Abstract
Fiscal decentralization, the decentralization of government expenditures to local governments, may enhance public sector efficiency. Vertical externalities, i.e. spillovers between local and central government, could however undo part of this advantage. In this paper we estimate spillovers from Social Assistance (SA), administered by municipalities, towards central government’s Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) scheme in The Netherlands. The latter scheme saw rapidly rising enrolment rates after financial responsibility for Social Assistance was transferred from central to local government. We find that the correlation between local SSDI enrolment and the local stock of SA benefits recipients has increased significantly in the years after decentralization. We show that an increased caseload shifting from Social Assistance to Disability Insurance is the only plausible explanation for this change. Our analysis shows that, following the decentralization of Social Assistance, at least one third of the SSDI inflow was diverted from SA. This caseload shifting increased more rapidly in municipalities experiencing deficits on their SA budgets than in municipalities running a surplus.
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Notes
The Dutch acronym for this scheme is wajong, which translates as ‘insurance for persons disabled at young age’. It is referred to as SSDI in this paper as it shares key features with the SSDI scheme in the US. In particular, it is funded by the central government; benefits can be claimed without employment history if one’s disability existed at young age; and qualifying conditions are broadly defined in terms of lack of ‘substantial gainful activity’, which include physical and mental conditions.
A similar issue appears to play in the US, where states have an incentive to redirect individuals towards the federally funded Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and SSDI programs, which may explain part of the rapid growth in these programs (see e.g. The Economist, March 12, 2011 pp. 48–49, and recently Liebman 2015). Most decompositions of the growth in these federal programs do not explicitly address this factor, for instance Duggan and Imberman (2009).
Other potential drawbacks of decentralization encountered in the literature are reduced economies of scale and/or scope; less competent government at local than at central level; and increased vulnerability to pressure from local interest groups.
Individual incentives for substituting SSI for AFDC were studied by Kubik (1999).
From 2009, a series of reforms to the SSDI scheme were announced that may have changed individuals’ incentives to claim SSDI. Hence, our study was limited to the period until 2008.
Errors are assumed to be normally distributed. As a robustness check, we did an estimation with residual kurtosis matched, t(5) distributed errors. This gave the same results.
The full set of reduced-form and structural-form estimates is available from the authors upon request.
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank Rob Alessie, Frits Bos, Wolter Hassink, Pierre Koning, Erzo Luttmer, Coen Teulings, Wouter Vermeulen, and Bas ter Weel for helpful discussions, and Peter Dekker and Sijmen Duineveld for research assistance. We also thank APE, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), and UWV for providing the data.
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Appendix: Consistent Estimation of the Model Parameters and Standard Errors
Appendix: Consistent Estimation of the Model Parameters and Standard Errors
The substitution model can be thought of as consisting of a structural form, Eqs. (1)–(3), and a reduced form, Eqs. (4)–(6). Consistent estimates of the structural form, which include the substitution parameters \(\lambda \) and \(\mu \), are obtained in two steps. In the first step, the reduced-form parameters \(\theta =\{\beta ,\gamma ,\Sigma \}\) of Eqs. (4)–(6) are estimated using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, where \(\Sigma \) represents the elements of the covariance matrix of the error terms.Footnote 7 This gives reduced-form estimates \({\hat{\theta }}\), and the Hessian of the negative log-likelihood at the maximum gives the (inverse) covariance matrix \({\hat{\varOmega }}^{-1}\) corresponding to \({\hat{\theta }}\). In the second step, the structural parameters \(\theta _0=\{\lambda ,\mu ;\beta _0,\gamma _0,\Sigma _0\}\) of Eqs. (1)–(3) are estimated using a Minimum Distance estimator.Footnote 8
For the second step we first express the reduced-form parameters in terms of the structural-form parameters. Writing out the covariance matrix of the error terms in the reduced-form model [Eqs. (4)–(6)] as:
and allowing for a similarly general covariance matrix \(\Sigma _0\) of the structural-form model [Eqs. (1)–(3)], we get the following set of equations (recall that \(\beta \) is the regression coefficient of the instrumental variable, and \(\lambda \) and \(\mu \) are the substitution parameters):
These equations form a set of restrictions on the parameters of the reduced-form model in terms of the parameters of the structural model; they follow directly from Eqs. (1)–(3). Denote this set of restrictions by \(\theta =g(\theta _0)\). A consistent estimate of the structural-form parameters \({\hat{\theta }}_0\) then obtains from minimizing the distance between the first-step estimate \({\hat{\theta }}\) and \(g(\theta _0)\), defined as:
where the metric tensor \({\hat{\varOmega }}^{-1}\) equals the inverse of the covariance matrix of \({\hat{\theta }}\) (see Chamberlain 1984). The corresponding covariance matrix of the structural-form parameters \({\hat{\theta }}_0\) is
where
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Roelofs, G., van Vuuren, D. The Decentralization of Social Assistance and the Rise of Disability Insurance Enrolment. De Economist 165, 1–21 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-017-9289-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-017-9289-4