's intelligence, is not an adhigama. A mere jñāna is an unconscious modification of the buddhi; only thanks to puruṣa, this modification becomes a conscious adhigama, which is the cognitive result. The author of the YD holds that the buddhi can grasp different objects, for example, pots, acquiring their form, but only thanks to puruṣa a cognition achieved by the buddhi can become a conscious cognitive result. (Would modern Sāṁ khyas recognize that unconscious cognitions of the buddhi are similar to cognitions of artificial intelligence?). 40 According to Sāṁ khya teaching, prakṛti and all of its products, including the buddhi, are unconscious, while puruṣa is consciousness (cetanā). With this in mind, the Sāṁ khya proponent claims that nothing can be apprehended, that is, cognized consciously, without puruṣa's intelligence (puruṣa-pratyaya). Thus, a pramāṇa, which is an unconscious modification of the buddhi, and its result, which is conscious thanks to puruṣa, are different from one another.
At the end of this polemic, the author of the YD attaches the Buddhist opponent's objection that puruṣa does not exist. 41 He answers this objection by referring to SK 17, which is the kārikā presenting Sāṁ khya arguments for the existence of puruṣa (ātman).

Critical Evaluation of the Yuktidīpikā's Position on the Relationship Between a Pramān . a and Its Result
The response of Sāṁ khya to the Buddhist identification of a pramāṇa and its result was pioneering, and it probably sparked further debate. It does, however, evoke critical remarks. I will present them and assess whether the Yuktidīpikā's position is Sāṁ khyan, that is, whether it agrees with Sāṁ khya teaching.
1. My first critical remark is that the YD's response to the Buddhist identification of a pramāṇa and its result undercuts the Sāṁ khya theory of pramāṇas. Sāṁ khya accepts three pramāṇas: perception (dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and reliable verbal testimony (āpta-vacana). Kārikās 4-6 of the SK together with classical Sāṁ khya commentaries on these kārikās present the three pramāṇas and their definitions. The YD's position undercuts Sāṁ khya's attempt to show a specific character of each of its three pramāṇas. If we accept, together with the author of the YD, that a pramāṇa is a modification of the buddhi that has the form of the object, the difference between particular pramāṇas will fade.
The YD's understanding of a pramāṇa in this polemic agrees with YD's interpretation of the expression trividhaṃ pramāṇam ("the threefold pramāṇa") from SK 4. Among all extant Sāṁ khya texts from Īśvarakṙṡṅa's Sāṃkhyakārikā till Aniruddha's Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, the YD is the only text that interprets trividhaṃ pramāṇam as stating that there is, in fact, only one pramāṇa, which is "sattva taking the form of the buddhi" (buddhi-lakṣaṇaṃ sattvam). The author of the YD directly rejects the view that there are three separate pramāṇas-perception, inference, and reliable verbal testimony (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 69.1-6).
Among the above-mentioned Sāṁ khya texts, there is one more text undercutting the specifics of each of the pramāṇas. This is Vācaspati Miśra's TK, the last classical Sāṁ khya commentary. Giving a general definition (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of a pramāṇa in TK 4, he characterizes it as citta-vṛtti, the modification of the citta, by which the antaḥ-karaṇa ('the internal instrument'), constituted by the three highest psychic organs (manas, ahaṃkāra, and buddhi), is meant. He distinguishes this modification from the cognitive result, pramā. In TK 5, Vācaspati describes perception as the sattvic modification (vṛtti) of the buddhi, distinguishing this pramāṇa from its result, which is called by him-like by the author of the YD-the 'favor' (anugraha) done for puruṣa by a pramāṇa. 42 Though Vācaspati-like the author of the YD-undercuts Sāṁ khya's theory of pramāṇas by saying that a pramāṇa is a modification of a psychic organ, which 41 The Buddhist does not acknowledge unchanging and everlasting ātman/puruṣa. 42 I also refer to this passage from TK 5 below, in the next subsection of this paper (presenting my next critical remark). entails that pramāṇas are not different from one another, he-unlike the author of the YD-never states directly that there is only one pramāṇa. Contrarily, Vācaspati states directly that there are three different pramāṇas (TK 4). The other classical Sāṁ khya commentaries, too, acknowledge three separate pramāṇas (see their commentaries on SK 4).
