Abstract
The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use of the method of reflective equilibrium and for the best interpretation of the method.
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Kappel, K. The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 9, 131–147 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-9006-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-9006-2