Abstract
The introduction of new varieties of goods increases welfare under certainty and perfect competition. However, when the quality of new goods is uncertain, the need for a regulatory regime on liabilities and hazards arises. We examine the optimality of the regulatory mechanisms of quality under ambiguity (non-uniqueness of the probability distribution). We develop a model showing that product liability does not lead to optimality under ambiguity and so it constitutes an inadequate instrument for controlling the potential damages caused by innovative products. The level of precaution will be larger, equal or less than the optimal level and will decrease with the degree of optimism and will increase with the degree of pessimism. Consequently the price will not reflect the actual product risk and consumers will buy either an insufficient or an excessive amount, according to the case. We present some considerations on the adequate institutional design, capturing the insights obtained in the comparison between regulatory regimes.
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Notes
The pros and cons of these different kinds of regulations have been widely debated in the literature. For further information see: Calabresi and Melamed (1972), Shavell (1984), Nichols and Zeckhauser (1986), Shavell (1987), Marino (1988), Arcuri (1999), Viscusi and Gayer (2002), Sunstein (2005), Kim (2006), Salvador-Coderch et al. (2009), Shavell and Polinsky (2010), Goldberg and Zipursky (2010), Polinsky and Shavell (2010), Daughety and Reinganum (2011), Miceli et al. (2012), Choi and Spier (2014).
The literature identifies two main kinds of informational settings. On one hand we find Knightian risk scenarios, in which the parties in a transaction know the probability distribution over the source of uncertainty (in our case, consumer damages). These contexts are often pervaded by asymmetric information problems. On the other hand, there are more complex scenarios, characterized by the so called Knight uncertainty (or its closely associated feature, the presence of ambiguity). In the latter case the probability distribution or even the magnitude of potential damages is unknown or not known with precision. In order to avoid the terminological problem of overloading the meaning of "uncertainty", Ellsberg (1961) introduced the term ambiguity to refer to the Knight’s notion. While risk scenarios have been thoroughly studied, uncertainty and ambiguity have been little considered, particularly in applications.
Products derived from nanotechnology, some transgenic foods and various developments and digital applications fall into this category.
Luppi and Parisi (2016) find also that optimism lead to suboptimal results under tort rules.
That is, for each \( \uppi_{\text{i}},\uppi_{\text{j}} \in {\bar{\text{P}}} \) there exists \( {\bar{\text{x}}} \) such that for \( {\text{x}} < {\bar{\text{x}}} \), \( \uppi_{\text{i}} ( {\text{x) >}}\uppi_{\text{j}} ( {{\bar{\text{x}})}} \) while for \( {\text{x}} \ge {\bar{\text{x}}} \), \( \uppi_{\text{i}} ( {\text{x)}} \le \uppi_{\text{j}} ( {\text{x)}} \). This indicates that πi on the left of πj (if it is on the right, the inequalities between the distributions are reversed).
Since \( \bar{\text{P}} \) is endowed with a linear order (due to the single-crossing property), which can be \( \bar{P} = \left[ {\pi_{min} ,\pi_{max} } \right]. \)denoted , we have, by a slight abuse of language that \( [ {\uppi_{\min} ,\uppi_{\max} }] \)
This type of representation is consistent with the weighted probability function of prospective theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
This denomination was introduced by Shavell (1987).
This is a direct consequence of Weierstrass theorem, which states that a continuous function in a closed and bounded interval (of real numbers) reaches its maximum and minimum values at points in the interval. The demonstration can be seen in the “Appendix”.
In this case, the marginal benefit from the expected reduction of losses is the sum of two components at play while the level of precaution increases: the reduction of the probability of damage and the reduction in the magnitude of damage.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proposition 4
\( V_{\pi } \left( x \right) \) is continuous and defined over a compact \( \left[ {0, \bar{x}} \right] \) and reaches a maximum in this interval.
The vertices of the graph of \( V_{\pi } \left( x \right) \) form a set of isolated points because the functions in \( \left( {\bar{\pi } \left( x \right), \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{\pi} \left( x \right)} \right) \) are continuous and decreasing and, because of the single-crossing property, intersect only at a finite number of points. Thus, in a neighborhood of a vertex there will not exist another vertex (by the continuity of the functions). The measure of a set of isolated points in the compact \( \left[ {0, \bar{x}} \right] \) is 0, which in our case implies that the probability of the optimum being at a vertex is null. In contrast, the generic case corresponds to the claim that, with probability 1, no vertex is an optimum. Thus, \( V\left( x \right) \) is regular and derivable except in a set of measure zero.
If \( x^{*} = argmax_{{\left[ {0,\bar{x}} \right]}} V\left( x \right) \) then
and therefore,
If \( \Delta x = x - x^{ *} \), \( \Delta \bar{\pi } = \bar{\pi } \left( x \right) - \bar{\pi } \left( {x^{ *} } \right) \) and \( \Delta \pi = \pi \left( x \right) - \pi \left( {x^{ *} } \right) \) expression (14) can be written as
Rearranging terms again,
And thus, if we denote \( \left[ \alpha {\Delta \bar{\pi }}/\Delta x+ \left( {1 - \alpha } \right){\Delta \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{\pi } }/{\Delta x} \right] = {\Delta \tilde{\pi }}/\Delta x \), we have that \( \Delta\tilde{\pi } \ge {\raise0.7ex\hbox{${ - 1}$} \!\mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{ - 1} l}}\right.\kern-0pt} \!\lower0.7ex\hbox{$l$}}\Delta x \) where \( {\raise0.7ex\hbox{${ - 1}$} \!\mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{ - 1} l}}\right.\kern-0pt} \!\lower0.7ex\hbox{$l$}} \) is the first-order approximation to the lower linear support of \( \tilde{\pi } \) at \( x^{ *} \).
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Castellano, A., Tohmé, F. & Chisari, O.O. Product liability under ambiguity. Eur J Law Econ 49, 473–487 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-020-09655-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-020-09655-5