The YD's position is in conflict with the Sāṁ khya theory of pramāṇas, and among Sāṁ khya texts taken into account in this study, it is the only text declaring such position. To substantiate that a pramāṇa and its result are different from one another, it is not at all necessary to take a standpoint undercutting Sāṁ khya's theory of pramāṇas. The author of the YD could, for example, describe a pramā as the modification (vṛtti) of the buddhi that is influenced by puruṣa, and a pramāṇa as the necessary, specific and most important causal factor in the cognitive process, that is, in the process of achieving this or that particular type of pramā. Such understanding of a pramāṇa, an instrumental cause (karaṇa) of a pramā, follows from Sāṁ khya teaching. For example, in the case of perception (dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa), the karaṇa could be described as the contact of a sense with its respective object, and in the case of reliable/authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana), as a reliable/authoritative sentence (this follows from the Sāṁ khya epistemology presented in SK 4-8 together with the commentaries, as well as Kramadīpikā 22 and Sāṃkhyasūtras I, 88-91, 100-103, 108-113 together with Aniruddha's Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti).
2. My next critical remark is as follows. The author of the YD claims that puruṣa is a substratum (adhikaraṇa), or locus (āśraya), of a valid cognitive result (pramā). According to Sāṁ khya, puruṣa does not undergo any changes. All changes are transformations (pariṇāma) of prakṛti (see SK 11, 19-20 together with the commentaries). From the Sāṁ khya perspective, it is hardly possible to satisfactorily explain how unchangeable puruṣa can be a substratum of changing cognitions. 43 Kumar observes, "Sāṁ khya-Yoga does not admit that the soul knows the objects directly or it is locus of knowledge" (1984, p. 1).
The YD's view on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result and calling puruṣa a substratum (adhikaraṇa) / locus (āśraya) of a valid cognitive result highlights one of the basic problems of the Sāṁ khya system. This problem follows from its ontological dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti, two eternal (nitya), independent (svatantra, anāśrita), and fundamentally different principles (see SK 10-11 together with the commentaries; Tattvasamāsa and Kramadīpikā 1-3; Sāṃkhyasūtras and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti I, 22; I, 61). Puruṣa is conscious (cetana), changeless (apariṇāmin), not an agent (akartṛ) / passive (udāsīna), and completely isolated from prakṛti and all its products (SK 11,19, and 20 together with the commentaries; TK 18; Kramadīpikā 3; Sāṃkhyasūtras and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti I,[145][146]I,148;I,[160][161][162][163][164]Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti VI,54). Prakṛti is unconscious (acetana) and active (kartṛ); it is the process of continuous transformation (pariṇāma) of three guṇas (SK 11, 16, 20 together with the commentaries; Kramadīpikā 1; Sāṃkhyasūtras and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti I,[126][127][128]III,[58][59][60][61][62]. This theory makes it difficult or even impossible to explain our experience of the prakṛtic world. Neither conscious but changeless puruṣa nor changing but unconscious prakṛti can experience the world, for being the experiencer requires both being conscious and being a subject of changing experiences. Does the buddhi become conscious under the influence of puruṣa, or is puruṣa a subject of these experiences? Sāṁ khya gives different answers to the question about a subject of changing experiences. The first one is that puruṣa experiences the world (see, for example, SK 17,[19][20][21]55,[65][66]. The second one is that our experiences are modifications of the buddhi (see, for example, SK 23, 62-63). The third one is that both the buddhi and puruṣa experience the world: the buddhi delivers its own experiences to puruṣa (SK 37). Sāṁ khya's attempts to explain the role of the buddhi and puruṣa in experiencing the world and the interaction between them (that is, how they can influence one another) drew the attention of philosophers of other darśanas, who criticized the Sāṁ khya views, 44 and of many researchers. 