Abstract
The extensive philosophical discussions and analyses in recent decades of function-talk in biology have done much to clarify what biologists mean when they ascribe functions to traits, but the basic metaphysical question—is there genuine teleology and design in the natural world, or only the appearance of this?—has persisted, as recent work both defending, and attacking, teleology from a Darwinian perspective, attest. I argue that in the context of standard contemporary evolutionary theory, this is for the most part a verbal, rather than a substantive dispute: the disputants are talking past one another. To justify this claim I develop a general framework within which reductionist views, such as the standard ‘etiological’ account of biofunctions, occupy an intermediate position between what I call full-blooded realism and full-blooded anti-realism, and suggest that whether such views count as ‘realist’ views has no objective, theory-neutral answer.
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Notes
As my focus is on general questions to do with realism, reductionism and teleology, I will not be addressing, except in passing, any of the more specific, and at times technical, questions that been the focus of much of the recent literature on biofunctions. This paper does not aim to be a contribution to that literature.
See also Ruse (1973), who argues that Darwinism is irreducibly teleological because it involves explaining the present in terms of the future: ‘To explain the eyes in terms of their function, seeing, is to explain the cause, the eyes, in terms of the effect, the seeing’ (195). Not if eyes are explained in terms of the fitness-enhancing effects of the seeing done by eyes in the past. He does allow that one can seemingly translate teleological talk into non-teleological talk, by invoking past selection and past fitness. But he says ‘it does seem to me that in a case like this, one is not translating a teleological explanation. Rather, one is replacing one’s teleological explanation with a different, non-teleological explanation. The teleology itself cannot be translated away.’ (196) It’s not clear what it could it mean to ‘translate away’ the teleology other than to offer an acceptable (truth-and-meaning-preserving) translation/replacement of a teleological statement by a non-teleological one.
See Allen and Bekoff (1998) on the relation between function and design. They argue convincingly that in biology function is necessary but not sufficient for design. See Buller (2002) for a critique of Allen and Bekoff. See also Lewens (2004) and Kitcher (1993). All these authors accept Dennett’s view that there is real design in the natural world, but disagree about its relation to function ascription.
Dennett has, it seems to me, held this view for a long time, which makes Perlman’s categorisation of him as an eliminativist about teleology (2004, 12) hard to understand. But see following footnote.
There is a close parallel to positions Dennett has defended on other issues, such as free will (1984, 2003), consciousness (1995), and intentionality (1987). He argues that despite what many have suggested, his reductionist accounts of these are not anti-realist, but realist: there really is free will, consciousness, and intentionality, he thinks, it’s just that these are not what they have traditionally been taken to be. But he admits that if one insists that free will, consciousness etc. must by definition be the kinds of things they have been taken to be, if they exist at all, then of course he is an anti-realist about those things. This also suggests a kind of verbal dispute concerning definitions. Whether one takes Dennett’s reductionist accounts of free will, consciousness and the like to be realist or anti-realist accounts—whether one thinks Dennett is offering naturalistic explanations of what these things are, or dispensing with them—depends on how one is defining ‘free will’, ‘consciousness’ etc.
I shall for convenience talk in terms of ‘entities’, but of course teleology is not an ‘entity’. ‘Entity’ here should be understood broadly to encompass forces, processes, forms of causation, and so on.
McGinn nicely, if somewhat colourfully, captures (a version of) this position: “The…position is that (the relevant facts) are irreducible and indefinable and inexplicable, and we should cultivate an attitude of insouciance towards them. (They are) brute facts for which no explanation can be given…they are what they are and not another thing…reductionism stems from a misplaced monism, obsessive unification. We need to rid ourselves of the compulsion to oversimplify the world, to level it ontologically, and instead relax, indolently, into the sui generis variety of our given conceptual scheme. After all, it was functioning perfectly well before we started to fret over it.” (1993, 15) As we shall see, there are two main varieties of full-blooded realism about teleology, the creationist and the Aristotelian. McGinn’s description fits the latter, but not the former (since on the creationist view biological teleology is not sui generis and inexplicable, but is explained in terms of the intentions and goals of a divine intelligent designer). It also fits well with the emergentist view of Cameron (2004).
