Notes
Sokolowski (2008, p. 78, n. 10). All further parenthetical references will refer to this text.
Intelligibility is not a copy or image of a thing; it is the thing itself as it is understandable to us—it is “in” us only to the extent that the thing is presented to us in human conversation.
This “searchlight” view of responsibility has been challenged by recent work in moral philosophy; see for example, Sher (2009).
See Zahavi (2003) for a description of the “East Coast” and “West Coast” schools, pp. 56ff.
References
Sher, G. (2009). Who knew? Responsibility without awareness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sokolowski, R. (1985). Moral action: A phenomenological study. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sokolowski, R. (2008). Phenomenology of the human person. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2001). Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity. E. A. Behnke (Trans.). Athens: Ohio University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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Smith, W.H. Robert Sokolowski: Phenomenology of the Human Person. Husserl Stud 26, 225–232 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-010-9079-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-010-9079-1