45 Though Sāṁ khya has the above-mentioned difficulties with explaining our experiences of the world and establishing the experiencer, it, however, tries to avoid stating that there are real changes in puruṣa. The position of the author of the YD in the polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result implies that puruṣa is the real substratum of changing cognitions, which is unacceptable for Sāṁ khyas. It is worth noting that the author of the YD himself rejects this position in another place of his commentary. In the commentary on the 20th kārikā, he says that changing experiences of the buddhi are only figuratively ascribed to puruṣa, which is changeless. This happens because puruṣa and the buddhi stay in the vicinity (sannidhāna) of one another. Though puruṣa is the experiencer (bhoktṛ), it does not undergo any changes (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 181.26-182.12). From this passage of the YD, it follows that puruṣa is not a substratum or locus of cognitions. 46 To demonstrate that Sāṁ khya does not acknowledge any real changes in puruṣa and therefore tries to avoid calling puruṣa a substratum or locus of changing experiences, I will refer to one more passage from classical Sāṁ khya commentaries. I have already referred to this passage from TK 5 in the previous subsection of my 44 On this criticism, see, for example, Bhattacharyya (1939) and Kumar (1983, pp. 102-109;1984, pp. 8-20, 32-36). 45 I mention only several of their studies: Catalina (1968, pp. 61-88), Bastow (1978), Larson (1979, pp. 167-176;1983, pp. 219-233;1987, pp. 73-83), Kumar (1984, pp. 1-8, 21-32), Parrott (1985;1986), Burke (1988), Murakami (1999), Burley (2007, pp. 77-81, 124-132, 150-162;Burley gives new interpretations of central Sāṁ khya-Yoga conceptions, which are contrary to the received interpretations), Łucyszyna (2011Łucyszyna ( ), Jakubczak (2013. 46 Cf. Vijñānabhikṡu's Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya on Sāṃkhyasūtras I, 87. Vijñāna says that a pramāṇa is a vṛtti of the buddhi and is thus located in the buddhi, whereas a pramā, the result of a pramāṇa, is located in puruṣa. He further states, however, that a pramā only seems to be located in puruṣa because puruṣa cannot undergo any changes. According to Vijñāna, changeless puruṣa does not take on the form of the object and is not a real substratum of changing cognitions. Puruṣa is merely a witness of experiences. Vijñāna explains that the buddhi is reflected in puruṣa as an object is mirrored in water-the buddhi throws its reflection in puruṣa without causing any real transformations in him. Though Vijñānabhikṡu (whose texts are beyond the scope of my study) treats Sāṁ khya as part of his own Vedānta system and not as an independent system of thought, he gives valuable explanations of many Sāṁ khya conceptions.
article, while pointing out the common ideas expressed by Vācaspati Miśra and by the author of the YD. Another likeness between the YD and the TK is that in both commentaries, the passage about the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result, calling the result the 'favor' (anugraha) done for puruṣa by a pramāṇa, says that the buddhi's modifications are unconscious and therefore puruṣa, consciousness, is a necessary condition of a cognitive result. However, unlike the author of the YD, Vācaspati adds that puruṣa, not connected with any modifications of prakṛti, only seems to possess cognitions.
3. And one more critical remark. Though the author of the YD tries to contrast his position to that of the Buddhist opponent, by accepting that a pramāṇa is a cognition having the form of the object, he makes the Sāṁ khya view close to the view of the Buddhist opponent.
According to Sāṁ khya, the buddhi, the highest psychic organ, takes on the form of the object to be cognized. 47 We learn this from SK 36 with the commentaries. In this kārikā, Īśvarakṙṡṅa says that during a cognitive process, the psychic organs (indriya, manas, and ahaṃkāra) whose functioning precedes the buddhi's modification (vṛtti) "put [the object that was grasped by them] upon the buddhi" (buddhau prayacchanti).
The author of the YD holds that such modification of the buddhi, considered by him as unconscious cognition (jñāna), is a pramāṇa, and its result, a pramā, is this modification transmitted to puruṣa in some way. According to both the YD's author and the Buddhist opponent, a pramāṇa, first, is a cognition, second, this cognition has the form of the object to be cognized.