An alternative version of full-blooded anti-realism is nonfactualism. While error theories take the relevant discourse at face value, nonfactualism denies that the predicates of the discourse denote properties, and denies that the relevant sentences express judgments equipped with truth conditions, despite the fact that they appear to (Boghossian 1990). The sentences are therefore not to be thought of as systematically false, but rather as neither true nor false. As far as I know no anti-realists about teleology have interpreted teleological discourse in nonfactualist terms, so we can set this aside.
‘Eliminativism’ is sometimes used to refer just to anti-realism: the view that the entities in question do not exist. But, firstly, we will see that it is an open question whether some reductionist views count as anti-realist, and secondly, even in the context of non-reductionist anti-realism, we need a way to distinguish the error-instrumentalist from the error-eliminativist (both of whom are anti-realists), hence I will follow Boghossian (1990) in using ‘eliminativism’ to refer more narrowly to the error-eliminativist position. On this interpretation the recommendation is that the discourse about Xs (or perhaps the concept X—Burgess and Plunkett 2013) should be ‘eliminated’ from our linguistic practices, not (or not only) that Xs should be eliminated from our ontology.
Error theories need to provide an account of why there has been systematic error in the region of discourse in question. For instance, some error theorists about moral discourse have suggested that there are sound evolutionary reasons why people should have falsely believed that moral facts and properties exist. The error-instrumentalist has a ready-made answer to the ‘why’ question: if believing the false sentences has certain heuristic or pragmatic virtues, it is not surprising that such beliefs have flourished, despite their falsity. The error-eliminativist may have a harder time answering the ‘why’ question, for she does not share the instrumentalist’s view about the benefits of the false beliefs. But other explanations for the systematic error are possible. (Of course, all that is needed for beliefs to become prevalent is a perception of a benefit, even if no such benefit exists.).
See Rudder Baker (1988) for a similar taxonomy of positions in the debate about intentionality.
This is a necessary but may not be a sufficient condition of Aristotelian teleology given the conceptual possibility of backwards causation in non-teleological contexts.
Ayala (1970) actually denies this was Aristotle’s view, as do Perlman (2004, 9), and Ariew (2002, 18), who suggest that for Aristotle, future states can explain earlier states without causing them, such that his view is more naturalistically respectable than is usually supposed. It would be interesting to explore firstly, whether this was indeed Aristotle’s view, secondly, whether invoking explanation without causation in this way is intelligible, and thirdly, whether such a view suffices for strong teleology, but this would take us too far afield.
On this view teleology comes apart from design.
Lewens (2004), in seeking to reduce all of teleology to the ‘artifact model’, is arguably guilty of this (see also Matthen 1997). Teleology is not exhausted by the artifact analogy. Aristotle’s teleology seemingly had little if anything to do with the artifact analogy, but was still teleological in virtue of its positing of objective goals, ends and purposes (Ariew 2002, 18). So the idea that we’ve naturalised teleology when we’ve ‘examine(d) the similarities between the processes that underlie the production of organisms and artifacts’ (Lewens 2004, Kindle Locations 193–194) strikes me as wrong. The artifact analogy, historically important as it has been, is only one part or aspect of teleological thinking.
The emergentist view of functions defended by Cameron (2004; see also Walsh 2013) can be thought of as a third variety of full-blooded realism about functions, as on this view functions and teleology are real and objective, but are not reducible. Emergent properties are higher-level properties that arise out of and supervene on underlying properties and their interactions, but are not reducible to them, possessing independent causal powers of their own, thus allowing for a kind of ‘downward causation’. The view seems to be logically independent of both of the other varieties of strong teleology: as far as I can see it does not require, and is not entailed by, either the intelligent design view, or the Aristotelian view (though it may have some affinities with the latter, in its positing of a kind of sui generis teleology). It may potentially be more compatible with naturalism, broadly understood (Cameron calls it a naturalistic view; Perlman calls it ‘quasi-naturalistic’ (2004)), and with standard forms of scientific explanation, than the other two, to the extent that emergentist theses in general are, something that is controversial. See Kim (1999).
As an anonymous referee pointed out, it is possible to interpret Searle as holding that there are functions—and thus that sentences referring to functions can be true—but they are not a mind-independent part of nature, rather they are constructed by our social and linguistic conventions. But when he says ‘the heart does not have any functions’, it is hard to know how to read it other than in a full-blooded anti-realist way, such that if I say ‘the heart’s function is to pump blood’ I say something false, strictly speaking, although perhaps useful for us given our interests and purposes.
