Abstract
Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.
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Notes
Elsewhere Kim (1993) allows that the causal explanantia and explananda might be statements or propositions. However, the arguments that follow are unaffected if explanation is instead a relation between propositions.
Note that Causal Exclusion rules out all cases of causal overdetermination. However, the more plausible version of this principle claims only that as a general rule there can be no more than a single sufficient and independent cause of any one event. It therefore allows that there may be exceptional cases of causal overdetermination, but rejects the possibility that an effect could be systematically causally overdetermined. If this weaker formulation of Causal Exclusion is adopted, EE will have to be correspondingly weakened so that it only rules out cases of systematic explanatory overdetermination. However, as none of the following discussion hinges upon this matter, I shall adopt Kim’s formulation of EE and hence the strong version of Causal Exclusion.
For the purpose of this discussion I shall assume, with Kim, that mental and physical statements both attempt to explain the same thing and hence that ‘the action’ can be used univocally here. This will be rejected by those who claim that mental statements explain action proper, whilst physical statements merely explain the movement that constitutes the action.
This closure principle is of a kind advanced by Papineau (1998). The probabilistic version of this principle is ‘Every physical effect has a physical cause which is sufficient to fix the chances of its occurrence.’ However, as none of the arguments of this paper rest upon probabilistic considerations I shall use the simpler version.
Note that this version of the argument from causal overdetermination does not rule out non-reductive physicalism, for it is consistent with mental causes being distinct from, but dependent upon, physical causes. Elsewhere, Kim does rule this out, for he formulates Causal Exclusion as the principle that ‘There can be no more than a single sufficient cause of any one event’ (Kim 1998; Kim 2005). However, the formulation of Causal Exclusion that I give here is the one that more accurately corresponds with Explanatory Exclusion. Note that Kim (1993, pp. 239–240) clearly considers non-reductive physicalism to be consistent with the argument from explanatory exclusion as he has defined it.
See, for example, Kim (1990, p. 39).
See, for example, MacDonald C. and MacDonald G. (1995).
What of those such as Burge (1993) and Baker (1993) who would want to advocate a shift away from an understanding of causation as an objective relation, and toward a position that views causation as derived from explanation? Their response to the argument from causal overdetermination is that there is no problem of mental explanation, and as causation depends upon explanation, therefore there should be no problem of mental causation. Kim’s problem shows, however, that the problem of mental exclusion extends not only to causation, but also to explanation. However, Kim’s argument is based upon the assumption that ER is correct, and hence that explanation is grounded in terms of causation, which is precisely the claim that Burge et al. dispute.
For Kim’s detailed defence of ER, see Kim (1993, pp. 229–232).
For further defence of this point, see Lowe (1998, ch. 3).
Analogous considerations apply for the external account.
The following is concerned with properties at the level of types. Hence the term ‘property’ is to be interpreted as either a universal or, for example, a set of exactly resembling tropes.
See Heil and Robb (2003) for further support of this claim.
For further defence of this claim see Armstrong (1997, pp. 26–28).
See, for example, Armstrong (1997, pp. 50–52).
For further defence of this claim see Armstrong (1997, pp. 26–28).
On this point, it is important to distinguish my objection from a seemingly similar one raised by Marras (1998). Like me, Marras considers that, contra Kim: ‘Two singular causal statements may … be extensionally equivalent and yet fail to have the same explanatory content.’ (p. 443). However, this is the full extent of our agreement, for throughout his discussion he equates levels of description with levels of property-type. To give but a few examples of this error, Marras assumes that because Kim allows ‘the same individual event to be individuated by inequivalent descriptions…’ it follows that Kim must allow that ‘…a single individual event can token indefinitely many distinct event types’ (where ‘types’ here refer to property-types) (p. 447). Marras’ reason for thinking that a fine-grained event cannot have multiple descriptions is presumably because it only has one property. However, this only follows if one adopts a semantical account of properties. Similarly, whilst Marras would want to reject EE, he accepts that ‘There can be no more that a single complete and independent explanation of a given explanandum’, where an explanandum is ‘not an event simpliciter, but an event’s being of a certain kind…’ (p. 449). However, as the examples that I gave in the previous paragraph demonstrate, events that are type-identified may have multiple explanations. Once again, any suggestion that they may not will arise from mistakenly associating levels of description with levels of properties, which itself will be due to a belief that properties correspond to predicates.
See Achinstein (1984) for a discussion of this point.
See, for example, Putnam (1978).
The final version of this paper was completed with support from the Arts and Humanities Research Council’s Research Grant AH/F009615/1 ‘The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate’.
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Gibb, S.C. Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenn 71, 205–221 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9150-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9150-x