It is worth noting that Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhat˙ṫa pointed out the similarity of the Sāṁ khya and Buddhist perspectives in his Nyāyamañjarī (Nyāyamañjarī 1969, pp. 69-70). He observes that in Sāṁ khya: a pramāṇa is a modification of the buddhi (buddhi-vṛtti) that has the form of the object (viṣayākāra); puruṣa becomes influenced (literally, 'coloured'-uparakta) by the buddhi's vṛtti; pramāṇa and its result have different substrata (adhikaraṇa), for a pramāṇa is in the buddhi whereas its result is in puruṣa. 48 Jayanta then concludes that the Sāṁ khya standpoint does not differ much from "the doctrine of cognition with the form" (sākāra-jñāna-vāda) of the Buddhists. 49 However, though there are conspicuous similarities between the Buddhist and Sāṁ khya positions, the deep difference between them becomes clear if we rely on the Sāṁ khya ontology of puruṣa, prakṛti, and prakṛti's products. For the Buddhist opponent, who holds that a pramāṇa and its result are identical, also a pramā is a cognition having the form of the object. In Sāṁ khya, the difference of the substrata 47 It is difficult, however, to imagine the buddhi's assuming the form of the object in the case, for example, of fire in general. The result of inference (anumāna) is fire in general, not a concrete fire. 48 It is most likely that the YD's polemic explored in this study was the source of Jayanta Bhaṫṫa's account of the Sāṁ khya view of a pramāṇa. He illustrates Sāṁ khya's view that a pramāṇa is a modification of the buddhi by giving the Sāṁ khya definition of perception. This definition, as well as his observations that I mention here, has conspicuous parallels with the presentation of the Sāṁ khya position in the YD. 49 On whether the Buddhist epistemologists adopted the concept of ākāra from Sāṁ khya, see Kellner (2016, pp. 128, 148-149). of a pramāṇa and its result claimed by the author of the YD excludes their identity. A pramāṇa is the buddhi's vṛtti that has the form of the object, but this cognition cannot retain the same form after being transmitted to puruṣa. Puruṣa is fundamentally different from prakṛti and its products. Unlike the buddhi, puruṣa is changeless and unlimited. Therefore, unlike the buddhi and other prakṛti's products, which change and have size, puruṣa does not assume any shapes. 50 To cite Harzer, "But the Sāṅkhya is a sākāravādin only to a certain extent, that is, the sense faculty assumes the form of the sense-content, or the sense-content is delivered up by the sense faculties so that the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) could perform its adhyavasāya, … . Consciousness, according to Sāṅkhya, stays distinct and does not take on an ākāra … . … In this respect the Sāṅkhya has to be labelled as a nirākāravādin. Apparently, the Sāṅkhya was both sākāravādin and nirākāravādin at the same time" (2006, p. 113, note 34). 51 In his commentary on the 20th kārikā, the author of the YD states directly that the buddhi takes on the form of the object (viṣaya-rūpa), but changeless puruṣa does not assume this form (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 181.26-182.12).