Perlman (2004, 11) suggests Searle has a non-reductive naturalist account of functions, which is misleading; given Searle doesn’t think functions exist in nature at all, he should not be said to be giving a naturalistic account of functions.
Lewens (2004) seems to defend a version of this view. Teleology and function talk is useful in biology, he argues, not because of the role of selection, as many think, but because of the similarity between organisms and artifacts. It follows, presumably, that traits do not have functions in an objective sense, independently of us: it’s just illuminating for us to think and talk in terms of functions and purposes, because we see this similarity between traits and things we make. (He admits this is a ‘deflationary’, or ‘pragmatic’ view of functions, which does suggest full-blooded anti-realism, of the error-instrumentalist variety.) Suppose humans had never existed. Then there would be no artifacts. So there would be no similarity between organisms and artifacts, and no one to notice this similarity. So the ‘artifact model’ would not apply; so traits would not have functions or purposes, and there would be no teleology in nature, on Lewens’ view. It is striking that Lewens focuses on when ‘artifact thinking would be of use’, where ‘teleological language would be appealing’ etc. Realists about functions would want to know which functions actually exist, not just when it is appealing or useful to use functional language.
I include here only the strongest critics of teleological and adaptationist thinking, according to whom all function talk is defective, and a hangover from the days of Natural Theology (e.g. Reiss 2009). More moderate critics of adaptationism, such as Gould and Lewontin (1979) would count as reductionists on my view. There is no reason to think that Gould and Lewontin hold the radical view that statements that attribute functions to traits are systematically false, or deny that teleology can be reduced to mechanistic, efficient causation in accordance with the standard etiological (or some other reductionist) account. In my view it is a mistake to interpret the critique of adaptationism associated with such thinkers as involving the rejection of teleological notions altogether. To put it another way, nothing about the reductionist view of biofunctions in itself entails adaptationism. As Lewens has argued convincingly (2004), the idea that there is a central and indispensable role for teleological language, function-talk, and solutions-to-problems talk in biology survives the critique of adaptationism launched by Gould, Lewontin and their cothinkers, even if we accept much of the substance of that critique, as Lewens does.
The etiological account is not the only reductionist account of biofunctions. The propensity account of Bigelow and Pargetter (1987), for instance, according to which the function of a trait is the effect it has that contributes to the fitness—the propensity to reproduce—of the organism that bears it, irrespective of selective history, is also a reductionist account. It has not been anywhere near as popular as the etiological account, hence I am setting it aside. But most of what I say about the etiological account’s relation to reductionism, realism and teleology, applies mutatis mutandis to the propensity account.
Interestingly, Gayon makes the point that Wright, the originator of the etiological account, was not a function-realist, as he held that functions were not an objective part of nature, but were ‘relative to our explanatory purposes’ (Gayon 2013, 75). Huneman (2013a, b) argues that the etiological account requires a weaker kind of realism about functions that is typically supposed. But he doesn’t dispute the standard claim that the etiological account is fundamentally a realist account of teleological functions.
As I have said, reductionists are not error theorists, and accept that statements about biofunctions can be literally true. This in itself might be thought sufficient for them to be committed to the reality of teleological functions. As we shall see, this is too quick. Much depends on what they takes these functions to be.
As Fodor famously said of intentionality, ‘If aboutness [intentionality] is real, it must really be something else.’ (1987, 97). Searle, expressing the full-blooded realist view, replied ‘You cannot reduce intentional content… to something else, because if you could [it] would be something else, and [it is] not something else… aboutness (i.e. intentionality) is real, and it is not something else.’ (1992, 51). Similarly, the reductionist about biological teleology holds that if it is real, it must really be something else, while the full-blooded realist holds that it is real, and is not something else.
This is the form of Kripke’s argument against materialism (1980). The problem with materialism, he argued, is that it excludes qualia, which is an essential property of certain mental states.
McGinn notes that it is typical for full-blooded realists to accuse reductionists of eliminativism (1993, 17).