Perspectives for Future Research
The YD may be helpful for understanding the position of Dignāga. In the YD's polemic explored in this study, the Buddhist opponent, who is almost undoubtedly Dignāga, holds that a pramāṇa is a mental image of the object to be cognized, and a pramā is a cognition of this object. In the PS and PSV, in the famous passage on the identity of a pramāṇa and its result (chapter 1, kārikās 8cd-10), Dignāga presents two positions. The first one is the same as the standpoint of the Buddhist in the YD, 50 YD 17 cites "the followers of Vārṡagaṅya" (vārṣagaṇāḥ), a teacher of preclassical (that is, pre-kārikā) Sāṁ khya, who say that puruṣa, "possessed of the modification of the buddhi" (buddhivṛttyā āviṣṭaḥ), follows it (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 171.12-14). Their view may be interpreted as claiming that not only the buddhi but also puruṣa takes on the form of the object. Such interpretation of the view of the followers of Vārṡagaṅya is given by Frauwallner, who writes, "[I]t had been taught without any scruple that like the sense-organs and the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ), the soul also assumed the form of the concerned object and knows the object concerned" (Frauwallner 1973, p. 312). However, it is necessary to be cautious in interpreting this citation. It is not said there how exactly puruṣa follows the buddhi's modification; the citation could mean that puruṣa follows the buddhi's vṛtti in some other way than by assuming its form. Assessing Frauwallner's interpretation of this citation, Kellner observes that it does not follow from this citation that puruṣa takes on the form of the object (Kellner 2016, p. 145). Right after citing the followers of Vārṡagaṅya, the YD attaches two other stanzas (their source has not been identified yet) that may seem to imply that puruṣa assumes the form of the object, transmitted to puruṣa by the buddhi (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 171.15-18). Frauwallner gives his interpretation of these two stanzas too (1973, p. 312). Kellner (2016, p. 147) writes that they do not allow us to conclude that puruṣa and the buddhi take on the object's form. Kellner provides a valuable, pioneering, and cautious analysis of the view of the followers of Vārṡagaṅya and of the above-mentioned stanzas (2016, pp. 144-147). This view and the stanzas need further research. 51 On the concept of ākāra in pre-kārikā Sāṁ khya, see Kellner (2016). She comes to the conclusion that the Ṣaṣṭitantra commentaries "contain the view that the sense transforms into the form of the object", and that neither the Ṣaṣṭitantra nor its commentaries provide evidence that puruṣa or other cognitive organs take on the form of the object (Kellner 2016, pp. 147-148). Thus in preclassical Sāṁ khya, unlike in the SK and its classical commentaries, only sense organs assume the form of the object. namely, that a pramāṇa is a mental image of the object, and a pramā is this object's cognition. The second position is that a pramāṇa is a cognition of the object, and a pramā, its result, is the self-awareness (svasaṃvitti, svasaṃvedana) of the object's cognition. 52 The question whether these are two separate positions or not, and what Dignāga's position is, is open.
In the YD, the Buddhist opponent states the first of these two positions only, and there is no mention of self-awareness. Does this confirm Kataoka's opinion that for Dignāga, a pramāṇa is a mental image of the external object and a pramā is a cognition of this object (Kataoka 2016)? Or does this also evidence that since for Dignāga, self-awareness was an inseparable aspect of every cognition, there was no need to mention this aspect separately? 53

Conclusion
Sāṁ khyas' Yuktidīpikā challenges the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and its result (phala), a valid cognition (pramā), are identical to one another. The opponent the YD polemicizes against is most likely Dignāga: his arguments are Dignāga's arguments as set forth by him in his PS and PSV. Sāṁ khya's response to Dignāga was pioneering, being one of the two earliest answers to the Buddhists in the polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. (The other earliest response was provided by Kumārila Bhaṫt˙a in the Ślokavārttika.) In the discussion presented in the YD, the Buddhist opponent gives two arguments for the identity of a pramāṇa and its result. The first one is that the cognitive result, characterized by him as "having the form of apprehension" (adhigama-rūpa), is achieved through its own rise. The rise of the cognition (jñānasya utpattiḥ), interpreted as a pramāṇa which performs an operation 52 Researchers propose different interpretations of svasaṃvitti, or svasaṃvedana, in Dignāga and his followers. See, for example, the opposing interpretations of Kellner (2010) and Yiannopoulos (2020, pp. 370-485). According to the Buddhists, svasaṃvitti, or svasaṃvedana, is a cognition revealing our mental states, including valid cognitions, and it is not separate from these states. The Buddhists hold that every cognition is self-illuminating: a cognition of an object and a cognition of this object's cognition are not two distinct cognitions but two forms/aspects of the same cognition. In this paper, I accept the translation of the terms svasaṃvitti and svasaṃvedana as "self-awareness". Exploring the Buddhist notion of svasaṃvitti (svasaṃvedana) is beyond my study. 53 In the polemic against the Buddhist, the author of the YD argues that a cognition (jñāna) cannot be an apprehension (adhigama) without puruṣa's intelligence (pratyaya). This does not evidence that the author of the YD thinks that the opponent considers a cognitive result as devoid of svasaṃvitti (svasaṃvedana). The author of the YD is brilliantly acquainted with Dignāga's thought. By "puruṣa's intelligence" (puruṣa-pratyaya), he means consciousness. According to Sāṁ khya, prakṛti and all of its products, including the buddhi, whose modification (vṛtti) is an ascertainment (adhyavasāya), and the ahaṃkāra (literally, 'the I-maker'), which is responsible for self-awareness, are unconscious, whereas puruṣa is consciousness (cetanā). Nothing can be apprehended, that is, cognized consciously, without puruṣa. Neither self-awareness nor ascertainment of the object of valid cognition (prameya) are conscious without puruṣa; there is no pramā, a conscious cognitive result, without puruṣa. Sāṁ khya distinguishes between consciousness, puruṣa, and self-awareness, which is produced by ahaṃkāra. The author of the YD criticizes the Buddhist opponent not for his not accepting the self-awareness of cognitions but for his not accepting consciousness, which is, according to Sāṁ khya, eternal, immutable, and transcendent.
(vyāpāra) from the worldly point of view, is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. The second argument of the Buddhist opponent is that a pramāṇa is itself a cognition possessing the semblance (image, copynirbhāsa) of the object of valid cognition (prameya).
The Sāṁ khya proponent aptly questions Dignāga's standpoint. He asks how there can be an instrument / instrumental cause (karaṇa) that produces valid cognition in that case. By asking this question, he argues that an instrument is necessary for getting a valid cognition (pramā), and if a pramāṇa, which is understood as an instrument (karaṇa) for achieving a valid cognitive result in Indian philosophy, is the same as the result, then we would be in the position of having no instrument that produces the result. Even if we accept, together with the Buddhist opponent, that the object's mental image has been present in our psyche before the epistemic event, a real karaṇa, that is, a karaṇa being something distinct from this unconscious mental image, is necessary to make this image a conscious pramā.
The Sāṁ khya proponent also points out that the Buddhist opponent's view that a pramāṇa and its result are the same cognition (jñāna) having the form of apprehension (adhigama-rūpa) is unproved. The author of the YD holds that not every cognition (jñāna) is an apprehension (adhigama). In his view, the opponent's position does not satisfactorily explain the source of consciousness, which is what causes an unconscious mental image of the object of cognition (possessed by a pramāṇa) to become an apprehension, a conscious cognitive result.
The author of the YD presents his position, contrasting it with that of the Buddhist opponent. The Sāṁ khya proponent states that a pramāṇa and its result are different because their substrata (adhikaraṇa) are different: a pramāṇa is located in the buddhi, which is a product of prakṛti, whereas the pramā, its result, is located in puruṣa. In Sāṁ khya, stating this difference of the substrata of a pramāṇa and its result means a conspicuous difference between them: a pramāṇa is a modification (vṛtti) of the buddhi, which is the buddhi itself that assumed the form of the object, whereas puruṣa does not undergo any transformations and therefore cannot assume the object's form. It is thanks to puruṣa, who is consciousness (cetanā), that a pramāṇa, which is an unconscious modification of the buddhi, becomes a pramā, a conscious cognitive result.
Though the YD's position evokes several critical remarks, the pioneering input of the Sāṁ khya darśana into this polemic attests to Sāṁ khya's importance for Indian epistemology. Sāṁ khya questioned the Buddhist position that a pramāṇa and its result are identical, and presented the alternative view. To fully understand Indian thought, which developed in polemics and through the mutual influence of its darśanas, we must consider Sāṁ khya's contribution to it. analysis of my article manuscript, supportive opinions, and brilliant comments, which helped me to significantly improve the quality of my work. All possible shortcomings are mine.
Funding This work was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, under Grant # 2019/35/B/Hs1/ 02444.

Declarations
Conflict of interest The author declares no conflict of interest.
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