This kind of move has indeed been made in the debate about biofunctions, as I discuss below. The debate proceeded for a time as a dispute about the essential properties of teleology; could biofunctions really be called teleological once they were given a mechanistic, naturalistic explanation? Feeling that this was simply a verbal dispute about how to define 'teleology', Mayr (1961) and Pittendrigh (1958) defended a policy of reserving the word 'teleology' for full-blooded, finalistic, end-directed purpose, and coined a new term, 'teleonomy', for naturalistically respectable, Darwinian biofunctions.
See Sidelle (1989) for a dissenting view.
A somewhat different interpretation of this shift could be motivated by the ‘conceptual ethics’ (or ‘conceptual engineering’) program of Burgess and Plunkett (2013). The focus would be on the normative reasons for revising or extending our concept of teleology, on the basis of conceptual negotiation, to include systems that do not satisfy strong teleology, given the scientific and/or philosophical role or function of the concept of teleology. This emphasis on the ‘ethics’ (I prefer just ‘normativity’) of the concept of teleology differs both from the verbal-dispute-about-definitions view (the question of the ethics of a concept is supposed to be more meaningful and substantive than a mere verbal dispute), and the factual-dispute-about-de re-necessity view (conceptual ethics is about which concepts we ought to use, not about what the world is like). Thomasson mentions Millikan’s Proper Function account as an example of conceptual ethics in this sense (Thomasson 2020).
Thank you to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of the theory-ladenness view to my discussion.
Their formulations of the distinction differed somewhat; Pittendrigh proposed that ‘teleonomy’ be used to refer to all end-directed systems that are not finalistic in Aristotle’s sense. Mayr criticized this on the grounds that Aristotle had a notion of end-directedness that is broadly consistent with the modern naturalistic (i.e. teleonomic) concept. For Mayr, ‘teleonomy in biology designates "the apparent purposefulness of organisms and their characteristics," as Julian Huxley expressed it. Such a clear-cut separation of teleonomy, which has an analyzable physicochemical basis, from teleology, which deals more broadly with the overall harmony of the organic world, is most useful because these two entirely different phenomena have so often been confused with each other… (T)here is no conflict between causality and teleonomy, but … scientific biology has not found any evidence that would support teleology in the sense of various vitalistic or finalistic theories.’ (1961, 1504).
One could hold that Darwinism is not and should not be teleological, while accepting full-blooded anti-realism, and rejecting reductionism, about biofunctions. This appears to be Searle’s view, for instance. But my focus has been on those, such as Ghiselin and Dawkins, who wish to praise Darwin for undermining teleology, while seemingly accepting the reductionist account of biofunctions. The relationship between Beatty’s taxonomy, and the tripartite taxonomy I presented in the previous section (full-blooded realism/reductionism/full-blooded anti-realism) is perhaps more complex that I have suggested.
Bedau (1998) discusses the different possible ways of understanding the ‘good’ of the end that is contributed to when functions are ascribed. Hardcastle (2002) discusses the relationship between the normativity of function-ascription and what she calls the ‘pragmatic’ account of functions associated with Cummins, disputing the claim that only etiological accounts are capable of capturing this normative dimension.
Perlman (2004) suggests that the no-functions-without-values position can also be used to defend what he calls a non-naturalist account of functions, inasmuch as values are not part of nature. This might be thought of as an anti-realism about natural functions, but a kind of realism about non-natural functions.
Thank you to an anonymous referee for suggesting this to me.
I argued that Dennett’s critique of worries about design-talk was misplaced when directed against fellow-reductionists such as Dawkins, but it seems entirely apt as a criticism of full-blooded anti-realists such as Reiss. The rejection of all teleological thinking and language as urged by Reiss arguably does play into the hands of creationists in the way Dennett fears. But I am not able to pursue this line of thought here.
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Acknowledgements
Thank you to two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions that have improved the paper. This paper was presented at the University of New England Humanities Research Seminar, and distant ancestors of parts of the paper were presented at the University of Melbourne Postgraduate Philosophy Seminar, and the University of Sydney mini-conference on Metaphysical Anti- Realism. Thank you to those in attendance for helpful comments and feedback.
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Boucher, S.C. Biological Teleology, Reductionism, and Verbal Disputes. Found Sci 26, 859–880 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09728-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09728-3